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ABSTRACT 
 
Adam J. Engel: Between Two Worlds: The Functions of Liminal Space in  
Twentieth-Century Literature 
(Under the direction of Pamela Cooper) 
 
 "Between Two Worlds" examines strategies used by Joseph Conrad, E. M. Forster, 
Virginia Woolf, Thom Gunn, and David Lynch to craft spaces in which characters can articulate 
seemingly ineffable experiences. To give meaningful accounts of isolation at sea, World War I's 
impact on a family structure, the dissolution of an AIDS-riddled body, the spiritual dissonance 
produced by colonization, and the danger of ignoring materiality in favor of ideological 
nostalgia, these authors establish spaces in which characters can challenge their bodies' 
boundaries. The "liminal" or middle phase of the rite of passage, treated as a real or imagined 
setting, enables this by temporarily dissolving conventional social hierarchies. The author hopes 
to draw attention to the potentially therapeutic practice of communicating liminal experience 
through writing, especially as it manifests during crises unique to the twentieth-century. This 
study intervenes in both anthropology and ontology by revealing artists' use of liminal spaces to 
challenge hierarchies, reimagine connections between individuals, and return voices to people 
who have lost them. 
 Two central questions emerge: Why do in-between spaces enable extraordinary 
communication? What sort of self exists in a space that is, by definition, between identities? In a 
departure from contemporary modernists such as T. S. Eliot, Conrad, Woolf, and Forster face the 
unsettling possibility of the self's dissolving without a new form or afterlife to follow. Gunn and 
Lynch never expect such a world. Rather, they learn to embrace the transient world they inhabit. 
To cross the threshold into liminal space is to confront all of these possibilities, and to emerge—
if at all—with shifted bodily boundaries.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Joseph Conrad, E. M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, Thom Gunn, and David Lynch craft 
interstices in which their characters are able to articulate seemingly ineffable experiences. To 
give meaningful accounts of isolation at sea, World War I's impact on a family structure, the 
dissolution of an AIDS-riddled body, the spiritual dissonance produced by colonization, and the 
danger of ignoring materiality in favor of ideological nostalgia, these authors establish spaces in 
which characters can challenge their bodies' boundaries. The "liminal" or middle phase of the rite 
of passage, treated as a reified or imagined setting, enables this by temporarily dissolving 
conventional social hierarchies. This study intervenes in both anthropology and ontology by 
revealing artists' use of liminal spaces to challenge hierarchies, redraw subjective boundaries, 
and return voices to people who have lost them. 
 The theory of liminal space begins with the study of ritual. In The Rites of Passage 
(1960), Arnold van Gennep lays the foundation for the study of threshold ritual. Van Gennep, 
concerned with “ceremonial patterns which accompany a passage from one situation to another 
or from one cosmic or social world to another,” divides such rites into three subcategories: 
“preliminal rites (rites of separation), liminal rites (rites of transition), and postliminal rites (rites 
of incorporation)” (van Gennep 11). All of these rites may apply either to an individual or a 
social group—including an entire culture. For the individual, rites of separation involve a 
physical removal from the activities of daily life. Rites of transition involve time spent in a space 
apart from one’s society, often in the company of a mentor with whom the participant exchanges 
knowledge, objects, gazes, or more—van Gennep likens this exchange to a communion (31). 
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Rites of incorporation involve a reintegration into society with the knowledge needed to fulfill a 
particular role (typically in a hierarchy). In “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites 
de Passage” (1964), Victor Turner pushes van Gennep’s argument further by analyzing the 
second category, rites of transition. During the liminal phase of a rite of passage, participants are 
often rendered symbolically invisible, forbidden to interact with non-participants. They become 
“not yet classified” and are symbolized by their cultures as embryos or newborns (Turner 236). 
In this way, a participant loses any tie to his or her socialized self, at least temporarily. As beings 
invisible to their cultural structure, the participants are regarded as close to their conception of 
infinite power (perhaps a deity) (236). They are compensated for this isolation with complete 
equality to all other participants in the ritual. By the end of this phase, Turner claims, participants 
are supposed to have been imbued with gnosis, the “arcane knowledge” of their culture that will 
allow them to take their place among their peers (239). This passage through the ritualized 
threshold, whether part of a coming-of-age ritual or a graduation, is a point of no return. 
Participants have been permanently altered, either in their own eyes or in the eyes of their 
culture. After temporary dissolution, those who undergo threshold rituals return not to their old 
selves but to new ones—albeit embedded within the same society. 
 In “Whose Threshold? Women’s Strategies of Ritualization,” Jan Berry suggests that 
rituals can challenge dominant (often patriarchal) narratives by introducing new symbolic 
expressions into women’s lives. Berry gives the example of a woman who builds a dream-
catcher with her friends to celebrate the completion of her dissertation. Rather than settling for 
the typical graduation ceremony, a relic of a community characteristically exclusive of women, 
this woman chose to create her own transition ritual, one that is not sanctioned by social 
authority but instead challenges (or in this example, merely ignores) that authority (Berry 278-9). 
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Berry’s suggestion points to questions at the heart of my project: why do certain experiences 
warrant ritualized commemoration, and how do authors use ritual to approach these experiences 
in their art? Citing Heather Walton, Berry highlights the role of ritual in articulating difficult 
experiences: 
There are some stories that resist telling. Heather Walton argues that some stories cannot 
be told without domesticating the pain and the horror of the experience, and that new 
ways of speaking need to be found: 'What is needed is not narrative but poesis; images, 
symbols and metaphors that carry the pain of trauma without committing the blasphemy 
of trying to represent, comprehend or reconcile the horror in story form.' [. . .] This poses 
the question as to whether ritual comes into its own when words and stories are 
inadequate. [. . .] Perhaps there is an elusive element in ritualizing which takes us where 
storytelling alone cannot go. (Berry 287; Walton, “Speaking in Signs” in Berry) 
But what is this “elusive element” of ritual, and how can it take us farther than words? And what 
sort of experiences cannot be adequately approached by words? I wish to argue that Berry’s 
understanding of threshold ritual as more than a socially-sanctioned, temporary escape from 
hierarchy applies not only to women’s ritual, but potentially to any liminal experience, especially 
those secular rituals enacted in a text rather than a temple. 
 The precise meaning of the threshold or liminal phase in ritual has been a subject of 
recent debate. In the aforementioned "Whose Threshold?", Berry raises several feminist critiques 
of Victor Turner’s theory of liminality. Caroline Walker Bynum points out that Turner’s concept 
of the threshold is problematic for women and other marginalized groups, who often neither have 
the luxury of withdrawing from their society nor stand to improve their status by doing so: 
"liminality itself—as fully elaborated by Turner—may be less a universal moment of meaning 
needed by human beings as they move through social dramas than an escape for those who bear 
the burdens and reap the benefits of a high place in the social structure" (Bynum 34). Berry 
pursues Bynum’s logic to suggest that “women’s ritualizing of the liminal phase will look very 
differently from that of men” (Berry 276). Anthropologist Ronald Grimes broadens the scope of 
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this difference. After a year of passing around an egg-shaped sock darner with his students 
before and after each class, Grimes offers a final explanation of the activity: “It means whatever 
it has come to mean by the actions, feelings, and thoughts you have mobilized around it in this 
class” (Grimes 81). Grimes suggests that a ritual practiced by twenty people may be no less a 
ritual than one practiced by a nation, and that (as Berry reiterates) even critical, self-aware 
individuals may practice and create threshold rituals (Grimes 82; Berry 281). If we accept this, 
then the practitioners of many individual threshold rituals will seek to subvert van Gennep’s 
postliminal phase, avoid a return to normalcy, and replace this return with a representation of 
their struggle, or even a renegotiation of power relations (Berry 283). This project will use van 
Gennep’s and Turner’s model as a base, noting the significant ways in which rituals diverge from 
this model depending on the practitioner’s personal experience. 
Catherine Bell notes another objection to Turner’s threshold theory and assumptions on 
which it rests. For Turner, the liminal phase ends with a re-inscription of social norms 
(“reincorporation”), and so it is a neutralized container for conflict and critique. This assumes 
with Emile Durkheim that all ritual has the dualistic tendency to oppose, and then rejoin, various 
permutations of the thought/action binary (Bell 24). A temporary critique of social norms at a 
safe distance, followed by reintegration into one’s society, has little or no value when one is a 
marginalized member of that society. Thus, as Jan Berry argues, women’s threshold rituals are 
concerned not with an orderly questioning of and recommitment to social norms, but with a 
performance outside of those boundaries (Berry 278). Marginalized people harness the implicit 
power of liminality to resist interpellation. As Bell suggests with her critique, to enter liminal 
territory is not necessarily to be a consciousness divorced from a body. Rather, it is to abandon 
one’s conventional limits—conventional in the sense of conforming to an established, rational 
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collection of social rules and assumptions dictated by one's culture—and open oneself to radical 
transformation. 
In “From One Identity to Another,” Julia Kristeva describes an extrasemantic mode of 
communication that operates in asocial, liminal space outside the bounds within which the self 
typically operates. Kristeva argues for a conception of subjectivity she calls the “speaking 
subject,” the ego that becomes a distinct subject by uttering “I” (1164). This subject replaces the 
philological subject who stands apart from and witnesses history, thereby stabilizing it into a 
coherent narrative. Kristeva thinks through the potential modes of expression open to such a 
subject by arguing that “poetic language” reaches beyond Jacques Lacan’s Symbolic Order (the 
order that composes the subject according to the masculine Law of the Father, produced by the 
resolution of the Freudian Oedipus complex), destabilizing rather than reinforcing subjective 
boundaries and (as Butler suggests) multiplying the possibilities for how a subject can 
communicate (1167). To do so, poetic language must employ extra-semantic expression, 
including, for example, rhythm and intonation. Kristeva calls this mode of expression the 
“semiotic disposition” and compares its sounds—its voices—to engraved symbols, ones that 
allow for ambiguous, unstable meaning rather than the referential meanings of semantic 
discourse. This semiotic disposition contains the “chora,” taken from the Greek word meaning 
“receptacle,” a womb-like space for experiences that cannot be expressed through logical 
language (1167). The speaking subject, as a user of language, requires both the symbolic order 
and semiotic disposition to exist, but there are radical differences in the degree to which a subject 
uses these modes. To illustrate this, Kristeva compares scientific discourse, which privileges 
symbolic language—direct, clear language that attempts to be as stable in its meaning as 
possible—with poetic language, which does the opposite: it attempts to multiply possible 
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meanings, supporting the speaking subject in the absence of semantics with its rhythm, 
intonation, and other sonic functions (1167-8). If Kristeva is correct, then the semiotic 
disposition that is part of every subject also renders subjects vulnerable to dissolution when 
removed from conventional settings; subjects’ temporary or limited departures from socialized, 
rational communication are departures from ego. This makes the semiotic disposition, and the 
liminal spaces that allow it, seem threatening to subjects who approach them. Perhaps they are—
but to brave this danger often results in self-knowledge and transformation. 
In “On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy,” Judith Butler carries Kristeva's observations 
forward by suggesting that prevailing concepts of the bounded individual are outdated. Butler 
calls for the reimagining of the idea of the human by introducing a concept of “ethical 
enmeshment.” She argues that all embodied subjects are dependent on each other, both in the 
material sense, for protection and basic bodily needs, and in the subjective sense, for recognition 
(25). Butler begins her discussion by asking what makes a life worth living, or more specifically, 
what makes a life “grievable.” For one’s life to be so, one must be considered human, and so 
Butler’s discussion of enmeshed subjectivity, her attempt to reimagine our interconnectedness, 
has high stakes. She claims that the way to widen the scope of human rights is not to create an 
all-encompassing definition of the human, but to leave that definition open in acknowledgement 
of its fluidity: 
We might try to claim that we must first know the fundamentals of the human in order to 
preserve and promote human life as we know it. But what if the very categories of the 
human have excluded those who should be described and sheltered within its terms? 
What if those who ought to belong to the human do not operate within the modes of 
reasoning and justifying validity claims that have been proffered by western forms of 
rationalism? Have we ever yet known the human? And what might it take to approach 
that knowing? (Butler 36) 
Butler acknowledges that people, especially members of oppressed minorities, must wield a 
unified concept of themselves in order to be politically effective, able to secure rights and 
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protections from their society (28). However, this is not the only way to understand subjectivity, 
but just a “legal” way, a useful and necessary fiction (20). Each individual’s subjectivity is not 
actually self-contained in this way but dependent on others’ recognition and protection. Those 
who are excluded from this recognition of subjectivity because they fall outside sexual and 
gender norms are left with diminished humanity, unable to partake in enmeshed subjectivity. If 
this is true, rather than working toward establishing new, concrete norms for sexuality and 
gender, we must expand future possibilities for norms. 
 Though writing at disparate times, the authors I discuss are all modernists linked by a 
concern for consciousness and the boundaries of subjectivity. In A Geneaology of Modernism, 
Michael Levenson argues that Joseph Conrad considers "the 'subtlety' of human consciousness" 
to be "the source of meaning and artistic 'justice'; against the evanescent flux of the phenomenal 
world, it provides permanence, pattern and significance" (2). I will assume with Levenson that 
this curiosity about the nature of individuality, and literary experimentation with "evanescent" or 
temporary subjectivity, is a cornerstone of the modernist movement that began in the early 
twentieth-century. The publication of modernist monoliths such as James Joyce's Ulysses and T. 
S. Eliot's The Waste Land in 1922 are a high-water mark for modernism, but its themes persist 
into the 1980s and 90s, alongside postmodernism. Conrad, Forster, Woolf, Gunn, and Lynch, 
though bridging the twentieth century, display a similar modernist proclivity to experiment with 
expansion of the self and with the communication it enables. All suggest a shared material 
foundation of subjectivity: the non-hierarchical, underlying self which Georges Bataille 
considers base (Visions 31). And, in all of the texts I discuss, this base element is prone to arise 
at any moment: in the texts of Conrad and Lynch, the base is the menacing, vital-seeming forest; 
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in the texts of Woolf and Lynch, it is food's force upon the body; and in the texts of Gunn and 
Forster it is the bodily relationship that persists beyond national borders and even after death. 
 My approaches to these artists' texts raise questions that persist throughout the study: why 
do in-between spaces enable extraordinary communication? What sort of self exists in a space 
that is, by definition, between identities? In chapter two, I demonstrate Conrad’s preliminary 
answer to both questions: a base self exists in liminal space, indistinguishable from the forest or 
sea surrounding it and so able to acquire and express dangerous knowledge, if only temporarily. 
In chapters three and four, Woolf, Lynch, and Gunn address the latter question by experimenting 
with representations of bodies in liminal settings. Lynch, though he works later than the other 
authors and in the medium of television, is the among the most relevant contemporary examples 
of an artist placing characters within liminal space to enhance their expressive capabilities. He 
uses doppelgängers to explore liminal thresholds in a modernist mode that echoes Conrad's 
exploration of subjectivity through doubling in "The Secret Sharer" and Heart of Darkness. 
Lynch's doppelgängers survive on repulsive food, and this food disrupts the small community of 
Twin Peaks in the same way that Mrs. Ramsay's food unites her family and friends. In chapter 
five, I claim that Forster addresses both questions at once by placing characters haunted by their 
relationship’s colonial power dynamics on a literal collision course. Each of these authors 
experiments with the crossing of threshold spaces into new subjective territories. 
Chapter two analyzes Joseph Conrad's use of ritual form in Heart of Darkness (1899) and 
"The Secret Sharer" (1910). Conrad reveals the dangerous, tempting knowledge communicable 
only in liminal settings. His works are marked by darkly comic moments of absurdity, including 
a dead scorpion in an inkwell and canons fired wantonly into a continent. William Freedman 
argues that the "foggy spots" in Conrad, moments that language is powerless to articulate, do 
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more than outline the contours of what can't be known. They also express Conrad's ambivalence 
about the truths to which knowledge refers: should they be known? Are they dangerous? Should 
we turn back? I argue that Conrad draws the supposed contours of language's limit and invites 
readers to glimpse truths beyond that threshold. Conrad's narrators are able to approach these 
truths only by proxy; in both Heart of Darkness and "The Secret Sharer," their doppelgängers 
must take the final steps. Conrad allows his narrators to approach the truth found at the end of 
rites of passage, and to contain it (imperfectly) within language. 
 My third chapter focuses on the ritualized tedium of shared meals and dinner parties, 
beginning with Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse (1927) and moving to David Lynch's Twin 
Peaks (1990-1), a television series that owes much to Woolf's treatment of the liminal dinner and 
uses it to warn against idealistic nostalgia. Mrs. Ramsay's dinner in Woolf's To the Lighthouse 
will act as centerpiece for a spread of instances in which troubled relationships and repulsive 
materiality erupt into the dining space. Conventional hierarchies are not replaced, as in Conrad, 
but thrown into sharp relief: tensions and forces burst through ritual's placid surface. After 
discussing To the Lighthouse, I will trace the ritualization of the tedious meal through scenes 
from Lynch's Twin Peaks. Both Woolf's Mrs. Ramsay and Lynch's Laura Palmer drive their 
narratives before and after their absence. Each narrative becomes a series of these women's 
traces, and their agencies persist after they become lifeless material. Dale Cooper and Donna 
Hayward discover that this path of traces leads not to cathartic knowledge, but to ubiquitous 
forces that can only be encountered, never contained. 
 In Thom Gunn’s The Man with Night Sweats (1992), the focus of my fourth chapter, each 
sexual act is brush with death, an opportunity poised between the greatest possible intimacy and 
the greatest possible loss. Gunn creates liminal dreamscapes in his poetry to contain fragments of 
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his deceased friends' subjectivity. By doing so, he expands his own sense of self, and his poems 
present narrators that envelop and protect the characters they remember. For Gunn, liminal 
settings such as dream allow cathartic contact between bodies that would no longer be possible 
in conventional space. This is not a promise of transcendence after death, as earlier modernists 
like T. S. Eliot seek, but a method for embracing the fluidity of the self despite the vulnerability 
it entails. 
 My final chapter explores the transformative potential of ritualized sound in Forster's A 
Passage to India (1924). Forster dwells on the liminal Marabar caves, marking them as ancient 
and hollow, empty of semantic meaning in a way that renders human activity invisible and 
irrelevant. The sign that the novel's English tourists have crossed the threshold past which history 
loses its meaning is a persistent echo, "boum," that renders speech impossible. When language, 
one of humanity’s oldest institutions, loses meaning in these ancient caves, nothing remains to 
enforce ideological and national divisions, though friendship is still a challenge. Forster uses 
ritualized repetition in liminal settings to break down language, and without its influence, the 
rational hierarchies established by colonial power become unstable. Though this does not ensure 
successful connection between colonizer and colonized, it does allow for these selves to collide 
in potentially transformative ways. 
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CHAPTER 2: APPROACHING THE EVENT HORIZON IN JOSEPH CONRAD’S “THE 
SECRET SHARER” AND HEART OF DARKNESS 
“[F]or academic men to be happy, the universe would have to take shape. All of philosophy has 
no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock coat to what is, a mathematical frock coat.” 
—Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess 
Joseph Conrad’s works are distinguished by their moments of absurdity, at times 
humorous, often dark: a scorpion in an inkwell, guns fired wantonly into a continent, and a 
hurricane successfully yet mysteriously traversed are a few examples. William Freedman argues 
that the "foggy spots" in Conrad, moments or phenomena that language is powerless to 
articulate, do more than outline the contours of what can't be known. They also express Conrad's 
ambivalence about the truths to which knowledge refers: should they be known? Are they 
threatening or dangerous? Should we turn back? This chapter explores the other side of the coin: 
does Conrad not only draw the supposed contours of language's limit, but also invite us to 
glimpse truths beyond that threshold? If an encounter with points of hidden truth generates what 
Victor Turner calls "gnosis," arcane knowledge granted during rites of passage, then these foggy 
spots not only threaten Conrad's characters, but also tempt them toward transformative 
experience. Conrad's narrators are undoubtedly fearful of these foggy spots. But coexisting with 
that fear is the desire to know truths that are inaccessible to rational understanding, and perhaps a 
linguistic means of realizing—if ephemerally—this desire. By imposing a ritual form onto his 
stories and setting them within what Turner calls "liminal space," Conrad allows his narrators to 
approach gnosis and to contain it (imperfectly) within their stories—within language. Following 
Arnold Van Gennep, Turner outlines the form of transitional rites, a pattern familiar to readers of 
Conrad: 
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The first phase of separation comprises symbolic behavior signifying the detachment of 
the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure or a set of 
cultural conditions (a "state"); during the intervening liminal period, the state of the ritual 
subject (the "passenger") is ambiguous; he passes through a realm that has few or none of 
the attributes of the past or coming state; in the third phase the passage is consummated. 
The ritual subject, individual or corporate, is in a stable state once more. ("Betwixt" 47) 
"Liminal entities," including space and its occupants, are "betwixt and between the positions 
assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial [sic]" (Ritual 95). Before 
returning from this space, participants are imbued with gnosis, the “arcane knowledge” that will 
allow them to take their place among their peers (Turner 239). The initiate-captain’s urge to 
approach the dark land mass Koh-ring in "The Secret Sharer," and his mix of apprehension and 
ecstasy while doing so, becomes understandable in this context: it is a ritual movement through 
liminal space and toward a horizon both feared and craved. 
 What are the dark horizons that manifest as the line of shrunken heads outside Kurtz's 
house, the black hole of Koh-ring, and the seams between earth, sea, and sky which partition 
Conrad’s ocean? These boundaries mark the threshold beyond which the traveler utterly loses 
her sense of conventional, embodied subjectivity: the severed heads mock the embodied Marlow 
by leering from their posts, Koh-ring is an all-encompassing mass of darkness, and the boundary 
between the shore and the Bay of Siam is “a perfect and unmarked closeness” with no defining 
features (Conrad 17). Even the line of fishing stakes that the captain glimpses as he enters the 
Bay are “mysterious” and “incomprehensible,” losing their directional function in the ocean’s 
vastness. In Heart of Darkness, as in “The Secret Sharer,” a line of stakes—this time topped by 
shrunken heads—becomes an anti-sign, a warning that orientation is impossible. These 
thresholds force Conrad's narrators to submerge their subjectivity within ephemeral and 
terrifying liminal space. They are places of panic, but also of liberation: the subject who enters 
liminal space becomes a force free of any particular social hierarchy. This dissolution shares the 
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generative quality of ritual passage as described by Turner: it is ecstatic in the Greek sense (ek-
stasis), a chance for the subject temporarily to step outside herself, and therein lies its temptation. 
By approaching the threshold beyond which they'd fully abandon their subjectivity, these 
characters are able to glimpse the ineffable. Conrad's horizons, the lines that serve as boundaries 
of "impenetrable darkness," are event horizons: the relationship between a subject and its 
socially constructed, rationally defined roles dissolves as the subject approaches them; beyond 
them, subjects cannot remain intact. At the threshold of this disorienting space, the captain is 
able to glimpse the truth he needs to assume his new authority as captain, and at such a threshold 
Marlow is able fleetingly to commune with Kurtz. 
Ritual is often mimetic, a reenactment, like a dream that manifests anxiety. But unlike 
that repetition, in which the dreamer futilely attempts to avoid a predetermined outcome, ritual 
can be efficacious: repeatedly, ritual’s participants symbolically reaffirm their solidarity with 
their community (Durkheim 264). For Bataille, ritual's objects are more than symbolic: they are 
an embodiment of the repulsive, unknowable, irrational aspect of the sacred. The liminal self 
could be understood as this repulsive, irrational aspect. Like the Freudian unconscious, it bubbles 
up from beneath the surface established by repression. In Heart of Darkness, Kurtz's voice rises 
from a dying body to haunt Marlow until he shares its horrible vision. In "The Secret Sharer," 
Leggatt's emergence from the sea is an irruption of the irrational into the narrator’s blossoming 
conventional role as ship’s captain. This irrational repetition of the captain, however, does not 
simply return to the depths without leaving a trace; nor does its appearance provide a therapeutic 
opportunity for the captain to confront his hidden desires. Instead, I argue that doppelgängers in 
both Heart of Darkness and "The Secret Sharer" help the narrators navigate liminal space. 
Marlow and the captain glean traces of knowledge left by doubles who have crossed an event 
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horizon; only through such proxies can Conrad's subjects encounter truth without irretrievably 
losing themselves. Doppelgängers are elements in liminal rituals that Conrad superimposes onto 
his narrators' drama (and which they, in turn, impose on their mystified crews); Kurtz and 
Leggatt, intentionally or not, enable the narrators to complete and return from their rituals. How 
are we to understand this ineffable truth that manifests in Conrad's work to fascinate and terrify 
his narrators? I will explore Conrad’s representations of knowledge-resistant phenomena through 
the lens of a particular tendency in modern German and French metaphysics. 
A Brief History of Nothing 
Sapere aude! declares Immanuel Kant in 1784, using the words of Horace to set the tone 
of the European Enlightenment. The ultimate tool for gaining knowledge, for Kant, is man’s 
rational faculty. By exercising reason, we can access not only phenomena, things as they appear 
to us, but also noumena, the essence of things, or things as they really are. Kant recognizes that 
there are sublime objects that overwhelm our senses either through their massive size 
(“mathematical sublime”) or through their force against our will (“dynamic sublime”). But even 
these objects are subject to reason. A giant redwood, for example, is not after all the object of 
mathematical sublimity, but instead the concept of absolute totality which it evokes is sublime—
a rational concept. Similarly, a deadly hurricane is not actually the object of dynamic sublimity; 
the sublime is the rational concept of absolute freedom attendant on the storm. The feeling of 
sublimity is therefore a “rapid alternation” between our fear of being overwhelmed, and the 
rational knowledge of absolutes that overwhelm the overwhelming. For Kant, even what seems 
to be unrepresentable and formless still ultimately falls within reason’s domain. To know, 
therefore, we must always use reason. 
This mission to acquire knowledge via reason has undergone a variety of critiques in the 
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. The most influential of these challenges all 
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suggest alternative modes of knowing and thus the possibility of non-rational representation. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy, writes of Dionysian ecstasy as a state opposed to 
the “beautiful semblance” of Appoline “measure” (128). “Measure” is Nietzsche’s musical 
metaphor for limitation: as a measure of music circumscribes a rhythmic unit of notes, so the 
artist circumscribes his artifice, and so dreams show us a contained, aesthetic vision 
(“semblance”) of our experiences. Nietzsche regards the Apolline impulse as tending toward 
rational civilization in much the same way that the later Jacques Lacan describes a repressive 
“symbolic order” of logic and language into which subjects are socialized (1167). The 
disciplinarian undertone of these theories is appropriate when we remember the musician’s slang 
for measure: “bar,” an enforcer, a warden. The Appoline’s contrary is the Dionysian impulse, a 
drive toward the dissolution of individuality that accompanies intoxication. This impulse is most 
recognizable in musical sound, that which expresses meaning beyond the measurable. Nietzsche 
describes the penetration of the Dionysian impulse into Apollonian measure of ancient Greek art 
as a bending, not breaking, of bars: 
It was into a world built up and artificially protected like this [Greek “Appoline” culture] 
that the ecstatic tones of the festival of Dionysos now penetrated, tones in which all the 
excess of pleasure and suffering and knowledge in nature revealed itself at one and the 
same time. [. . .] [I]n the self-oblivion of the Dionysiac states the individual with all his 
limits and measures sank out of sight[.] (128-9) 
The “excess” of formless, unlimited collectivity—though a deeper truth than Appoline 
semblance—must be contained and harnessed to service an elevated “will,” human motivation 
which finally manifests in Greece as tragic theater, and in modernity as music like Wagner’s 
opera, which romanticized the heroic folklore of Germanic nations and was later appropriated by 
Nazism. Despite Nietzsche’s passionate advocacy for intoxication, his goal still aligns with 
Kant’s: sapere aude. For Nietzsche, what we dare to know includes an acceptance and 
containment of the irrational, not an unadulterated encounter with it. Though valuable, such 
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experience is hierarchically lower than reason, and worthless or even dangerous without reason’s 
intervention. 
 Although there are many interventions between them, Martin Heidegger offers the most 
relevant continuation of Nietzsche's challenge to the supremacy of reason; like Nietzsche, he 
acknowledges the utility of encountering the irrational, but he departs from Nietzsche in 
affirming a total immersion in "nothingness," a liminal mode that lacks reason's mediating 
presence. Heidegger claims that the myriad of modern scientific disciplines, in their striving to 
know their specific corners of the world, miss the forest for the trees, with one caveat: there is no 
forest (94). The modern sciences refuse to attend to nothingness, since they consider nothingness 
merely the opposite of being (96). For Heidegger, nothingness is “the complete negation of the 
totality of beings” (98). It cannot be grasped intellectually, and thus it is more primitive than 
negation itself (which is an intellectual act). We may encounter nothingness during the mood of 
anxiety, a negative ecstasy in which identity dissolves: “We cannot say what it is before which 
one feels ill at ease [unheimlich]. As a whole it is so for one. All things and we ourselves sink 
into indifference” (101).1 But what is the benefit of encountering nothing?  Such authentic 
encounters, claims Heidegger, lead to an elevation of dasein, our specific, historical way of 
being-in-the-world (109). Not only does this attempted elevation of our dasein by bringing 
ourselves to meet nothingness create an affinity (however tenuous) between Heidegger and 
fascism, but it also implies something to be elevated above. It is therefore essential for us to 
encounter the nothing, but only in service to an idealized end. 
 Drawing on these forerunners, Georges Bataille and his radical revision of materialism 
provide a way into Conrad’s “foggy spots,” since base material serves as both a grounding and 
deeply unsettling substance for the non-conventional subjects who explore these ritualized 
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liminal spaces. In “The Big Toe,” Georges Bataille distinguishes between two kinds of 
seductiveness—of elegant form, and of absolute baseness—and our ability to know or not to 
know a phenomenon with our intellect. To know a thing’s form is to grasp it with the intellect; 
the formless, which Bataille equates to base material, cannot be so grasped. The formless (base) 
cannot be “frocked” by the intellect but also makes no pretense to elevating us via our 
knowledge of it (Visions 31). This is an historic break with past metaphysics, one that influences 
future philosophers, including feminists such as Julia Kristeva, who affirm a non-intellectual, 
arational mode of experience as an end in itself, not a means to an idealized end. Kant’s “sapere 
aude” is turned on its head by Bataille and, I hope to show, by Conrad: dare not to know, or 
perhaps more appropriately, dare to encounter the unknowable in all its baseness, without 
taming, containing, or elevating it. It is this uncomfortable or dangerous encounter to which 
Bataille refers in “The Big Toe”’s closing comment: “A return to reality does not imply any new 
acceptances, but means that one is seduced in a base manner, without transpositions and to the 
point of screaming, opening his eyes wide: opening them wide, then, before a big toe” (23). As 
we will see, the matter-of-factness with which the base big toe falls at the end of this piece 
mirrors the baseness of Koh-ring at the end of Conrad’s “Secret Sharer.” 
Although the German philosophers I’ve mentioned so far challenge the Enlightenment 
privileging of reason, they stop short of transcending the dualistic mode so typical of Western 
thought. Nietzsche’s theory of the Appoline/Dionysian binary is dualistic: the elevated, Appoline 
mind opposes the lowly Dionysian body. Heidegger tries to go beyond dualism by articulating a 
“nothing” that is more primitive than rational activity, but he fails, since his desired elevation of 
dasein implies dualism: again, the low becomes the high. By refusing to apologize for the base, 
Georges Bataille succeeds where Heidegger fails, collapsing the high/low distinction by 
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introducing base material as a third term (Noys 502). Bataille does not insist that humanity holds 
a privileged place in the world, and instead he chooses to dwell with the base, the space and 
matter that Conrad represents as primitive. Base materialism raises a question that art, rather than 
philosophy, can answer: how are we to conceive of a self underwritten by (or fully composed of) 
base material? It is in this mode of inexcusable, irredeemable baseness that Conrad portrays the 
self that arises during liminal ritual. Baseness consumes and transforms Conrad’s characters and, 
like Bataille, Conrad acknowledges—but ultimately rejects as fiction—the ontological hierarchy 
that would denigrate the base. Baseness is irredeemable because it has no need of redemption. 
Liminal Golems 
I have claimed that Conrad places his characters within ritual structures to allow them to 
approach truths that would otherwise be inaccessible to language, especially encounters with the 
base. These truths are the most difficult elements of Conrad to write about: like base material, it 
is their nature to elude expression. One is left to describe Conrad's approach to truth—his way of 
knowing—much like he describes his protagonists' approaches: by tracing the approach's form, 
describing the process of gaining knowledge rather than that knowledge's referent. In "The 
Secret Sharer," for instance, Conrad gives the reader minute detail about the ship's approach to 
Koh-ring, a manifestation of base truth, but the landmass remains a black hole in the narrative (as 
I will discuss shortly). Conrad begins to elucidate the relationship between truth and knowledge 
in his Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus: "[A]rt itself may be defined as a single-minded 
attempt to render the highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to light the truth, 
manifold and one, underlying its every aspect" ("Preface"). Conrad's emphasis on "justice" and 
"justification" signals that art justifies itself by approaching the "truth, manifold and one," 
underlying the universe's every individual aspect. Hence, the "unrestful episode in the obscure 
lives of a few individuals" that constitutes the Narcissus must also be presented by the artist; if 
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it's an approach to truth, it's justified. The artist often fails this approach to some degree: "[a]rt is 
long and life is short, and success is very far off. And thus, doubtful of strength to travel so far, 
we talk a little about the aim—the aim of art, which, like life itself, is inspiring, difficult—
obscured by mists." As Conrad suggests above, the "aim of art" is universally to communicate 
truths lived by individuals. This aim is "obscured by mists" when knowledge cannot reach the 
"clear logic of a triumphant conclusion" or arrive empirically at "one of those heartless secrets 
which are called the Laws of Nature"; knowledge cannot fully access truth. Marlow's narration of 
the never-quite-complete approach to Kurtz in Heart of Darkness and the Captain's thoughts 
during his ship's near-collision with Koh-ring in "The Secret Sharer" are particularly revealing 
failures to render truth communicable by language and thus knowable. Both Kurtz's bodiless 
voice and the black silhouette of Koh-ring are manifestations of base material, an ontological 
truth opaque to conventional subjects. 
 These obscured, dangerous, yet tempting truths are what William Freedman calls "foggy 
spots" in Conrad's narratives. Freedman outlines various critical interpretations of Conrad’s 
relationship to knowledge and its occlusion. A “minority” of critics hold that Conrad believed 
language could make readers “see” (H. M. Deleski’s appropriation of Marlow’s word) a 
communal truth behind the semblance of reality; in other words, language grants access to a 
universally intelligible, knowable truth (Freedman 13). Proponents of what Freedman calls the 
“more common” view, including Ted Billy, suggest that though truth may exist in Conrad's 
world, language is an “ensnaring illusion” that can never articulate it (13). It is evident in 
Conrad's work, however, that language strives to articulate truth, whatever form it may take. 
Edward Said locates Conrad's logic in the malleability of truth: "if Conrad can show that all 
human activity depends on controlling a radically unstable reality to which words approximate 
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only by will or convention, the same is true of empire, of venerating the idea, and so forth. With 
Conrad, then, we are in a world being made and unmade more or less all the time" (Said 30). In 
support of Said, Freedman notes in Conrad “a sustained effort to make words tell, even as it is 
frequently evident that words are ultimately inadequate, so special and eccentric is the 
experience” (Freedman 13). "To make words tell" can mean to make words express truth, but it 
can also mean to force words to generate truth. Perhaps Conradian truth must be wrung from a 
struggle with language, rather than discovered.  
Between this malleable truth and its articulation, J. Hillis Miller and Royal Roussel 
situate “an ominous darkness, amorphous and opaque, the primal chaos out of which the world 
was formed and to which it rushes, annihilatingly, to return [. . .] an image of matter stripped of 
all attributes but existence. It is, but nothing more can be said about it” (Roussel in Freedman 
13). If, for Conrad, intelligible truth is created through struggles to control and even apprehend 
language, then this darkness is the source of all epistemological difficulty. The language these 
critics use to describe Conradian darkness implies both extreme excess and extreme simplicity: 
the darkness is “ominous,” “amorphous,” greater than the world and capable of annihilating it, 
and yet it is “stripped” naked, refined to its foundation. In its refusal to be contained in any 
hierarchy produced by linguistic or intellectual forces, the darkness corresponds with Bataille's 
base material. Bataille uses body parts to exemplify the base, especially the big toe, which is the 
dirty foundation upon which being (and thus hierarchy) depends, yet pretends not to. Conrad 
similarly treats parts of bodies as dirty materials that both enable and defy hierarchy, as I will 
show. For Conrad, these body parts tend to mark the thresholds past which control of language—
even a voice—offers no guarantee of stable truth. These thresholds both attract and repel 
Conrad's characters; they tempt with knowledge that can only be gained through an encounter 
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with baseness. Freedman compares Conrad’s ambivalence toward the unveiling of truth to a 
“dance [. . .] an alternating attraction and revulsion, eagerness and failure of will that urge him 
toward and then away from what he anticipates or glimpses” (12). This is the same contradictory 
reaction that Julia Kristeva attributes to the “abject,” which “beseeches, worries and fascinates 
desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns aside; 
sickened, it rejects” (1). The knowledge of hidden truths—truths which manifest in Conrad as 
base material—possesses these abject characteristics. It entices characters, as gnosis motivates 
the participants of liminal rituals, yet renders itself inaccessible to language. Rather than viewing 
Roussel’s “darkness” as an autonomous obstacle to expression, I view it as the base material 
ground in which truth finally rests, a foundation Conrad's characters attempt not to overcome but 
to encounter at face value. 
Like Freedman, Ella Ophir has recently shed light on Conrad's treatment of truth and 
knowledge. In Heart of Darkness and Conrad's other novels of that period, Ophir locates a 
nineteenth-century notion of "sincerity," the most essential feature of which is “articulate 
expression that is congruent with actual feeling” (342). Conrad affirms sincerity in the Preface to 
the Narcissus, when he calls for art both to approximate the artist's lived experience (his "truth") 
and to temporarily awaken the reader to the forces, "the stress and passion," which compose that 
experience: "[t]he [creative] task approached in tenderness and faith is to hold up 
unquestioningly, without choice and without fear, the rescued fragment before all eyes in the 
light of a sincere mood. It is to show its vibration, its colour, its form; and through its movement, 
its form, and its colour, reveal the substance of its truth—disclose its inspiring secret: the stress 
and passion within the core of each convincing moment" ("Preface"). Over the course of 
Conrad's literary career, claims Ophir, his concept of sincerity lost its moral and social value; 
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what remained was the revelation sincerity entails: self-knowledge and its articulation. Lacking 
its Victorian moral and social connotations, the self that is known in this gesture need not be 
virtuous or beautiful. On the contrary, the selves Conrad reveals are often ugly, detestable—base. 
The famous “horror!” of Kurtz’s self-knowledge throws into sharp relief the other horrible selves 
throughout the text, including Marlow, who has also participated in Kurtz’s horror. In this 
instance and others, I suggest that Conrad’s sincerity is not diminished, but refined: free of moral 
concerns determined by external, hierarchically social forces, the self as it exists when divorced 
from convention—a hidden, base truth—reveals itself. This is the “defrocked” self, the 
amorphous base material upon which all form depends. An encounter with the base is ephemeral, 
as is any revelation brought about by art. Conrad refers to the instant of revelation as the 
"moment of courage," the "convincing moment," and most tellingly the "moment of vision" 
during which the artist and his reader briefly find "solidarity" through sensuous, not intellectual, 
identification. The artist's appeal "must be an impression conveyed through the senses [. . .] 
because temperament, whether individual or collective, is not amenable to [rational] persuasion" 
("Preface"). Conrad's moments of vision, at their most sincere and least conventional, are 
insights into what Freedman calls "spots of unknowing," moments or phenomena that attract and 
repulse by their resistance to rational language. The remainder of this chapter will expand on 
Freedman’s and Ophir’s arguments, using Turner and Bataille especially to further understand 
the nature of Conrad’s spots of unknowing and his strategy for communicating encounters with 
such “spots” to others. This strategy involves the ritualization of narrative, and the treatment of 
the protagonist as a primary participant. 
In both "The Secret Sharer" and Heart of Darkness, a subject that has been temporarily 
ripped from his conventional role participates in a liminal passage, but only the protagonist's 
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doppelgänger completes those passages, generating a profound yet necessarily incomplete 
glimpse of truth for the protagonist and reader. The nature of this temporary doppelgänger-
subject, for Conrad, reflects the element—earth, sea, or a combination of the two—that most 
characterizes the narrative’s setting. Conrad’s earth and sea are more than landscapes, however; 
they are excessive, powerful forces in his universe, and Conrad’s doppelgängers, like golems, 
seem to derive their substance from the most primal matter. The emergence and withdrawal of 
these doppelgängers has the character of birthing: sucking mud and bioluminescence. This is the 
base material from which the rational, social world emerges and to which it must return in the 
end. In Conrad, reason's domination is always ephemeral, though it is not simply replaced by 
liberating sensuality or intuition. The massive, empty, hungry forest of the Congo and the 
devouring maw of Koh-ring represent the limit of reason, which are both threats and potential 
sites of transformation. 
 Conrad converts his narrative to a rite of passage by reimagining the self as base material, 
represented by the sea in “The Secret Sharer” and by the earth in Heart of Darkness. Their 
doppelgängers arise from the narrative's basest substance, its shit—or, the narrators descend into 
it. Each narrator experiences this descent not just vicariously through his double, but as if his 
double was his own base reality, the repulsive matter supporting their conventional, rational 
subjectivity. This temporary state in Conrad's narrative serves the same function as Van 
Gennep's rite of passage: to facilitate transformation from a childish identity to a role of wisdom 
and authority. For Conrad, however, the gnosis understood outside a rational, conventional 
context does not necessarily remain with the narrator after the double disappeared and left its 
trace: after the reassertion of the conventional self over the base-material self, the experience of 
gnosis is no longer accessible. And, Conrad seems to suggest, perhaps this is often for the best. 
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Knowledge can be dangerous: hence, his narrators approach it by proxy, willfully participating in 
a ritual that allows them temporarily to approach gnosis before turning back to the illusion of 
civilization. This approach must be a voyage. It is a physical movement away from the forces 
determining conventional social hierarchy, through the base avatar that manifests where traces of 
gnosis have been left, and then back to safe harbor. For Conrad, transportation is transformation. 
Geoffrey Harpham notes that Conrad’s ocean, like Freedman's attractive yet repulsive 
knowledge, is at some times a reflective surface, but at others an occlusive space. The ocean is 
an unrestricted field of exploration in which to explore self-doubt and erotic desire, but also one 
that must be traversed within a bounded, claustrophobic vessel (83-4). This vessel can never 
reach a resting place in this free space. It must approach a threshold, the boundary beyond which 
rational knowledge is impossible, and turn back. Early in “The Secret Sharer,” Conrad ridicules 
the notion that we can know everything about our personal narratives: he does so through the 
person of the first mate, who 
"liked to account to himself" for practically everything that came in his way, down to a 
miserable scorpion he had found in his cabin a week before. The why and the wherefore 
of that scorpion—how it got on board and came to select his room rather than the pantry 
(which was a dark place and more what a scorpion would be partial to), and how on earth 
it managed to drown itself in the inkwell of his writing desk—had exercised him 
infinitely. (19-20) 
 This sailor's effort is fruitless, and Conrad emphasizes his folly: the task "had exercised him 
infinitely” (19). The scorpion, a creature partial to "dark" or occluded places, abandons its habitat 
to make a disturbing appearance before sinking again into the "inkwell," a blackness similar to 
that from whence it came. This image, though seemingly a minor detail, is perhaps one of the 
most direct manifestations of Roussel’s “ominous, amorphous” Conradian darkness that retreats 
as quickly as it advances, repels with its ugliness but seduces with its mysterious promise of a 
basic truth. In typical Conradian fashion, this event is terrible, yet strangely comic: the scorpion's 
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invasion of the mate's quarters, though dangerous, is hilarious in its absurdity—much like the 
mate's philosophy of "accounting." Accounting implies inscription, made possible by ink; the 
scorpion merges with the vehicle of language, the mate’s primary tool, as if to suggest that 
language is inseparable from arational forces. He exercises this tool by discoursing, as the 
narrator makes clear: “His dominant trait was to take all things into earnest consideration,” and 
he makes a “pronouncement” about the Sephora anchored in a group of islands (19-20). This 
mate is driven by reason, but the scorpion’s appearance defies rational explanation. The presence 
of such a rational man surrounded by the chaos of the sea is almost as absurd as a scorpion in an 
inkwell. Reason, Conrad suggests, has boundaries. 
 The scorpion episode is made stranger by the fact that the scorpion is already dead upon 
its discovery, having “drown[ed] itself in the inkwell.” Leggatt emerges in much the same way 
as the scorpion—seemingly from nowhere—but he is described as virile, and the danger he 
represents isn’t immediately apparent. The already-dead scorpion is the trace of gnosis: it is 
knowledge in the form of a confrontation with base material left behind by a living being. This 
cadaverous material is no longer living, but retains the form of its threatening past existence, thus 
forcing the mate to encounter it directly rather than symbolically. Again, Kristeva clarifies the 
nature of this revenant: 
A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not 
signify death. In the presence of signified death—a flat encephalograph, for instance—I 
would understand, react, or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or masks, 
refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body 
fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the 
part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. (3) 
Kristeva shares Bataille’s focus on encounters with the base that don't apologize for it or try to 
assert its place within a hierarchy. The corpse is (does not symbolize) what Bataille describes as 
existence without a “mathematical frock coat,” the semblance of rationality. To encounter the 
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corpse is to experience the subject-as-waste, a once-living body that could no longer “extricate 
itself” from death. Since the living subject depends on this borderless “elsewhere” for its 
existence, when it encounters the corpse, it recognizes that “the impossible constitutes its very 
being, that it is none other than abject” (5). Imagine the retrieval of the scorpion corpse from the 
inkwell: an inexplicable encounter with death, saturated and dripping with ink, a vehicle for 
written language now appearing as Roussel’s “darkness, amorphous and opaque.” This pool of 
black ink reflects reason and chaos in quick succession, seducing and repulsing, and by expelling 
a corpse, threatening. The episode is both a joke and an omen.  
Threshold People 
Conrad’s ocean is not only a rich environment for narrative, but it is also an extremely 
complicated space. By allowing the ocean’s spatial qualities to influence the unfolding of “The 
Secret Sharer”’s ritualized narrative and its subjects, Conrad treats the ocean as an agent within 
that ritual. To illustrate the way in which a vast space such as the ocean informs subjectivity, I 
turn to the “maritime model” of smooth and striated space offered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guatarri. A Lacanian subject recognizes itself as such by orienting itself, through socialization 
processes beginning at birth, to various public spheres, and engaging with those spheres by using 
language. This model of the subject assumes a stable social environment from which to 
distinguish itself; it learns to understand itself as a unique point on a grid. Smooth space, the 
space of the nomad, offers no such stability: it is “occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, 
and sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice” (528-9). Given the instability 
of points within smooth space, there are no permanent lines; instead, there are “vectors,” 
movements that constantly shift along with their endpoints (528). These vectors are not 
dimensions, but directions, intervals that pause at temporary points before striking out again. 
Lacking permanent points by which to triangulate subject and object, smooth space is populated 
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by haecceities—innate, affective forces or events not distinguishable as subjects or objects—
rather than by phenomena perceptible with the senses or intellect. Striated space, such as that of 
the city, is gridded, measured and divided by permanent structures. For example: a farm is an 
established, perceptible point in striated space such as that of a village; a collection of such 
points defines the form of a striated space. In smooth space, materiality and affect precede form; 
a nomad’s movement toward a temporary oasis shifts suddenly as the landscape changes; this 
change of mind, a haecceity, is among the forces that compose smooth space. Smooth space 
renders any orientation temporary at best. The ocean is the smooth space par excellence, but also 
the first to be striated. Navigation striates it: by finding one's bearings, using latitude and 
longitude to orient oneself, one prioritizes points over lines, dimensionality over directionality 
(529). The liminal space of ritual is necessarily smooth, nomadic space even if it occurs as a 
transformation within striated space: the liminal is that which is betwixt and between 
conventional space, and smooth space is similarly defined by intervals rather than points. 
Orientation, therefore, is difficult in liminal as well as smooth space. This raises two challenges. 
The obvious question: how can one orient oneself in a space defined not by coordinates, but by 
travel in a direction? The less obvious but perhaps more crucial question: how can the liminal 
self orient itself in the world at all? Conrad’s answer: with the help of other travelers. 
“The Secret Sharer” begins with the captain’s description of his surroundings at the head 
of the Gulf of Siam. His language illustrates the smoothness of ocean space even more 
effectively than Deleuze and Guattari’s maritime model. By detailing this seascape’s smoothness 
and intimating the freshly-minted captain’s initial loneliness within it, Conrad marks the Gulf’s 
threshold as the entrance to a liminal space: 
On my right hand there were lines of fishing stakes resembling a mysterious system of 
half-submerged bamboo fences, incomprehensible in its division of the domain of 
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tropical fishes, and crazy of aspect as if abandoned forever by some nomad tribe of 
fisherman now gone to the other end of the ocean; for there was no sign of human 
habitation as far as the eye could reach. To the left a group of barren islets, suggesting 
ruins of stone walls, towers, and blockhouses, had its foundations set in a blue sea that 
itself looked solid, so still and stable did it lie below my feet; even the track of light from 
the westering sun shone smoothly, without that animated glitter which tells of an 
imperceptible ripple. And when I turned my head to take a parting glance at the tug 
which had just left us anchored outside the bar, I saw the straight line of the flat shore 
joined to the stable sea, edge to edge, with a perfect and unmarked closeness, in one 
leveled floor half brown, half blue under the enormous dome of the sky. (17) 
The man-made features of this landscape are not anchoring points (as in striated space), but 
traces of ephemeral human events. The “fishing stakes,” like “fences,” show an attempt to 
measure and divide the “domain of tropical fishes,” but in the ocean’s vastness this effort appears 
pointless. The captain speculates that these stakes may have been left by a “nomad tribe of 
fisherman” who have since traversed the ocean. This passage subtly points to the absurdity of 
imagining the ocean as a space to be fully traversed: such a circumscription would be as fleeting 
as the fishing stakes, briefly useful (perhaps) but now “mysterious.” The Gulf is not a space in 
which one travels from point A to point B. It is more similar to a hole: upon entering, one travels 
continuously in a direction and encounters events, ephemeral phenomena, along the way. 
However, interventions in this space are pointless only if we assume that any impermanent 
alteration to a landscape is meaningless, an assumption that trivializes the forces and events 
(haecceities) of smooth space. Although smooth space’s weathering forces have robbed the 
stakes of their original, stable forms, the captain’s encounter with them is one of countless 
contingent events that form this space’s fabric: it is a trace of the nomadic fishermen’s vector, 
and it marks the threshold of the space the captain will share with his double. Conrad’s fishing 
stakes suggest both the futility of attachment to transient objects, and the all-encompassing 
nature of the smooth space into which objects always return.  
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The captain further highlights the impermanence of human intervention by mentioning 
the “ruins of stone walls, towers, and blockhouses.” Despite their solid composition, these 
manmade structures are more ephemeral than the fluid ocean, which “looked solid, so still and 
stable did it lie.” The ruins do not serve as points for orientation, but as temporary apparitions. 
The seascape’s only unchanging feature is the sea. “Even the track of light from the westering 
sun shone smoothly”: even light, which enables visual perception, is absorbed into the sea’s 
timeless immensity, becoming smooth and undifferentiated from the water’s surface. This 
smooth space is the appropriate setting for what Turner calls an “anti-structure,” a practice or 
event that dissolves conventional social structures as it erects its own transient (dis)order. Turner 
writes, “[l]iminality or [. . .] liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are necessarily ambiguous, 
since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that 
normally locate states and positions in cultural space” (95, emph. original). It is evident here that 
smooth space exists apart from “cultural” or social space, the space of conventionality and stable 
orientation. As he ponders his loneliness at the head of the Gulf, the captain notes the “perfect 
and unmarked closeness” of sea and sky; he prepares to cross a threshold beyond which dualistic 
subjectivity is transformed. 
Both “The Secret Sharer” and Heart of Darkness illustrate the processes by which 
smooth, liminal space dissolves conventional subjectivity before transforming it. In liminal 
space, subjects transform first into Turner’s disoriented “threshold people” who’ve slipped 
through the public sphere’s “network of classifications.” Threshold people are no longer subjects 
in the conventional sense of being distinct from objects; they are the liminal selves who 
participate in the haecceities of smooth, liminal space. After a voyage through this ambiguous 
space—often a rite of passage—the threshold person re-enters the public sphere and assumes an 
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identity determined by her participation in the voyage and its outcome. Because the vectors that 
compose smooth space are constantly changing course, any intrusion in its processes by a 
conventional subject—any attempt to locate and stabilize points, subjects and objects—is 
ephemeral. Accordingly, the Gulf of Siam resists striation; the fishing stakes’ utilitarian form 
disappears amidst the sea’s vastness. A similar image appears in Heart of Darkness when a non-
plussed Marlow observes a man-of-war firing aimlessly into the vast continental jungle: 
There wasn’t even a shed there, and she was shelling the bush [. . .] In the empty 
immensity of earth, sky, and water, there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a 
continent. Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a 
little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech—and 
nothing happened. Nothing could happen. There was a touch of insanity in the 
proceeding, a sense of lugubrious drollery in the sight; and it was not dissipated by 
somebody on board assuring me earnestly there was a camp of natives—he called them 
enemies!—hidden out of sight somewhere. (79) 
Conrad’s texts are full of smooth spaces, of which the ocean is but one example. Here Conrad 
emphasizes the near-blending of immense horizons: “earth, sky, and water” are a single 
“immensity.” This echoes “The Secret Sharer”’s image of “the straight line of the flat shore 
joined to the stable sea” (17). Both plateaus, Africa’s shore and the Gulf’s water, are “empty” 
smooth spaces unoccupied by discernible subjects. In Heart of Darkness, subjects’ bodies are 
often obscured by dense fog or jungle, while their voices or other forces emanate from an 
ambiguous, nomadic source. In the quote above, “somebody” on the man-of-war—an unnamed, 
unranked silhouette—declares that there are “enemies” hiding “out of sight somewhere.” Neither 
the speaker nor those he wishes to identify are locatable in the space of the Congo River. The 
reader hears voices floating free of bodies. Similarly, Marlow describes Kurtz as “very little 
more than a voice,” his memory “like a dying vibration of one immense jabber, silly, atrocious, 
sordid, savage, or simply mean, without any kind of sense” (57-8). Marlow, too, is “no more to 
us than a voice”; he and his audience lose their bodies as darkness descends upon the Thames 
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(Conrad 32; Engel 25). Ivan Kreilkamp, noting Conrad’s anxiety over Edison’s invention of the 
phonograph in 1877, reads Kurtz as a synecdoche rather than a unified subject: the voice stands 
in for the man (Kreilkamp 235). But this movement from part to whole fails. Kurtz’s voice seems 
not to have a bodily referent, and thus he becomes like the floating phonographic voice, a 
groundless entity that may once have had a source but is now strangely autonomous. In this way 
Conrad leads readers through two false levels of Kurtz’s state-of-being before settling on a 
representation that is unsettlingly ambiguous at best. Kurtz is not a whole material body, nor is 
he is a voice that substitutes for a whole (Engel 24). He is an autonomous, bodiless voice no 
longer traceable to a subject or stable point in space. During his tenure at the heart of the Congo, 
Kurtz becomes the untethered voice of a threshold person, a force, one of the jungle’s shifting 
vectors. Hence Kurtz, an “initiated wraith from the back of Nowhere,” provides Marlow’s 
unstable yet imperative sense of direction through this space: “[W]e crept on, towards Kurtz. [. . 
.] Sometimes I would pick out a tree a little way ahead to measure our progress towards Kurtz 
by, but I lost it invariably before we got abreast. To keep the eyes so long on one thing was too 
much for human patience” (127; 110). Through Kurtz, Conrad demonstrates the dissolution of 
subjects into forces within liminal space, and the influence of those forces on ritual participants.  
 As a vector, Kurtz’s influence on Marlow persists in his absence and after his death. 
Kurtz has entered the liminal space of the jungle, participated in its rituals, and transformed 
accordingly. However, his dissolution is so complete that he will never regain subjectivity and 
reenter the public sphere. Rather than completing his ritual, which is not the detailed rite of a 
specific culture but a disorienting voyage through the smooth, liminal space of the jungle, Kurtz 
remains an element of the jungle’s ritual structure. Though Kurtz’s actions seem erratic, Marlow 
twice describes him as “initiated” (125, 127). Kurtz has been “initiated” though his intimacy with 
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the forest, as Marlow makes clear while describing his appearance: “[The wilderness] had 
caressed him, and—lo!—he had withered; it had taken him, loved him, embraced him, got into 
his veins, consumed his flesh, and sealed his soul to its own by the inconceivable ceremonies of 
some devilish initiation” (125). The Congolese jungle, like the Gulf of Siam, attains agency via 
the influence of its spatial qualities on Conrad’s ritualized narrative. Both jungle and ocean are 
smooth spaces, ripe for liminal experiences. By dissolving the hierarchies determined by 
subject/object dualism and converting participants (temporarily or permanently) to forces, these 
spaces also serve as manifestations of base material. This is evident in Marlow’s treatment of the 
jungle not as a subordinate setting for Kurtz, but as his material equivalent: the jungle “caressed” 
and “embraced” Kurtz like a lover, “consumed his flesh” as if to add Kurtz to its own 
composition, and finally “sealed his soul to its own,” erasing any subjective distinction between 
man and landscape. Marlow further suggests Kurtz’s identification with the jungle’s base 
material by insinuating that Kurtz has already died before their encounter: “They say the hair 
goes on growing sometimes,” he remarks, and he casually refers to Kurtz’s body as “disinterred” 
(125). Marlow also describes Kurtz as “from the back of Nowhere” and “from some ghastly 
Nowhere” (127, 152, emphasis added). Marlow’s language suggests that Kurtz is no longer 
traceable to the civilized, striated space of his bodily origin; the “voice” whom Marlow meets 
arises from and returns to the base material of the jungle which, like Bataille’s big toe, underlies 
all being despite its repulsiveness. Marlow’s description of the pilgrims’ disposal of Kurtz’s 
body again suggests the departure of Kurtz’s conventional subjectivity before his death: “The 
voice was gone. What else had been there? But I am of course aware that next day the pilgrims 
buried something in a muddy hole. And then they very nearly buried me” (154). But they do not 
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bury Marlow. Kurtz, by dissolving into the jungle’s field of forces, is able to point Marlow back 
from his voyage into liminal space. 
Kurtz has become the force that will deliver the gnosis (“the horror!”) Marlow needs to 
complete and return from his own ritualized voyage. In this way, Kurtz inadvertently acts as 
Marlow’s directional guide. Even after Marlow reaches Kurtz’s station, the latter changes 
locations—first by running away, then by dying—and alters Marlow’s course as well. Shortly 
after Marlow reaches Kurtz's station, he wakes to find that Kurtz has already fled his corporate 
followers. Kurtz will not allow himself to be "taken away," as his Russian follower in harlequin 
clothes twice puts it. To be "taken away," back to Europe, would be to reinstate Kurtz as a fixed 
subject capable of fulfilling the Company's lofty capitalistic expectations. For Kurtz, to be "taken 
away" is not to move at all, but to be restrained. Marlow repeatedly reminds the reader that 
"restraint" is not Kurtz's strong suit. Although this lack of "restraint" is typically read as moral 
restraint, I suggest that it is also physical. Kurtz, who has exchanged his subjectivity for sheer 
force (manifested as "voice") by dissolving into the jungle's smooth space, cannot be 
permanently contained or triangulated. As a vector, Kurtz's flight is a change in direction, an 
event in smooth space, and a component of Marlow's initiation into that space. Kurtz appears to 
Marlow as a base manifestation of the jungle: as Leggatt in "The Secret Sharer" emerges from 
the sea, Kurtz emerges from the ground: "[h]e rose, unsteady, long, pale, indistinct, like a vapour 
exhaled by the earth" (148).  
In Heart of Darkness, as in “The Secret Sharer,” a boundary of stakes appears to mark the 
threshold of liminal space. As I’ve previously suggested in “Talking Heads,” this in-between 
state and the often violent fragmentation of subjectivity it entails manifests concretely and 
grotesquely when Marlow approaches Kurtz’s station. From a distance, nothing seems amiss: 
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“near the house half-a-dozen slim posts remained in a row, roughly trimmed, and with their 
upper ends ornamented with round carved balls. The rails, or whatever there had been between, 
had disappeared. Of course the forest surrounded all that” (63). Marlow, nearing the wondrous 
goal of his journey, sees not a fence but the remnant of one, a barrier that has partially fallen. As 
he draws closer, the truth becomes clear: 
These round knobs were not ornamental but symbolic [. . .] food for thought and also for 
the vultures if there had been any [. . .] They would have been even more impressive, 
those heads on the stakes, if their faces had not been turned to the house. Only one, the 
first I had made out, was facing my way [. . .] there it was, black, dried, sunken, with 
closed eyelids, —a head that seemed to sleep at the top of that pole [. . .] smiling 
continuously at some endless and jocose dream of that eternal slumber. (70-1) 
These heads compose the final physical point of Marlow’s journey down the Congo River and 
seem misleadingly simple. Marlow misreads them as “symbolic” of Kurtz’s power over the 
Congolese, signs of “uncomplicated savagery [. . .] something that had a right to exist—
obviously—in the sunshine” (71). These signs, however, point to the deeply complicated 
boundary between life and death and to Kurtz, who straddles this border and lacks such an 
obvious right to exist. The heads are “sunken” yet elevated on poles; they are dead, yet seem to 
be “smiling” in their “sleep.” Conrad places these containers of contradictions at the crucial point 
between the Congo River, the material site of Marlow’s travel, and Kurtz’s station, a shrine 
containing the being who embodies death. The contradictions run deeper still. The heads are 
physically extreme—“black, dried, sunken [. . .] with the shrunken dry lips showing a narrow 
white line of the teeth,” a radiographic vision of a decaying body—yet wrapped up in 
metaphysical images of infinity. The dream is “endless” and slumber “eternal.” The heads do not 
merely signify the end of Marlow’s journey. They signify the end of physical travel and the 
beginning of movement within the metaphysical, atemporal realm of death. Although several 
characters move in and out of Kurtz’s house, demonstrating that it is possible to pass this limit in 
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a literal sense, it is impossible for a living being to cross it in its symbolic sense and remain 
alive. The heads’ most striking contradiction lies in the direction of their gaze. All the faces point 
toward Kurtz, but one points away from him, toward Marlow. The faces warn Marlow away 
from an attempt to transgress the life/death barrier, an attempt made successfully yet fleetingly 
by Kurtz, but also—almost coyly—invite him to follow in Kurtz’s absurd footsteps. This 
foreboding invitation toward knowledge parallels the captain’s inexplicable and dangerous 
attraction both to his doppelgänger and the land-mass of Koh-ring in “The Secret Sharer.”2 
Flirting with the Base 
For the captain in “The Secret Sharer,” who is participating in a liminal ritual of passage, the 
ship has a complex, seemingly paradoxical set of roles. The ship is a point (a set of coordinates) 
on the sea, and as such it is a stable setting in which ritualized narrative can unfold. This point, 
however, moves: it is the unsettling setting of a voyage, a journey through liminal space in which 
conventional orientations are dissolved or reversed. But for Leggatt, who is a nomad in the 
smooth space of the sea, the ship is more simply an ephemeral stopping point between 
movements. He has moved in lines before and after this point at which he’s temporarily arrived, 
lines with direction but without clear, stable endpoints. This focus on Leggatt’s directionality, his 
movement, rather than the content of what happens before and after his arrival on the ship is 
highlighted by the narrator’s nonchalance concerning Leggatt's violent departure from his 
previous ship: "I knew well enough also that my double there was no homicidal ruffian. I did not 
think of asking him for details, and he told me the story roughly in brusque, disconnected 
sentences. I needed no more. I saw it all going on as though I were myself inside that other 
sleeping suit" (26). Leggatt’s coming and going are more integral to his character than the 
murder he's committed. By emerging from the sea and merely standing beside the captain, 
Leggatt shares secret knowledge; hence his "disconnected sentences" more than suffice to 
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explain his expulsion from the Sephora. This is radically different from Conrad's treatment of the 
titular character of Lord Jim. Like Leggatt, Jim abruptly leaves his previous ship in disgrace. But 
while Jim's jump haunts him throughout the long novel, Leggatt's greater crime is almost 
instantly accepted by both Leggatt and the narrator. This different treatment suggests that while 
Jim is a fully human character, Leggatt is something beyond human: rising from the depths, he 
embodies base material that cannot be held to moral standards legitimized by rational 
hierarchies. Leggatt's violent past cannot catch up with him, because he never occupies a fixed 
space on the ship; he is a liminal being forever in transition. The captain and Leggatt, therefore, 
have an inverse relationship to the ship. The captain treats his ship as a shifting, ambiguous 
ground yet to be mastered; it is a platform that anchors him as he moves through liminal space. 
For Leggatt, the ship is not a ground at all but another fleeting force passing through liminal 
space. Leggatt finds temporary cover within the ship as if he were possessing it, rather than 
traveling on it. 
 Liminal and smooth spaces overlap: smooth space, depopulated of rational hierarchies 
and subject/object dualism, can be a setting for liminal rituals that culminate in encounters with 
base material. In narrative, therefore, smooth space can be a richly sensuous venue for the 
articulation of ritual's transformative experience. In “The Secret Sharer,” Conrad treats the ocean 
as smooth space in order to allow the narrator to gradually submerge his subjectivity, a process 
that begins with the emergence of Leggatt. The captain, unfamiliar with his ship and its protocol, 
tries to steady himself on its deck by conforming to his crew's expectations. Shortly after 
embarking, he realizes that his early dismissal of his officers has left the anchor watch 
improperly set; the rope ladder had not been hauled in. The captain worries that this blunder 
"made me appear eccentric. Goodness only knew how that absurdly whiskered mate would 
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'account' for my conduct" (22). Before the captain can begin assuaging the crew's doubts, 
however, Leggatt emerges, disrupting the illusion of potential stability by challenging his sense 
of subjectivity and sanity. Leggatt's emergence casts the disruption of convention in a 
particularly unadorned light: 
I saw at once something elongated and pale floating very close to the ladder. Before I 
could form a guess a faint flash of phosphorescent light, which seemed to issue suddenly 
from the naked body of a man, flickered in the sleeping water with the elusive, silent play 
of summer lightning in a night sky. With a gasp I saw revealed to my stare a pair of feet, 
the long legs, a broad livid back immersed right up to the neck in a greenish cadaverous 
glow. One hand, awash, clutched the bottom rung of the ladder. He was complete but for 
the head. A headless corpse! (22-3) 
As in Heart of Darkness, Conrad uses body parts to mark the threshold into smooth space. After 
Leggatt's appearance, the captain's journey changes from one of simple mastery of a new role, 
defined by rationally intelligible codes, to a series of concealments and self-denials, and 
ultimately an approach to death. Leggatt signals the smoothness of the Bay of Siam, and by 
encountering his double and realizing his social displacement, the captain enters the liminal 
phase of his ritual passage (Turner 47). Leggatt's body parts mark this beginning, the journey's 
threshold, and so they both attract and repel. Foreshadowing the bulge of Koh-ring, Leggatt’s 
body interrupts the sea’s smooth surface. The captain first notices "something pale and elongated 
floating very close to the ladder." The body is unidentified at first; it may be a fish, an 
appendage, or a creature we'd expect to find in Lovecraft's Necronomicon. Like Kurtz, who is 
also "long, pale, [and] indistinct," Leggatt's body is pale and passive, "floating" rather than 
struggling (Heart 148). This shared imagery generates an aura of death. Before the captain notes 
any indication of life, a vital flash of light emanates from the body and flickers "with the elusive, 
silent play of summer lightning in a night sky." As in Heart of Darkness, where he uses it to 
represent civilization's resistance to encroaching darkness, here Conrad uses the flicker as an 
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image of ephemeral vitality. Like Kurtz's floating voice, this moment of light can sustain itself 
outside of a body, but only temporarily. 
 The sudden illumination is "elusive" and "silent" like "summer lightning in a night sky," 
attributes that mirror Conrad's description in the Preface of the "moment of vision" sought by the 
artist. The flicker briefly "reveal[s] the substance of [the rescued fragment's] truth—disclose[s] 
its inspiring secret: the stress and passion within the core of each convincing moment." During 
Leggatt's emergence, this "substance" of truth that contains the ineffable "stress and passion" of a 
passing moment manifests as base material. The flicker reveals the fragments of Leggatt's body 
one-by-one in order to emphasize the contingency of his subjectivity within smooth, nomadic 
space. First "a pair of feet" resolves; as in Bataille, the toes underwrite all material beings who 
stand erect. Next "long legs" and "a broad livid back" become visible: the narrator 
voyeuristically guides the reader's imagined gaze up what he already knows to be "the naked 
body of a man." The narrator then notes "[o]ne hand, awash," clutching the ladder's bottom 
wrung. Again, Leggatt remains as calm as a "resting swimmer" as his "awash" hand, just 
breaking the water's surface, holds the ladder, a bridge to the ship, at its lowest point. As a 
nomadic, directional force within smooth space, Leggatt can freely arrive at and depart from 
points such as the ship. This potential for movement allows him to guide the captain to the 
threshold of dissolution and back. After rising above the water's surface, the narrator's gaze is 
foiled in its expectation of a head: "[a] headless corpse!" Conrad doubly disturbs the narrator's 
certainty about the nature of the object emerging from the sea. First it is an ambiguous shape; 
next it is a living body that seems to manifest one part at a time; then it is an incomplete cadaver; 
finally Leggatt turns to reveal the silhouette of his "black-haired head," alleviating the captain's 
dread. For Bataille, the head signifies the lofty seat of reason that pretends to exist independently 
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from the dirty big toe. In this moment, the length of a flicker, Leggatt initiates the narrator into 
liminal space by giving him his first fleeting taste of the ambiguous base material that will so 
compel him throughout his voyage: first the base foot, then the connecting body, then the 
insinuation of a gap where the head should be. In an inversion of their typical relationship, the 
foot seems for a moment to exist without the head, suggesting the persistence of base material 
after the disappearance of reason, and even after death. Like Conrad's artist, the narrator briefly 
holds rescued fragments of this revelatory moment—here manifest as fragments of Leggatt's 
body—in the light for all to see. 
In smooth space, it is difficult at best to get one’s bearings. The only possible navigation 
depends on the directional forces that occupy smooth space, which serve as signposts for 
traveling subjects. Though in no need of bearings himself, Leggatt acts as a compass for the 
captain, furthering him on his ritual passage to a new authority. Like everything else in smooth 
space, Leggatt's signs are not straightforward. To complete his passage, the captain must depart 
from his crew's logical expectations of how a captain should behave. The signs of this departure 
from logic both excite and horrify, attract and repulse, the captain.3 Facial hair, for example, 
receives a conspicuous amount of the narrator's attention. Leggatt has "no growth on his cheeks" 
but sports "a small, brown mustache" that compliments his other boyish good looks: he has "a 
well-shaped, round chin," is a "well-knit young fellow of twenty-five at most," and has "white, 
even teeth" (25). These virile features, more than his incomplete explanation of his crime, seem 
to garner the captain's trust and protection. After describing Leggatt, the captain interrupts his 
retelling of Leggatt's justification for his murder as if their physical resemblance renders it 
irrelevant: "'But what's the good of talking? You know well enough the sort of ill-conditioned 
snarling cur—' He appealed to me as if our experiences had been as identical as our clothes. [. . .]  
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And I knew well enough also that my double there was no homicidal ruffian. [. . .] I needed no 
more" (26). Leggatt sums up the captain's frustration with his entire narrative: "what's the good 
of talking?" I've mentioned the captain's disdain for the ship's mate, who speaks in hackneyed 
"ejaculations" and is driven by his desire rationally to "account" for all of the ship's events. This 
mate's facial hair inspires anything but trust. Each time he encounters the mate, the captain's 
attention (and the reader's) is drawn to his whiskers: he has "a simple face, overcharged by a 
terrible growth of whisker" (19). Here, "simple" does not imply a lack of intelligence, but an 
overdependence on "simple," rational explanations. Since the captain would never be able to 
explain Leggatt's concealment, the mate's "frightful whiskers" are a frustrating sign of his 
bounded movement on the ship. Just as one look at the handsome Leggatt dispels all mistrust, a 
single thought of these whiskers is enough to deter the captain from confiding in his crew. While 
considering Leggatt's crime, the captain thinks "suddenly of my absurd mate with his terrific 
whiskers and the 'Bless my soul—you don't say so' type of intellect" (26). At the same moment, 
Leggatt chimes in: "My father's a parson in Norfolk. Do you see me before a judge and jury on 
that charge?" Sharing a thought, the men tacitly agree that the captain's role is not to expose 
Leggatt's crime, but to help a man who would be misunderstood by all others. Leggatt's mustache 
is mentioned only briefly, but it parallels the mate's obtrusive whiskers, providing the captain 
with a purpose—concealment of that which is unaccountably familiar and attractive—while 
remaining unseen. Every element of Leggatt's body, which the captain views as his "own 
reflection in the depths of a somber and immense mirror," is a signpost that motivates the captain 
to continue his transformative passage (25). 
 The captain, uncomfortable with his divided subjectivity, feels compelled to hide Leggatt 
from his crew, unwitting participants in the captain's ritual passage. During a particularly 
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mysterious episode, the captain hides Leggatt in his bathroom to avoid the steward's notice. To 
placate the steward, the captain bathes while the steward cleans, leaving him to inspect the 
premises. The scene would be nearly slapstick if not for the pervasive presence of the captain's 
fear, which is felt from the start: "It was very much like being mad, only it was worse because 
one was aware of it," he reflects (37). Here Conrad at once discounts insanity as a motive for the 
captain's behavior while also evoking a sense of dangerous loss of control. This sense of danger 
is quickly made palpable by the captain's whispered warning to Leggatt: "'All's well so far,' I 
whispered. 'Now you must vanish into the bathroom.' He did so, as noiseless as a ghost" (37). 
Though the situation could be humorous, a nervous silence hangs in the air. While the captain 
does his "dressing, splashing, and whistling," Leggatt stands "drawn up bolt upright in that little 
space, his face looking very sunken in daylight, his eyelids lowered under the stern, dark line of 
his eyebrows drawn together by a slight frown" (37). The captain's detailed description of 
Leggatt's face and posture suggests that he is watching Leggatt as he bathes, though he mentions 
no interaction between them. This voyeurism contains not only fear of discovery, but also sexual 
tension: a man washes in front of another with inches between them while a third curious man 
works outside. The captain reminds us of his fascination shortly after this incident: "I saw him 
back there [behind the writing desk], sitting rigidly on the low stool, his bare feet close together 
[. . .] I was fascinated by it myself. Every moment I had to glance over my shoulder" (38). Again, 
the captain first draws the reader's attention to Leggatt's "bare feet" as he sits on a "low stool"; 
the same exposed feet that touch the dirty deck, the same feet he's compelled to place "out of 
sight of the door," compel his gaze. Conrad never provides a rational explanation for this. The 
bathroom is a foggy spot in Conrad's tale: the reader observes but doesn't share the space of the 
bathroom with the narrator and Leggatt. Through Conrad's tedious yet sensuous portrayal of the 
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captain's non-rational compulsion to hide his doppelgänger, the reader gains insight into his 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion to knowledge of the base. 
 The captain's final approach to Koh-ring makes sense not from a rational standpoint as 
crew or captain of a commercial vessel, but as the final approach to the truth buried in liminal 
rituals of passage. From the captain's perspective, it must be approached: "It was now a matter of 
conscience to shave the land as close as possible—for now [Leggatt] must go overboard 
whenever the ship was put in stays. Must! There could be no going back for him" (58). From his 
perspective as narrator, however, doing so with language is tricky:  
The black southern hill of Koh-ring seemed to hang right over the ship like a towering 
fragment of the ever-lasting night. On that enormous mass of blackness there was not a 
gleam to be seen, not a sound to be heard. It was gliding irresistibly towards us and yet 
seemed already within reach of the hand. [. . .] Such a hush had fallen on the ship that she 
might have been a bark of the dead floating in slowly under the very gate of Erebus. (59) 
Although this language has a striking poetic quality, a "fragment" of "night" and an "enormous 
mass of blackness" reduce to the same substance: a negation that can't be fixed in space. By 
comparing Koh-ring to Erebus, the Greek underworld, the captain tries to bring Koh-ring into the 
realm of discourse. It is a failed attempt to fix Koh-ring within a rational structure. "Erebus" is a 
Greek word meaning "deep darkness," and so the captain's allusion, like his metaphors, is 
circular. Koh-ring does not resolve into its hypothetical settlements, but remains a "great black 
mass" even when the ship is closest (60). The only disturbance to this blackness is the 
reappearance of the captain's floppy white hat, which he had given to Leggatt: "All at once my 
strained, yearning stare distinguished a white object floating within a yard of the ship's side. 
White on the black water. A phosphorescent flash passed under it. What was that thing? . . . I 
recognized my own floppy hat" (61). As when Leggatt emerged, now a flicker of light seems to 
mark the last moving sign the captain needs to depart from liminal space. Even here, rational 
discourse fails: "What was that thing?" could refer to the "flash," the "hat," to Leggatt, or to none 
  43 
of these. In any case, however, it refers to a "thing," an unknowable mass like Koh-ring. The 
narrators in Heart of Darkness and "The Secret Sharer" surrender first to the attraction, then to 
the repulsion of such things: they must approach and retreat from truth, and they must be 
satisfied with traces of it retrieved by temporary forces that manifest as their doppelgängers. 
When Conrad's narrators attempt to explore his foggy spots, they engage in flirtation with the 
base. 
 The ending of the captain’s ritual passage, the approach to Koh-ring, seems violently to 
subordinate the crew to the captain, rather than reaffirm their bond with him. Why does he risk 
their lives? By nearly colliding with Koh-ring, the captain subjects himself to the same stresses 
that led Leggatt to murder, and he resists them. "I caught [the mate's] arm as he was raising it to 
batter his poor devoted head, and shook it violently,” the captain recounts, and proceeds to 
vocalize each of his movements: "'You go forward'—shake—'and stop there'—shake—'and hold 
your noise'—shake—'and see these head-sheets properly overhauled'—shake, shake—shake" 
(60). This repetition of "shake," like the bathroom incident, would be comical if it didn't occur 
during a tense crisis. In this moment, Conrad invites us to laugh grimly at the captain's 
completion of his ritual passage. If he had murdered his crewmate, the captain would likely have 
ended up awash and naked—he would have fully merged with Leggatt, and would not have 
returned. Instead, after passing Koh-ring, the captain declares that "[n]othing! no one in the 
world should now stand between us, throwing a shadow on the way of silent knowledge and 
mute affection, the perfect communion of a seaman with his first command" (61). Foregoing his 
relationship to the smooth sea and to Leggatt, its avatar, the captain fully inhabits his role within 
the striated space of the ship, a piece of floating civilization. Because the ship is always referred 
to as female, this is also a turn away from the homoerotic tension evinced by Leggatt’s virility, 
toward heteronormative relations. To complete Conrad’s rite of passage, the captain had to 
  44 
approach the base material underlying his body and ship, let a doppelgänger touch that base, and 
then turn back. Conrad chooses to return his narrators to their social hierarchies in the end; as I 
will show in later chapters, other authors make different choices about how to complete their 
ritual forms. 
 To participate in ritual passage as understood by Turner is to enter liminal space, to 
relinquish one’s role in social and ontological hierarchies, and finally to encounter Bataille’s 
base material, which rises from the earth or sea where it had been ignored by rational subjects. 
Conradian base material manifests as fragments or duplicates of the traveler’s own body. The 
traveler’s doppelgänger is composed of base material, but so is the part of the traveler that 
remains conscious, individual, and able to narrate while approaching the event horizon of 
subjective dissolution: the liminal self reflected by the doppelgängers in “the depths of a somber 
and immense mirror.” The liminal self, the self that “stands outside” in the Greek sense of ek-
stasis, can glimpse gnosis and transform the social role to which it returns. Leggatt is a station on 
the narrator-captain’s voyage toward gnosis; he dissolves as Koh-ring appears. As in Heart of 
Darkness, when Kurtz envisions “the horror” and bequeaths an inkling of it to Marlow just 
before dying, so Leggatt's final sign, the captain's hat, allows the captain to peep over the 
threshold of dissolution and return (155; 61). Leggatt, like Kurtz, alters the narrator’s course, 
helping the narrator to complete his rite of passage through smooth, liminal space despite his 
gradual merger with that space. Conrad uses the form of a ritual passage to articulate this 
experience more vividly, rather than elide it. Where mere rational description would fail entirely, 
Conrad deploys liminal space to express something of the traveler’s abject experience with the 
foundation of his being. In the texts of Virginia Woolf and David Lynch discussed in the next 
chapter, this foundation manifests not at a moment of climax, but as an ubiquitous background 
agency—food—that promises both danger and transformation.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LIMINAL SHARED MEAL IN VIRGINIA WOOLF’S TO THE 
LIGHTHOUSE AND DAVID LYNCH’S TWIN PEAKS 
"Form in action is ritual. Ritual is very important for us because it is through participating in 
form that we can experience intimacy.” 
—Dainin Katagiri, Returning to Silence 
 
“[The adventure of] telling the truth about my own experiences as a body, I do not think I solved. 
I doubt that any woman has solved it yet.” 
—Virginia Woolf, “Professions for Women” 
Although Virginia Woolf's novel To the Lighthouse (1927) and David Lynch's television 
series Twin Peaks (1990-1) are somewhat distant in time, Woolf's treatment of food as an active 
participant within the liminal space of the shared meal informs Lynch's representation of 
consumption as a shaper and motivator of subjectivity—especially female subjectivity. Both 
storytellers find an ancestor in Joseph Conrad, who portrays confrontations between material 
forces and isolated subjects with unstable identities. In this chapter, I focus on the ritualized 
tedium of shared meals and dinner parties in these related works of twentieth-century literature 
and television. Mrs. Ramsay's dinner party in Woolf's To the Lighthouse acts as centerpiece for a 
spread of instances in which troubled relationships and repulsive materiality irrupt into the 
dining space. In Woolf's novel, ritual form acts within the family structure that it animates. As an 
animate network of forces temporarily replaces the characters' stable familial hierarchy—as she 
stares into the boeuf en daube—Mrs. Ramsay reevaluates her relationship to the food that, as a 
woman, she is expected to serve but not savor. Post-WWI authors use the form of the dinner, a 
social ritual, in their narratives for the same reason that Conrad uses rites of passage: to find a 
linguistic vehicle for experiences that would otherwise be incommunicable, and to broaden 
language’s potential beyond its rational applications. At the dinner table, as at sea, conventional 
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hierarchies are transformed. They are not replaced by a new hierarchy, as in Conrad, but revealed 
to their participants, opening the possibility for changing relationships between individuals: 
tensions and forces, often manifest as food, burst through the dinner party’s would-be-placid 
social veneer. This trend of food's interjection into a narrative's conventional surface continues in 
Twin Peaks. Both poles of Twin Peaks' suburban landscape, the stable world of the nuclear 
family and the profane liminal space that is the Black Lodge, are haunted by tedious dining 
scenes. From cherry pie to creamed corn, Lynch uses food to highlight the body's dependence on 
(often grotesque) consumption, a dependence which results in violent, disturbing challenges to 
bodily boundaries. To deny the human need to consume, a denial especially common in 
Victorian paradigms of femininity, is to ignore a foundational aspect of selfhood (Angelella 
174). This bodily component of the self precedes the Lacanian symbolic order and will persist 
with or without any order whatsoever. 
Gazing into the Boeuf 
In Conrad, the arc of the narrators' voyage through liminal space is the form that animates 
the narrative, moving the ships forward. Form also acts in Woolf's text, but it acts within the 
structure—here not a ship but a family—that it animates. The family and its hierarchy in To the 
Lighthouse don't move in a line; instead, they gradually disappear. This gradual vanishing of 
stable hierarchy, and the animate network of forces that replaces it, is most evident at Woolf's 
dinner table. Several critics agree that the dinner (especially for Woolf) is a social ritual, but they 
are not in agreement about its efficacy. In her discussion of The Waves (1931), Vicki 
Tromanhauser suggests that Woolf's novel "documents the formal meals and ritualized 
gatherings that sustain friendships and that function, more broadly, to define human society 
through its opposition to other forms of creaturely life that it strategically organizes, subjugates, 
and even consumes" (73). Sociologists Nickie Charles and Marion Kerr write that "Food 
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practices can be regarded as one of the ways in which important social relations and divisions are 
symbolized, reinforced and reproduced on a daily basis" (2). Janine Utell, also discussing The 
Waves, continues to paint a picture of the shared meal as a grounding, uniting space. She claims: 
[Woolf's characters] seek to come to terms with grief through ritual moments which bring 
them together. [. . .] As they join for meals, however, they are made solid even as the 
slipping away of the self in death is made visible; a connection is forged and reaffirmed 
in the face of impending death. Meals provide the ritual moments, the ritual spaces, for 
these instances of awareness and community. (2) 
I agree that shared meals can function as spaces of communion, especially in liminal settings 
during which social roles are equalized. However, to read Mrs. Ramsay's dinner as an efficacious 
ritual to reaffirm social bonds is to ignore the unruly role played by the food. Woolf embeds the 
dinner's form into her narratives for the same reason that Conrad embeds rites of passage: to use 
that form as a linguistic vehicle for experiences that would otherwise be incommunicable—to 
broaden language’s potential beyond its rational applications. 
 Writing after the First World War (1914-18), during which violent experiences often 
found no language for expression outside the context of battle, Woolf finds motivation to 
experiment with liminal space. Of the millions of soldiers who lost their lives during the War, 
nearly one million were British; nearly five million more returned wounded (Keegan 7, 423). 
These deaths often left no corpse behind for families to view, since countless bodies disappeared 
in battle (Booth 29). Allyson Booth distinguishes between the meaning of “[m]issing” for a 
medical officer in a soldier’s division and for that soldier’s mother; the former witnesses a shell 
eradicating all traces of the body, but the latter regards “[m]issing” as a hopeful alternative state 
to death (29-30). These disappearances, coupled with the British government’s 1916 decision 
requiring soldiers to be buried at the front, rendered corpses invisible to civilians (24). Those 
soldiers who did return from the Western Front were often unwilling or unable to help civilians 
gain a more realistic image of war due to a newly recognized mental illness: post-traumatic stress 
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disorder, then known as shell shock. The resulting invisibility of death widened the already 
substantial experiential gap between those who fought at the Western Front and those who 
remained at home, especially women. Allyson Booth elaborates this problem of communication 
as it appears in the texts of wartime authors such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon:  
The sheer noise of trench warfare flummoxes the orderly progress of plot [in combatants' 
novels] by flummoxing language itself: characters speak but we can’t hear them. For all 
soldiers know, crucial explanations disappear into noise that is simultaneously 
meaningless (in terms of verbal import) and fatally meaningful (in the noise that signals 
shells, machine guns, grenades). (117) 
Although Woolf did not directly experience battle as Owen and Sassoon did, she did experience 
the gaps—both experiential, as a lack of communication, and material, as a lack of male 
bodies—left by the War in English culture. During and after the War, the conventional, 
mannered family dinner becomes a microcosmic model of the conflict's strain on the English 
psyche. In To the Lighthouse, the War is a virus acting on Mrs. Ramsay's family, and in the 
dinner, we see it coursing through their collective veins. As the liminal sea surrounds and 
influences Conrad's ships, which represent fragments of civilization, so the dinner is not free of 
hierarchy, but has its own temporary structure influenced by the War's destruction. It is a setting 
for the acting out of tensions that bubble up beneath these conventions, the playing out of forces. 
When Mrs. Ramsay disappears from the narrative after "Time Passes," she merges with these 
invisible forces (much as we will see Mrs. Moore do in Forster's A Passage to India) and 
continues to bring characters together as she did with her boeuf. Woolf creates a setting, the 
Ramsays' seaside house, in which Mrs. Ramsay's presence and the lingering memory of her 
material (as opposed to linguistic) power to unify individuals through food persist. In this way, 
Woolf renders the family's relationships vulnerable to transformation, usually in the form of 
increased intimacy. The War's tendency toward silence is overridden (to an extent) not by a 
return to social normalcy, but by the material mediation of shared food produced by a shared 
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loved one. 
 This transition to more intimate relationships is not without obstacles. Each participant’s 
cognitive dissonance is displayed as she strains against her own manners, conventions 
challenged by the War. This is evident in Lily Briscoe’s observation of Mrs. Ramsay:  
“Did you find your letters? I told them to put them in the hall for you,” she said to William 
Bankes. 
Lily Briscoe watched her drifting into that strange no-man’s land where to follow people is 
impossible and yet their going inflicts such a chill on those who watch them that they 
always try at least to follow them with their eyes as one follows a fading ship until the sails 
have sunk beneath the horizon. (84) 
The dinner’s texts have at least three layers: characters’ voiced dialogue, their inner monologue, 
and Woolf’s narration. In the latter two layers, foils to the superficial speech, Woolf represents 
the family’s relationships as vectors that spark across the table and transmit affect. Lily’s 
impression of Mrs. Ramsay’s words is not a simple, emotional response; Woolf gives us her 
impression as a space, a “no-man’s land.” As Marlow watches his doppelgänger Kurtz cross the 
threshold of death but cannot follow, so Lily cannot follow Mrs. Ramsay into the “no-man’s 
land” she perceives behind her banal conversation. Lily’s spatial sense of Mrs. Ramsay’s 
movement toward danger is reinforced by the contemporary connotation of “no-man’s land,” 
which described the ground between trenches at the Western Front. To set foot in this space was 
to risk one’s life. By thinking about Mrs. Ramsay’s conversation in this way, Lily not only 
judges her, but empathizes with her. She follows Mrs. Ramsay’s movement through the 
metaphorical conversation-space “with her eyes” rather than ears, implying an effort to see 
beneath the dialogue’s surface. Lily’s image of watching the “fading ship until the sails have 
sunk beneath the horizon” conjures a sailor’s patient wife, but since this attention is “inflict[ed]” 
by “a chill,” a sense of dread at the departure, it may be morbid fascination as well as 
compassion. Taken as a whole, this moment in Lily’s mind recalls the “fragmented components 
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of frozen imagery and sensation” which Judith Herman attributes to stories of trauma. Woolf’s 
“horizon,” like Conrad’s, is a point-of-no-return, a threshold to be crossed only by proxy. To 
approach it is to encounter experience that can’t easily be stored in narrative memory. Though a 
table replaces the sea, the space is smooth and liminal, a temporary departure from social 
normalcy. Woolf shows us that liminal space's radical shift in convention can be a tightening 
rather than a loosening, though with a similar effect: the expression of experience—here, that of 
compassion for an extraordinary woman absorbed into the tedious realm of banality—that is 
impossible to articulate using ordinary language and rational, linear narrative. 
 Mrs. Ramsay's dinner party takes place over a great expanse of text, as Woolf savors 
every detail of the food's texture, flavor, and odor, as well as every nuance of her characters' 
thoughts. The descriptive passages in this section (the conclusion of "The Window") vacillate 
between images of stasis and fluidity, of the unity implied by order and the fragmentation 
implied by change. Following other critics, Utell describes the serving of the boeuf en daube as a 
"moment of communion" (3). According to Utell, when the eight candles on the table are lit and 
the boeuf arrives, 
[O]ne sees a language of transformation, of change making a moment different. The 
moment is performed through the body, which is why the taking of food is so crucial to 
Woolf: the body can enact such transformations beyond language. [. . .] The melding of 
scents and flavors and ingredients—the olives, the oil, the juices—in a profusion of color 
and taste signifies the blending of the subjects in the house, a moment of shared 
community and harmony. (4) 
Utell then notes that this scene is directly followed by Mrs. Ramsay's death in "Time Passes," 
"perhaps the the most devastating parenthetical in English literature" (4). For Utell, the dinner is 
a proleptic death ritual: it allows the characters "to mourn in advance of the death of the loved 
one": 
Death ritual reveals a heightened knowledge of the inevitability of the death of the other, 
as well as a heightened sense of being as the dissolution of that being is made visible. 
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Part of Woolf's consolation occurs when the characters in her works look backward at the 
ritual moment that was initially not seen to be so, and learn how to read it as such. (5) 
Utell maps Van Gennep's and Turner's tripartite form of the rite of passage—separation (which 
involves communal mourning), limen, and aggregation—onto To the Lighthouse; the novel's 
elegaic form mirrors these stages. But in all its complexity, the dinner party is more than a high 
point in the family's life to be understood during a retrospective catharsis. While the boeuf's 
candlelit arrival is certainly one harmonious moment, the dinner's many moments move among a 
variety of emotional registers. Even with the boeuf present, anxieties remain at play in the 
characters' inner monologue and in Woolf's narration. These anxieties manifest as concerns about 
food: its qualities reflect on both individual and national identities. Woolf's intense moments of 
focus on the dynamic between bodies and food reveal the instability of social relationships even 
while they appear most solid. Woolf's candles, like Conrad's, flicker. 
 Although Utell reads "The Windows" as a separation, "Time Passes" as a limen, and "The 
Lighthouse" as an aggregation, recent posthumanist readings of To the Lighthouse lead me to 
challenge this mapping. Although "Time Passes" is undoubtedly liminal in its tone and 
placement, Woolf already enters liminal territory during the preceding dinner party. Liminal 
spaces are characterized by the levelling of conventional ontological hierarchies, as well as by 
communion among the newly and temporarily equal participants—the initial separation phase of 
a rite of passage is not the only phase that can include communion. Mrs. Ramsay's dinner party 
entails not only communion among human subjects, but also among humans and the food that 
they see, smell, and consume. Tromanhauser suggests that "The textures of Woolf's narrative 
attune us to the sentience of a nonhuman world that suffuses and interfuses our being" (74). To 
elaborate, she cites feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz's understanding of individuality "as a kind 
of dynamic integrative absorption of an outside that is always too much, too large, to be ordered 
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and contained within life alone" (Grosz 28). In her discussion of women's consumption, critic 
Lisa Angelella concurs: 
The eating body is active not only in the sense that it is moving but in that it is 
constituting itself and reconstructing its world. It is active in making decisions in a realm 
of biology outside of culture. Such a means of activity is particularly important for 
allowing subjectivity to women denied action and choices in other areas of their lives. 
(174) 
The notion of a world in which things, including our body and the food with which it merges, 
demonstrate pervasive agency arises again in political scientist Jane Bennett's work. Bennett 
defines "thing-power" as the ability of things to exert complex forces upon other bodies, thereby 
distinguishing themselves from the subject/object binary (xvi). Mrs. Ramsay's boeuf resists 
objectification even as it revels in its materiality. It is saturated with sensory detail, "too much, 
too large" to be consumed all at once, so characters instead perform a "dynamic integrative 
absorption," lingering over its textures as the mingling company and food produces not one, but 
countless subtle transformations of subjectivity. As Angelella claims, the dinner represents a 
particularly opportune setting for women to refashion their subjectivities: consumption allows 
for decision-making "outside of culture," and so outside the patriarchal symbolic order which 
necessitates that women fit into its rational paradigm. In its sensuous flux, the dinner party is 
more of a liminal space than a space of shared loss, as will be evident after a closer look at Mrs. 
Ramsay's meditation over her boeuf en daube. 
 Mrs. Ramsay denies neither her own agency nor that of the food she serves. Rather, her 
repeated glances into the pot reveal a sense of creative power: "And she peered into the dish, 
with its shiny walls and its confusion of savoury brown and yellow meats and its bay leaves and 
its wine, and thought. This will celebrate the occasion" (100). Mrs. Ramsay inwardly revels at 
the “shiny,” clean walls of the dish and its flavorful contents as if it were her own work of art, an 
accomplishment on par with Lily’s painting-in-progress. When she begins plotting to bring Lily 
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Briscoe and William Bankes together, her musings become a flight of fancy that recalls Gerard 
Manley Hopkins' 
dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, in his riding  
  Of the rolling level underneath him steady air, and striding  
High there, how he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing  
In his ecstasy! then off, off forth on swing [. . .] ("The Windhover" 2-5)  
  
Like the falcon, Mrs. Ramsay's inner monologue circles upward in exhilaration before, "like a 
hawk which lapses suddenly from its high station," she dives back into the banality of dinnertime 
chat (Woolf 105). All the while, she serves unwitting William an excessive amount of boeuf. 
This moment's frenetic emotional energy is mediated by food, the material agent that comes 
between Mrs. Ramsay and William: 
Everything seemed possible. Everything seemed right. Just now (but this cannot last, she 
thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they were all talking about boots) 
just now she had reached security; she hovered like a hawk suspended; like a flag floated 
in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her body fully and sweetly, not noisily, 
solemnly rather, for it arose, she thought, looking at them all eating there, from husband 
and children and friends; all of which rising in this profound stillness (she was helping 
William Bankes to one very small piece more, and peered into the depths of the 
earthenware pot) seemed now for no special reason to stay there like a smoke, like a fume 
rising upwards, holding them safe together. Nothing need be said; nothing could be said. 
There it was, all around them. It partook, she felt, carefully helping Mr. Bankes to a 
specially tender piece, of eternity; [. . .] there is a coherence in things, a stability; 
something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out (she glanced at the 
window with its ripple of reflected lights) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the 
spectral, like a ruby[.] (105) 
There are two levels of inner monologue here: the parentheticals represent Mrs. Ramsay's 
interactions with her material surroundings and so focus on sensual detail (audible speech, 
textured food, and visible light), while the rest of the monologue is an attempt to process 
ineffable emotions. This textual barrier between her material world and her emotions is 
permeable, and like the boeuf's juices, they mingle. With her first parenthetical, "(but this cannot 
last)," Mrs. Ramsay immediately belies her newfound "security." The doubt surfaces in the same 
parenthetical as her "dissociati[on]" from a discussion about "boots." As Bataille notes, feet bring 
  54 
to mind the dirty, grounded material foundation upon which existence rests. At first reading, it 
may seem as though Mrs. Ramsay is retreating from a materialistic discussion in favor of an 
ethereal, imaginative space more appropriate to the feminine "servile subjectivity" Angelella 
describes (175). However, by figuring herself as a hawk in flight while serving an excessive 
amount of excessively sensual food, Mrs. Ramsay exhibits Bataille's materialism: she brings 
together the low and high, again "peer[ing] into the earthenware pot" while afloat on the 
"smoke"-like "element of joy" that is "rising upwards." Despite its acrobatics, a hawk is a 
material creature; while Hopkins' hawk symbolizes the kernel of immaterial, divine grace in all 
material, Mrs. Ramsay's hawk reverses this, pointing toward a material, gem-like "stability [. . .] 
in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral." She envisions her "joy" not as an intangible 
feeling, but as an "element" that both buoys and pervades her. In Woolf's liminal dinner setting, 
Mrs. Ramsay presides over ritualized consumption, crafting rather than performing her own 
subjectivity and that of those who eat her food. 
 Angelella, noting that Mrs. Ramsay never eats the boeuf, claims that this scene represents 
"a servile subjectivity, in which the woman is alienated from her own bodily needs and desires 
and does not incorporate her external world, but rather serves it" (175-6). Although Mrs. Ramsay 
does seem alienated from her bodily needs, her distribution of the boeuf need not be read as 
servitude. By doling out the meat, Mrs. Ramsay creates not only a transformative moment, but 
also a comedic one: we know she intends to stop serving William, yet we witness her distraction 
as her thoughts soar to sublime heights, and she continues. She finally assures William, who has 
not asked, that "there is plenty for everyone" (105). Although she doesn't consume, she controls 
others' consumption. While her thoughts fly like Hopkins' falcon, she forces a man (one whom 
she suspects desires her) to confront heaps of her excessive, sensuous, material food. This 
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interaction, like the others during the dinner party, brings two characters' complex relationship 
into focus: "Of such moments, she thought, the things is made that endures." Yet Mrs. Ramsay 
herself does not endure; she is dead when the narrative resumes after Time Passes. As in 
Hopkins’ “Windhover,” the disappearance of Mrs. Ramsay’s material form allows the full scope 
of her agency over the narrative to manifest. Like Mrs. Moore in the discussion of Forster to 
follow (whose name persists as a religious chant), Mrs. Ramsay’s absent body is replaced by the 
reformed relationships she leaves behind. 
Something's Fishy in Twin Peaks 
Although seemingly innocuous, food in David Lynch's Twin Peaks epitomizes the 
dangerous temptation of enjoyment. Sherryl Vint notes that Lynch uses both dialogue and 
camera angles to suggest Federal Agent Dale Cooper (Kyle MacLachlan)'s moral superiority 
relative to the other characters (72). As Lorna Piatti-Farnell claims, however, Cooper 
distinguishes himself from other lawful protagonists by his eagerness to indulge in bodily 
pleasure—especially the pleasure of eating (89). The Double-R Diner's cherry pie may be "damn 
fine," as Cooper remarks, but its consumption comes with a price. In Twin Peaks, as in Woolf's 
To the Lighthouse, shared meals are spaces in which identities are in flux, and the dynamics of 
relationships manifest in tangible ways, generating an abundance of tension. Unlike Mrs. 
Ramsay's dinner party, during which most detail reaches the reader through inner monologue, 
Lynch's meals are punctuated by unsettling external interruptions. In the isolated town of Twin 
Peaks, to open one's mouth is to open one's body to various external forces—some decidedly 
unsavory. By attending to the infamous "fish in the percolator," an encounter with the Log Lady, 
dinner at the Palmer residence, and the Black Lodge's demonic diet, I will show that Lynch treats 
the shared meal as a space in which relationships and subjectivities are sharply altered. Much 
like Leggatt irrupts into Conrad's captain's isolated world, so manifestations of base material 
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irrupt into the small town of Twin Peaks, often using food—and its association with waste—as a 
conduit. Lynch treats the meal as a vulnerable, open moment in an individual's daily life, and this 
openness parallels the act of eating: as a bit of the external world enters the body and is digested, 
so external forces invade the communal body of participants in the mealtime ritual. Digestion 
often entails unforeseen discomfort; similarly, the forces at play around food in Twin Peaks often 
suggest hidden malevolence. This subtle evil finds its ultimate manifestation when it moves from 
food, which becomes part of one's body, to doppelgängers, complete body doubles who usurp 
their original subjects. In this way, Lynch is strikingly Conradian: unsettling moments in which 
knowledge is both tempting and destructive form the connective tissue of Twin Peaks' mythos. 
As the Black Lodge's demons and doppelgängers underlie the deceptively placid suburbs, so 
dangerously seductive food lurks beneath the show's detective narrative. And, as the Black 
Lodge makes a mockery of logic and language, so Lynch's food highlights the impossibility of 
Cooper's quest fully to understand Laura Palmer's murder. 
 In my previous chapter on Conrad, I raised the following question: how are we to 
conceive of the self as it navigates liminal space? If the liminal self temporarily loses its 
conventional subjectivity, what remains in the interim? Whatever remains is not intelligible, and 
so Bataille's base material became a helpful concept for envisioning this liminal remainder. 
Bataille's big toe reminds us that our anthropocentric privileging of the head and its ideas is 
arbitrary: the filthy toe is the ultimate foundation and substance of all matter, and Leggatt's 
naked emergence from the depths signals this. Although she locates her work in a tradition of 
vitalist philosophers, Jane Bennett shows an affinity with base materialism. In Vibrant Matter, 
Bennett argues that objects are only objects insofar as subjects perceive them as Other. She joins 
W. J. T. Mitchell in describing a pre-human, "never objectifiable depth" from which objects "rise 
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up toward our superficial knowledge" (2). Mirroring William Freedman's interest in Conrad's 
knowledge-resistant "foggy spots," Bennett notes the limitation of our superficial knowledge; she 
cites Hent de Vries' notion of the "absolute," that which is "loosened off" from the human 
intellect and thus marks its boundary (3). Bennett departs from Freedman, de Vries, and her 
vitalist predecessors (primarily Spinoza and Thoreau) by focusing her inquiry not on the nature 
of this limitation and the intellectual gap it presents, but on "the moment of independence (from 
subjectivity) possessed by things, a moment that must be there, since things do in fact affect 
other bodies, enhancing or weakening their power" (3). Independent from subjectivity, objects 
are no longer objects, but rather "things," "vivid entities not entirely reducible to the contexts in 
which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics" (5). Here Bennett 
borrows from sociologist Bruno Latour, who claims that stable objects as such do not exist. 
Instead, drawing on the Icelandic etymology of the word "thing" as an assembly to address 
matters of concern, Latour analyzes malleable gatherings of actors and elements (39). Both 
Latour and Bennett acknowledge the recalcitrant stuff that remains—and acts—despite our 
failure to grasp it with the intellect. When this anthropocentric curtain of the object's dependence 
on the subject falls, both humans and their former objects are revealed to be ontologically equal. 
This equivalence is "neither a smooth harmony of parts nor a diversity unified by a common 
spirit," but is rather a Deleuzean smooth space without fixed points by which to triangulate 
subject and object (xi).  
 Bennett's "thing-power," the ability of things or "actants" to manifest traces of 
independence by exerting force upon other bodies, is similar to Deleuze's haecceity, an affective 
force not distinguishable as a subject or object (xvi). However, unlike Deleuze's paradigm, in 
which the smooth spaces of haecceities exist independently from the striated spaces of subjects 
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and objects, Bennett's thing-power always underlies the forces of human agency: "[t]o note this 
fact [that things and persons constantly exchange properties] explicitly, which is also to begin to 
experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take 
a step toward a more ecological sensibility" (10). As I've argued in the previous chapter, if a 
person inhabits a smooth space that lacks subject/object division, that person also inhabits 
liminal space; one cannot retain one's subjectivity without objects. Bennett's argument, in which 
thing-power is ubiquitous, implies that we are always poised at the threshold of liminal space. 
Therefore, by attending to things in liminal space, we also attend to humans. By bringing 
together Bataille's notion of foundational base material and Deleuze's notion of nondualistic 
space, Bennett provides a model for understanding the many interlocking liminal spaces and 
forces of Twin Peaks.4 
 The things of Twin Peaks—-especially the food—appear in a smorgasbord of liminal 
landscapes. The Double R Diner is a nostalgic break from modernity, One-Eyed Jack's is a 
temporary retreat from the town's conservative values, and the Great Northern Hotel, set apart 
atop a waterfall and steeped in the occluded aesthetic of the forest, is treated as a transient space 
for negotiation. I'll begin at the Great Northern, where we may attend to a misplaced fish. Like 
the scorpion in the first mate's inkwell in Conrad's "The Secret Sharer," Pete (Jack Nance)'s "fish 
in the percolator" not only resists, but also mocks attempts to understand it rationally. And, like 
Bennett's things, it exerts affective force over other bodies in the narrative. The scene, part of the 
second episode ("Traces to Nowhere"), begins by fading into a close-up shot of a chopping 
block. Three small silver fishes rest on the block, and two green bell peppers rest at its side. We 
see Pete's hands gutting one of the fish for a few seconds before the scene cuts to Pete standing 
in profile, all but his hands and the block visible as he works. Josie Packard (Joan Chen) wanders 
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leisurely into the room in her nightgown, and Pete corrects Josie's "on-top-of-the-morning-to-
you." Sheriff Harry Truman (Michael Ontkean) buzzes the intercom to tell Pete that he and 
Agent Cooper have arrived to question Josie about Laura Palmer's death. Josie looks unsettled 
for an instant before she recovers and offers to go make a fresh pot of coffee. During the ensuing 
discussion, Josie offers nothing of substance except Laura's last statement to her, "I think now I 
understand how you feel about your husband's death," of which Josie says: "I can't help hearing 
it in my head, like some haunting melody." Just before Truman is about to sip the coffee—and 
just after Cooper's first sip—Pete abruptly announces: "don't drink that coffee! You'd never 
guess, but there was a fish in the percolator!" For Cooper, who takes his coffee quality quite 
seriously, this fish is not easily forgotten: in the next few moments, we see his mouth working as 
his expression is uncharacteristically blank and sickened. This fish is itself a "haunting melody," 
a visual, olfactory earworm: Cooper mentions the coffee's fishy taste in the next scene, and 
Lynch never resolves the titillating mystery of its source for the viewer. Josie may have placed 
the fish to ward off further investigations by Cooper, but this is speculative at best. We soon see 
Pete scrubbing the percolator, but when he sniffs it, his face tells us that the fishy smell persists. 
In all of these ways, this scene's fish exert thing-power over Cooper, Truman, Pete, and the 
viewer. Despite its triviality, no one can get it out of his or her head, nose, or palette. Lynch is a 
disciple of Conrad: this dead fish rises from the blackness of the coffee just as Conrad's scorpion 
rises from the inkwell. And although it is a trivial food item—what we would readily call an 
"object"—this fish is a cypher for Laura's corpse, the recalcitrant mystery that drives the series. 
We might say that in Twin Peaks, something is fishy from the beginning. 
 Shortly after the fish incident, a memorable mealtime encounter occurs at the Double R 
Diner. Before his food is even served, Cooper sets an anxious tone for what should be a casual 
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meal at the Diner's counter. After suggesting that Cooper would enjoy the cherry pie, Truman 
makes a request of Shelly Johnson (Madchen Amick): "Can you ask Norma to stop by a second, 
Shelly?" When Shelly replies with a clipped, unthinking "Sure," Cooper interjects: "Nothing's a 
sure thing, Shelly." The camera turns to Shelly's face, which undergoes a subtle shift from 
impassive to bemused as she turns away. Cooper's ominous and out-of-place intrusion would 
provoke surprise in most contexts, but Shelly's reaction is closer to flirtatiousness than fear. 
Cooper then deepens the subtle sense of dread by evoking the fish-in-the-percolator incident: 
"Damn, I still can't get the taste of that fish-filtered coffee out of my mouth." Although the 
Double R's coffee is damn fine, the taste of fish persists. As Cooper and Truman begin to talk 
shop, the camera pans to the Log Lady (Catherine E. Coulson), who hunches over her log 
(played by itself) in a nearby seat. Her mystique is palpable. "Hi," says Cooper in her direction. 
She glances up in brief reproach before turning back to her log. Cooper asks Truman if he can 
inquire about her log, to which the Sheriff replies, "many have." But before he can, Norma 
(Peggy Lipton) arrives with the pie. Norma confirms that Laura had been an organizer and 
volunteer for meals-on-wheels, "delivering hot dinners to elderly shut-ins." Truman asks Norma 
to find the names of those on Laura's route, suggesting an association between the arrival of food 
and murder. Cooper orders two more pieces of pie, and at that moment, the Log Lady approaches 
and addresses him: 
"For your information, I heard you speaking about Laura Palmer. One day, my log will 
have something to say about this. My log saw something that night."  
"Really? What did it see?" 
"Ask it." 
When both the Sheriff and Federal Agent hesitate, the Log Lady makes a frustrated face, 
declares "I thought so," and leaves. This exchange not only interrupts Cooper's enjoyment of an 
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excessive amount of pie, but seems provoked by his order. Cooper's initial, verbal salutation to 
the Log Lady is fruitless, as is his silence. The characters will learn that to communicate with the 
log and gain vital knowledge about the murder case, they must not only suspend their disbelief, 
but also suspend logic and accept a paradigm in which non-human materials have agency. Like 
large quantities of donuts, coffee, and cherry pie, the log occupies a central yet obscure place in 
Twin Peaks' narrative. Lynch treats mealtime, during which the body is open, as a liminal space 
in which engagement with these material actants is possible. Cooper's hesitant yet curious 
reaction to the Log Lady's interruption echoes Shelly's earlier reaction to Cooper's mysterious 
interjection: "Nothing's a sure thing." Both characters are tempted and pleased by these 
interrupting forces, yet do not embrace them—yet. 
 The disruptive emergences of material agency in Twin Peaks begin gently; the surprising 
appearance of a fish, the oracular log, and the distractingly fine cherry pie harm no one. But as 
the series moves toward its climax—the revelation that Leland Palmer, possessed by BOB, raped 
and murdered his daughter—the material incursions grow increasingly violent. Non-human 
materials, especially foods, abruptly exert force over participants in shared meals; material 
actants take advantage of the vulnerability that attends consumption. One could claim that to 
"take advantage of" a situation requires human agency, not unmotivated thing-power. However, 
as Bennett shows with a variety of examples, material often exploits both its environment and 
agents with which it interacts: a current follows the path of least resistance not because it desires 
to, but because it is able to. The same logic applies to material actants' exploitation of the open, 
vulnerable, changing bodies that inhabit the shared meal space. As we've seen in Woolf's To the 
Lighthouse, dinner parties are liminal rituals: within a dinner's space and allotted time, 
participants' conventional roles are clarified and altered. Instead of moving between characters' 
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inner-monologues, Lynch externalizes the traumatic disturbances that simmer beneath the 
suburban dinner party's polite surface. 
 Lynch's violent externalization of turbulent material forces is evident during the inaugural 
meeting of the Hayward Supper Club, hosted by Donna Hayward (Lara Flynn Boyle)'s youngest 
sister Gersten (Alicia Witt) in their family's dining room. The episode, "May the Giant Be with 
You," is the first of season two and occurs shortly before we learn that Leland is Laura's 
murderer. The scene begins by drawing our attention to food, as Donna (investigating her 
friend's death) calls Norma to adopt Laura's old Meals-on-Wheels route. She asks to "use the 
Double-R's station wagon," setting a nostalgic tone by referencing both a classic American diner 
and classic American car. Beneath the nostalgia, the dark opening chords of "Laura Palmer's 
Theme" add a dimension of dread and impending violence to the scene. As Donna hangs up the 
phone and looks pensively downward, a shadow falls across her face, mirroring Laura's leitmotif. 
If left to play a few more seconds, the first few notes of "Laura Palmer's Theme's" simple piano 
melody would have broken through the synthesizer's looming minor chords like beams piercing a 
dark mist. Instead, Lynch cuts to a shot of the Hayward's dinner table, and the leitmotif fades 
into long, quiet, nondescript major chords. This frustrates the viewer's expectations, since 
composer Angelo Badalamenti uses Laura's theme frequently throughout the series to build from 
a moment of despair or tension to a moment of hope, relief, or redemption. Instead, we're 
presented with Gersten's monologue: her "good news" is that she's landed the part of "fairy 
princess" in her school play, and that she "got the highest scores in mathematics and English this 
midseason term, just as my sisters Harriet and Donna did before me. So now I don't have to 
worry about being ashamed anymore." All that Gersten brings to the table, including her 
predictable classical music, is regurgitated. Perhaps most egregiously, she fetishizes the pink 
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costume she wears (complete with wand and tiara) by calling it her "special dress." She 
unknowingly plays the Trickster in this mealtime ritual, parroting convention to such a degree 
that convention is revealed to be groundless.5 This insipid monologue, following Donna's 
nostalgic promise of diners and station wagons, and underwritten by musical frustration, initiates 
the dinner's tedium. It is through this tedium that material forces make their violent entrances. 
 As Harriet (Jessica Wallenfels), the Hayward's middle child, begins to recite her poem 
about Laura, Gersten's opening notes on the piano do not harmonize with the non-diegetic music. 
The effect is an unsettlingly dissonant setting for lines that are already eerie: "It was Laura. And 
I saw her glowing. / In the dark woods, I saw her smiling." The second line evokes Ghostwood 
Forest, the site of Laura's murder, although Harriet couldn't know this. This allusion jars the 
viewer; it slips past the listening characters, though the cryptic imagery and sparse piano do seem 
to unsettle Mrs. Palmer. While Gersten's monologue is banal but appropriate, Harriet's poem is 
emotional and deeply personal. She hesitates and stutters as she reads, and her refrain, "it was 
Laura," grows more insistent each time she utters it. Harriet is sharing her "dreams" in poetic 
form, and her poem's surreal logic—"the woods was our sadness, / the dance was her calling"—
further disturbs Mrs. Palmer, whose face contorts in a mixture of pain and exasperation. What is 
presented as a family-friendly dinner performance becomes another link to Laura's murder. 
Defying dinnertime expectations of cleanliness and neutral conversation, Laura's corpse—and 
the woods into which her living body disappeared—arises from Harriet's dreams to exert force 
over the assembled guests. By participating in the liminal ritual of the shared meal, the characters 
expose themselves to the intrusion of dreams, food, and music: all material actants. 
 One of Twin Peaks' strengths is its ability to skirt the line between realistic and 
metaphysical causation. Lynch creates bizarre situations, such as the fish in the percolator, but 
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leaves the viewer to determine what agencies were at play (and whether said agencies were 
human). However, Lynch does not merely create a binary between the human and spiritual 
(angelic or demonic) realms. The ambiguities he leaves in his narrative, like Conrad's "spots of 
unknowing," do not present the reader with such simple choices. Rather, human bodies, non-
human materials, and metaphysical entities are all potential participants in the narrative. 
Moreover, Lynch blurs the boundaries between these actants: humans are interpolated with the 
demonic, but also with their own non-human bodily functions, as is apparent in the rest of the 
Hayward Supper Club scene. After Harriet's poem, the scene jumps ahead: dinner has been 
served, and Gersten is playing Mendelssohn, generating tension by making the guests uncertain 
about whether they should speak. The guests deepen the tension by clinking their silverware 
reluctantly over a classically American yet bland-looking meal of red meat, mashed potatoes, 
and vegetables. Donna whispers her investigation's latest development to Maddy (Sheryl Lee), 
while Doctor Hayward comments aloud on Leland's newly silver hair. Leland replies that he 
"woke up this morning, looked in the mirror, and there it was," and that he "physically felt like a 
great weight had been lifted from his heart." This may have been the weight of remorse. Leland's 
silver hair signifies his spiritual occupation by the demonic entity BOB, but that isn't all. Like the 
fish in the percolator, Leland's striking hair emerges without warning or context. This material 
change in Leland's body belies Agent Albert Rosenfield (Miguel Ferrer)'s later speculation that 
"BOB is just the evil that men do." It is reductionist to attribute the influence BOB has on 
Lynch's narrative to purely human agency. Rather, BOB is a demonic version of Thoreau's Wild 
as Bennett describes it: "a not-quite-human force that addled and altered human and other 
bodies" (2). Like the Wild, BOB tends to inhabit the wilderness, away from human constructs. 
But when BOB enters the civilized realm, he does more than addle bodies; he inhabits them, 
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doubles them, and ultimately destroys them. Like an all-consuming grief or anger given physical 
form, BOB has been dissolving Leland's identity from within. But is Leland consumed by 
emotion, by BOB, or by both? Perhaps BOB's presence and precise nature isn't the point. Instead, 
Lynch draws attention to the emotionally tortured body's attack on itself: Leland's silver hair 
worries his doctor, and his cheerful reaction to it disturbs his peers. Leland's behavior during the 
rest of dinner reveals the increasing intensity of Leland's bodily material's attack on its human 
subject. To express his newfound lightness of spirit, Leland insists on singing "Get Happy" with 
Gersten's accompaniment. Although the song starts out well enough, Leland quickly gets carried 
away, rushes ahead of the piano, and finally collapses on the floor. Even in his weakened state, 
he refuses to acknowledge his body's resistance; "'Begin the Beguine'!", he insists from the floor 
as Doctor Hayward examines him. Rather than dispel this dinner's mounting tension, Leland's 
ironically happy song makes it clear to everyone that the influence of Laura's death has not run 
its course. On the contrary: just as Laura's body unexpectedly emerges from the lake in the pilot 
episode, so the material factors and products of her death continue to surface through the town's 
other bodies. The eruption of Leland's silver hair during a ritualized shared meal is a warning: 
"the evil that men do" is certainly at play in the town of Twin Peaks, but so are the non-human, 
not-necessarily-metaphysical forces that surround and inhabit humans.6 The unappetizing food, 
uneaten and forgotten in the wake of Leland's awkward interruption and collapse, reminds us that 
materials are not inherently subordinate to human will. Food is not always our friend. 
 Leland's abortive performance associates food with dancing, as do Audrey Horne 
(Sherilyn Fenn)'s trance-like dances in the Double R Diner and The Man From Another Place 
(Michael J. Anderson)'s dances in the Black Lodge. More specifically, Lynch associates eating—
by Bennett's account, the consumption of vital bodies by other vital bodies—with movement. 
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Citing nineteenth-century philosophers Nietzsche and Thoreau, Bennett describes eating "as a 
series of mutual transformations in which the border between inside and outside becomes blurry: 
my meal both is and is not mine; you both are and are not what you eat" (49). Eating, then, is 
always a liminal act, an act that begins to dissolve subjective boundaries and allow movement 
across them. The act of eating does not have this effect in isolation (only on the eater), but on all 
bodies involved: "[i]n the eating encounter," continues Bennett, "all bodies are shown to be but 
temporary congealments of a materiality that is a process of becoming, is hustle and flow 
punctuated by sedimentation and substance." In the episode following the Supper Club, "Coma," 
Donna takes over Laura's Meals-On-Wheels route and experiences one of the most literal, yet 
metaphysical, movements of food in Twin Peaks. This moving food undermines the 
verisimilitude of Donna's world, exposing its many permeable boundaries. The scene in question 
opens with Donna walking slowly toward the camera, down a gently-winding paved path, 
carrying a closed silver cloche atop a tray. She's just entered a yard that is apparently surrounded 
by a high wooden fence, visible behind her. The high fence and its ruggedly ornate entryway 
(including a hanging log) mark Donna and her food's passage from the world of the Double R's 
Landrover, parked outside, to a space insolated from the Double R's cheery American 
normativity. Although she is in a residential area, Donna has entered what Northrop Frye calls a 
"green world," a liminal space where social conventions are temporarily suspended, allowing 
stymied elements of a plot to play out and resolve themselves before a return to normalcy. It is 
useful to describe Donna's stroll down this path as a passage into the green world rather than 
merely into liminal or smooth space. "Liminal" describes the transitional middle phase of a 
process, and Deleuze uses "smooth" to distinguish liminal spaces of fluid identity from "striated" 
spaces of fixed, socially determined identity. The green world is a liminal (and often smooth) 
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space, but it is unique in its propensity not only to suspend convention, but to harbor radically 
unconventional events—as Donna discovers, it is a magical space. Lynch's three-layered mise-
en-scène underscores the sense that Donna is moving between worlds: in the center of the shot 
we see, through the entryway's rectangular cut-out, the outermost layer in which the Landrover 
waits; closer to us, we see the fenced yard with its well-tended lawn, flowers, and path; and 
closest to the camera, the corner of a house dominates the shot's left side, as if we were peering 
around it to watch Donna. A menacing drone of low brass plays as Donna makes her way toward 
the camera, glances nervously around, and rounds the corner to the doorway. In the twenty 
seconds it takes for Donna and her food to cross two boundaries and reach a third—the car's 
threshold, the yard's threshold, and the house's threshold—Lynch associates the approach of food 
with the approach of danger. This scene's framing, its music, and Donna's slow, uncertain gait 
defamiliarize the conventionally safe suburban yard, capturing in a moment one of the series' 
major themes: that evil can lurk behind the appearance of convention. This change of perspective 
prepares the viewer for a more unorthodox movement of food in the next scene. 
 As Donna knocks on the door, the scene cuts to the interior of Mrs. Tremond (Frances 
Bay)'s apparently one-room house. Mrs. Tremond, an old woman with her frazzled gray hair in a 
bun, sits upright in a bed against a window. Facing her, a child of about six dressed in a tuxedo 
lounges on a chair. The camera lingers on this view for a long moment as Mrs. Tremond stares at 
the door but says nothing. Finally, she announces: "enter." This belabored and formal invitation 
to cross her threshold recalls the oddly ceremonial entryway to her yard. Like Conrad, Lynch 
marks significant thresholds—such as those between worlds—with material signposts that 
influence those whom encounter them. In Conrad's "The Secret Sharer," the narrator encounters 
"lines of fishing stakes resembling a mysterious system of half-submerged bamboo fences, 
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incomprehensible in its division of the domain of tropical fishes, and crazy of aspect as if 
abandoned forever by some nomad tribe of fisherman" at the Gulf of Siam's threshold (17). 
Similarly, in Heart of Darkness, Marlow recounts the row of shrunken heads on stakes that 
marks the threshold of Kurtz's house, noting one in particular: "there it was, black, dried, sunken, 
with closed eyelids, —a head that seemed to sleep at the top of that pole [. . .] smiling 
continuously at some endless and jocose dream of that eternal slumber" (71). In both instances, 
the material boundary of liminal space disorients and repels a narrator. The captain finds the 
fishing-stake-fence "mysterious," "incomprehensible," and "crazy." Though Marlow calls the 
shrunken heads "impressive," his language makes his impression clear: they are "black, dried, 
sunken." Like her Conradian predecessors, Donna reacts with confusion and a little fear to the 
markers of liminal thresholds, though she doesn't rationally grasp their significance. For her, 
these markers are the log-frame entryway and Mrs. Tremond's frail yet forceful voice: "enter."  
 Donna enters. She places the tray on a stack of old newspapers beside the bed. The 
camera cuts to a close-up of Mrs. Tremond having a coughing fit into her handkerchief. 
Although the food hasn't yet been revealed, this reminder of bodily expulsion initiates the "series 
of mutual transformations in which the border between inside and outside becomes blurry" that 
Bennett associates with eating (49). The dapper child gets Donna's attention to announce 
"sometimes things can happen just like this" (he snaps his fingers). As Mrs. Tremond opens the 
cloche, which holds a piece of fried chicken, rice, and creamed corn, her face registers surprise 
and indignation. "Do you see creamed corn on that plate?" she asks Donna. The camera cuts to a 
close-up of the meal, the corn an unappetizing, glistening blob. "Yes," Donna replies. "I 
requested no creamed corn," continues Mrs. Tremond, her voice trembling: "do you see creamed 
corn on that plate?" At first the repeated question seems meant to chastise Donna, but when 
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Donna glances down at the plate again, the corn has vanished. "No," she says, as a bass drum 
booms softly in the background. Mrs. Tremond's question moves from a rhetorical to a literal 
register: she is asking Donna whether she actually acknowledges the corn's material presence. 
The camera cuts to the child, who is now holding the creamed corn in his cupped hands. It then 
cuts to a close-up of the boy's exposed hands, and again we see the corn in uncomfortably fine 
detail, this time as it touches the exposed hands. Like Mrs. Tremond's coughing fit, this shot 
draws the viewer's attention to the permeability of the human body. As Bataille and Bennett 
argue, humans tend to imagine that they occupy a superior position to base material in an 
ontological hierarchy. And, as Julia Kristeva claims in her essay on abjection, humans are 
repulsed by reminders of our identity with nonliving material, our proximity to death—hence our 
commonly held fear of corpses (Powers of Horror). When a subject encounters material that is to 
become part of her, she would rather this merger be invisible, maintaining the semblance of 
distinction between the consuming subject and the consumed Other. But in this scene, the 
nourishing creamed corn's relationship to the body is not buffered by plate or utensil. We see it 
in the boy's hands, and though it was destined for a human stomach, we are repulsed. That no 
one actually eats in this scene reinforces the sense of food's independent agency; rather than 
serve the purpose arbitrarily assigned it by humans, the corn travels off its plate (beyond its 
boundaries) and across the room. This common food item, like the suburban yard outside, has 
become unfamiliar to Donna, and—in its movement across the room—magical. 
 In the space beyond Mrs. Tremond's threshold, food's unmotivated agency (Bennett's 
"thing-power") manifests as a mimicry of consumption. After the creamed corn moves instantly 
and invisibly from the plate to the boy's hands, it vanishes entirely. Creamed corn's later 
reappearance in the series as "garmonbozia," the sustenance of the Black Lodge's demons, 
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suggests that its initial disappearance is a digestion. It moves through the narrative's layers—the 
socialized realm of the suburb, and the base material realm of the Black Lodge—as if through 
bowels. Like Conrad's Kurtz, who begins as a rumor, manifests as "little more than a voice," and 
continues to exert force over the narrative after his burial in the muck, Lynch's food embodies 
the thing-power that radiates outward from his liminal interiors, crossing and unsettling 
subjective boundaries (57). Donna came to Mrs. Tremond's house not to be a good Samaritan, 
but to seek knowledge about her friend's murder. Without being asked, Mrs. Tremond points 
Donna toward her next clue (Mr. Smith's house), but the child offers extra, undesired knowledge. 
Despite Donna's drive rationally to grasp Laura's death, its causes are irreducible to reason: 
"sometimes things can happen just like this (snap)."  
 Conrad's characters tend to explore spaces that are liminal in their vastness, openness, 
and distance from civilization. They clearly begin and conclude their journeys through liminal 
space, and they are able to leave it behind. Lynch takes a different approach to embedding 
liminal spaces within his narratives. His liminal spaces tend to be interiors, close at hand but 
sealed off from the external world. Lynch's liminal spaces are never far away, and threaten 
constantly to reemerge. Mrs. Tremond's decor—faded red curtains, pinkish bedspread, and faded 
red carpet—evokes the Black Lodge, home of BOB and Twin Peaks' liminal space par-
excellence. Though the Black Lodge manifests in Cooper's prophetic dreams, and other rooms 
(like Blackie's room in One-Eyed Jack's) bear a resemblance to it, the Black Lodge never 
explicitly appears in the same material world as the characters. Even in the final episode 
("Beyond Life and Death"), when Cooper gains entry to the Lodge at the sycamore tree grove in 
Ghostwood, the Lodge hasn't physically manifested. Instead, an immaterial red velvet curtain 
fades slowly into view, and as Cooper walks through it, he is absorbed into the Black Lodge and 
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disappears until the camera cuts to the Lodge's interior. The names "Black Lodge" and "White 
Lodge" are ironic; as Cooper reminds us, “nothing’s a sure thing,” and nothing in Twin Peaks is 
simply black or white. Instead, Ghostwood Forest becomes a nexus for Conradian “spots of 
unknowing.” But unlike Conrad’s typical narrative arc, in which a character travels out (to sea, 
or into the jungle) to encounter tempting, dangerous foggy spots, Lynch’s spots function less like 
the Bermuda Triangle and more like an earthquake: they begin at an epicenter—an interior 
space—and move outward. The series frequently hints at Ghostwood as this epicenter of 
dangerous force: Laura's mother has a vision of her daughter's heart necklace buried in the 
woods; the final episode shows various characters' hands trembling as they feel the Black 
Lodge's influence; and a recurring shot of a traffic light at Ghostwood's edge changing from 
yellow to red betokens danger in following scenes. Like the forest in Heart of Darkness, 
Ghostwood exhibits a complex agency that predates human influence. Like Bennett's vibrant 
material, the forest acts despite its lack of human motivation. It opens the Lodge to Cooper, but it 
also provides the owls that serve as BOB's eyes. It allows Cooper to escape the Lodge, but as 
Lynch reveals in the series' final shot, he has become BOB's newest host: Cooper looks into a 
mirror, and a malicious stranger stares back. In Twin Peaks, as in Conrad and Woolf, the 
transformative potential of a liminal space depends upon the dangerous, tempting knowledge 
hidden there: knowledge about the nature of the demons—perhaps psychological, perhaps real—
involved in Laura's death. Twin Peaks' uniqueness lies in its representation of this knowledge as 
a force that is not distant, but locked away and simmering beneath the surface of everyday life. 
 Sheryl Vint notes the false binary of an insular suburban paradise and an external 
corrupting influence. Laura's life and murder belie that fiction. Not only was her life unaligned 
with nostalgic American ideals, her actions and motivations also can't be explained in binary 
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terms. Laura isn't a pure homecoming queen who Fell (capital F) into corruption. She is a human, 
never an angel. Twin Peaks' nostalgic narrative, supported by Cooper's vocal love of the town, 
actually points up the dangers of nostalgia not only to individuals, but to civilization. Lynch 
appeals to American viewers' desire for illusory ideals—as Vint says, "a past that never was"—
only to demonstrate the complexity and pain inherent in Laura's actual past. Idealistic nostalgia 
obscures the sources of current social problems: the investigators want Laura's death to be a 
simple, sterile mystery with an intelligible answer whose discovery leaves the community intact: 
"the evil that men do." Instead, it is the culmination of a muddy network of material forces, all 
constantly at work within the community. Nostalgia in Twin Peaks manifests as Laura's body—
each episode ends with credits rolling over a framed photo of Laura as homecoming queen—but 
also as food. Laura's haunting of the narrative is not distinct from food's ubiquity in it. Through 
food, Lynch warns that despite the idealized stories subjects craft for themselves and others, 
material forces—consumption and expulsion—still motivate them. Vint claims that Twin Peaks' 
central ethos is "the longing for a stable, virtuous moral universe and the impossibility of finding 
anything that does not fall into corruption." I add that this ethos is not only the failure to find a 
bastion from corruption, but the recognition that what appears in binary logic as "corruption" is 
actually a field of forces, especially consumption, inherent to any community. For this reason, 
Lynch portrays BOB and the other Black Lodge spirits as consummating their murders by eating 
"garmonbozia"—creamed corn, the food that appears and disappears so unexpectedly in Mrs. 
Tremond's house. Twin Peaks, like anywhere else, is driven by material forces: though these are 
often uncontrollable and unintelligible, they don't disappear when ignored. 
 Mrs. Ramsay and Laura Palmer are both women who drive the narratives in which they 
appear before and after their absence. The narrative becomes a series of their traces. Like the 
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thing-power of Bennett's vibrant material, these women's agencies persist after they become 
lifeless material. Cooper and Donna try to follow those traces to their end, which they imagine to 
be knowledge that will end Laura's posthumous hold over their lives. They discover that this 
knowledge is not the cathartic end of a linear path, but an ubiquitous force—perhaps an affect—
that can be encountered, but not contained. Both before and after death, consumption is a force 
through which human bodies constantly reconstitute themselves. To the Lighthouse and Twin 
Peaks ritualize subject-formation through consumption by placing their characters in liminal 
settings. The tedium of shared meals arises from the forced interaction of unstable subjects: food 
clashes and merges with other material under a veneer of civility. The resulting fireworks mark 
the futility of repressing these forces and the opportunity for women to resist oppressive, 
conventional expectations.
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CHAPTER 4: FRAGMENTS OF MEMORY IN THOM GUNN'S THE MAN WITH 
NIGHT SWEATS 
“These fragments I have shored against my ruins” 
—T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land 
 
Thom Gunn's poetry chronicles transition. His poems are in constant motion, traveling 
from Britain to America, from safety to danger, from intimate physical presence to memory, and 
from life to death. Gunn lived much of his early life in a liminal state. Bruce Woodcock 
describes him as a "chameleon poet," moving between social roles without fully actualizing any 
of them (61). These various facets persist throughout Gunn's career, though the later poet is less 
inwardly focused. In The Man with Night Sweats (1992), Gunn recalls the early spread of HIV 
infection, when AIDS, the syndrome caused by the HIV retrovirus, became a deadly stigma for 
gay men. In the early eighties, methods of HIV transmission were unclear, and the FDA didn't 
release the first antiretroviral drug until 1987 (aids.gov). Gunn preserves fragments of deceased 
friends' memories while lamenting their twin killers: the epidemic and the complicit, 
misinformed, or homophobic public discourses that surrounded (and continue to surround) it. A 
drive to preserve these friends' disintegrating bodies in memory—finding safety for them after 
their death—runs through Gunn's poetry. Whereas Janine Utell describes the dinner party in 
Woolf's To the Lighthouse as a "proleptic elegy," mourning Mrs. Ramsay before her passing, 
Gunn reverses this gesture, seeking a postmortem refuge for his loved ones. As Deborah Landau 
notes, Gunn's poetry about AIDS contains "a brief, reluctant concession about the possibility of 
regeneration," but this is not to be mistaken for the "epiphany" of earlier modernists like T. S. 
Eliot and Wallace Stevens (198). In Eliot's Four Quartets
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promise: the last poem, "Little Gidding," acknowledges death but prophesizes that "the end of all 
our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time." 
Although death ends "all our exploring," we still "arrive" somewhere and "know" something, 
implying that death is not annihilation but a new mode of existence. For Stevens, especially in 
Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, imagination exerts force against reality, and this 
transformative force is manifest and communicable in poetry's playful abstractions. Unlike Eliot 
and Stevens, who lived through the twentieth century's World Wars without serving on the front 
lines, Gunn directly witnessed the decimation of his community by HIV. The result is poetry 
bereft of most abstraction, containing and insulating the details of particular lives and bodies 
against destructive rhetoric. Though not a soldier, Gunn fits into a tradition of English war poetry 
begun by the likes of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, a tradition that diverges from the 
modernist current and distinguishes him from his postmodern contemporaries: he resists reality 
not by turning to religion or imagination to transform it, but by embracing the material body's 
instability and surviving in spite of it.  
  Gunn's work in the early nineties exemplifies his vision of the unstable self as it exists, 
thrives, and grieves in liminal settings. Unlike Conrad, who flirts with the dissolution of the self 
but retreats, and Woolf, who uses temporary liminal settings to bring the shifting contours of the 
self into clearer focus, Gunn commits to inhabiting liminal space. In The Man with Night Sweats, 
Gunn's characters encounter deceased friends in dreamscapes situated between consciousness 
and annihilation. Unlike Conrad's Marlow, they do not bury these apparitions and move on; 
instead, Gunn's dreamers touch, speak with, and share the suffering of these embodied visions. 
The ironic contrasts—and overlaps—between dream and reality render legible the illusory, 
politicized, and often destructive barriers between bodies. This recognition entails the acceptance 
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of intimacy despite bodily risk. Bodies are never perfectly safe, but for Gunn, loss of intimacy is 
a terrible consequence of, not the solution to, the HIV epidemic.7 
The Problems of Safety and Containment 
Though he misjudges the function of Gunn's poetic personas, Bruce Woodcock (writing in 1993) 
is among the first critics to note the thematic search for safety in Gunn's work, and his 
interpretation of the young Gunn's poetry is foundational to an understanding of the older Gunn's 
characters. Woodcock finds a defensive posture in Gunn's Beat poems of the sixties that their 
American counterparts, notably Allen Ginsberg's "Howl," reject. Woodcock explains that 
"[Gunn's] best poems of this period achieve a play-off between explosive subjects and tight-
lipped formal concentration. Their veneer of rebelliousness is contained in a formal poetic 
practice which American Beats had already overthrown" (62). This statement has a troubling 
implication. By framing the decision not to use formal verse in the sixties as a matter of forward 
progress, Woodcock assumes that verse can contain—but never fully express—repressed desire. 
He goes on to confirm this: 
Desire, fantasy, bodily energies—all fascinate [Gunn] and are clothed in the rebellious 
subcultural poses of the rock-'n'-roll decade. But their subversive implications are then 
resolutely contained by the controlling will of the verse form—as if, despite the freedoms 
of America, Gunn were as yet incapable of confronting the implications head-on or in the 
open. (63) 
There is truth to the notion that verse forms exert a "controlling will" over the content of poems; 
however, there is no reason to assume that forms are masks, poses, or barriers to authentic 
expression. It is also true that Gunn, up to this point in his career, lacked the "explicit homo-
erotic poems like [Ginsberg's] 'Many Loves'" (62). But Woodcock falsely equates fullness of 
expression with explicitly homoerotic content. Indeed, by portraying sixties Gunn as lacking the 
chutzpah to confront desire's implications "head-on or in the open," and by denigrating the use of 
formal verse to tackle "explosive subjects" as "rather like John Dowland singing Presley's 
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'Jailhouse Rock' to lute accompaniment," Woodcock reenacts the macho trope which he reads as 
a "veneer of rebelliousness" in English and American Beats (63, 62). Despite this, he raises a 
crucial point: "Tailored into verse, the leather-clad Beat imagery is expressed and made safe. It 
allowed Gunn to explore experiences which touched on hidden sexual fascinations, without 
having to come out from behind the pose" (63, emphasis original). I agree that Gunn's 
"fascinations," elaborated as "images of leather, straps, whips" and "an obsession for soldiers, 
warriors, heroes," are made "safe" by their ambiguity and form. But a combative "pose" rendered 
in formal verse need not be a hiding place for a more authentic voice. Rather, Gunn's steadfast 
forms provide structural support for the expression of content that is not only socially 
"explosive," but also deeply, lyrically painful. 
 Gunn's early macho poses (like the "flesh" that "was its own shield" in the later "Man 
with Night Sweats") are transitory protective devices, yet they are not fearful or passive. Poems 
like "On the Move" celebrate the poet's ability to contain (and only then express) the suffering 
that attends movement between identities. In this context, to "resolutely contain" the implications 
of desire is not to negate them, but to circumscribe and preserve them. For example, in "On the 
Move" (The Sense of Movement, 1957) Gunn compares the movement of passing bikers with that 
of birds, and finds instinct to be a prominent drive for both. Though the bikers enact what 
Woodcock would describe as a macho pose, Gunn does not portray them as invulnerable. The 
bikers wear "gleaming jackets," icons of the pose Woodcock notes, but they hold their 
motorcycles, representative of the human will, "by calf and thigh" (lines 14, 12). This tenuous 
grip on an "imperfectly control[led]" will propels the bikers into an indeterminate "future from 
the taken routes" (25-6). Echoing the "uncertain violence" of the birds' movement in the first 
stanza, the bikers "strap in doubt—by hiding it, robust— / And almost hear a meaning in their 
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noise" (15-6). Rather than eliding their "doubt" about their destination, value, and purpose in 
favor of stereotypical bravado, Gunn portrays the bikers with their insecurities strapped to their 
bodies. Though they are made "robust" by hiding "doubt," it is transparent to the reader, as is the 
"almost" that qualifies the "meaning in their noise." Neither Gunn nor his characters hide behind 
poses. Instead, Gunn creates surrogates rich with strengths and weaknesses. Each identity helps 
the poet express a particular mode of anxiety or suffering (here the existential worry over life's 
direction, and later the more immediate destruction caused by HIV); and, each is temporary, 
meant to play a role and fade away. The bikers demonstrate this: "A minute holds them, who 
have come to go: / The self-defined, astride the created will / They burst away" (33-5). It is this 
openness to the body's frequently shifting boundaries that allows Gunn to respond to the AIDS 
crisis with The Man with Night Sweats, a book that affirms intimacy despite the body's inevitable 
dissolution. 
 "On the Move" is written in a variation of ottava rima: each of its five eight-line stanzas 
of iambic pentameter uses an ABACCDDB rhyme scheme. Rather than evoking Elvis Presley 
wearing a ruff, as Woodcock suggests, this formal choice provides structural support for the 
poem's sense of movement (appropriate for a poem published in The Sense of Movement). The 
original ottava rima form uses the ABABABCC scheme. Like the Italian and Elizabethan sonnet 
forms, this pattern alters its end-rhymes in the final couplet in order to introduce a new idea or 
invert the reader's expectations. In Gunn's subtly adjusted pattern, two new sets of consecutive 
end-rhymes (CC and DD) build the poem's momentum by propelling each stanza forward more 
quickly than the original alternating scheme. When this momentum peaks, each stanza's final line 
returns to B, an end-rhyme from the second line that barely remains on the reader's palate. While 
the original ottava rima form drives toward its concluding couplets as if willfully following a 
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predetermined path, Gunn's variation in "On the Move" reflects the poem's content: it "spurts" 
forward "astride the created will," yet circles back on itself, enhancing the poem's sense of 
forward movement despite frustrated desire (lines 3, 34). The poem's final lines render this 
tension explicit: "At worst, one is in motion; and at best, / Reaching no absolute, in which to rest, 
/ One is always nearer by not keeping still" (38-40). Much is summarized in this final end-
rhyme: the poem's form lends it a constant rhythm, a "will," that propels it forward despite its 
thematic treatment of uncertain direction, the threat of becoming "still." Gunn's use of form is 
not a decorative mask for "a submerged exploration of sexual identity"—it is an extension of that 
exploration, one which develops throughout his career. 
 Whether submerged or transparent, the exploration of sexual identity entails social and 
physical risk. Given the ubiquity of AIDS after the eighties, this risk drastically multiplies. 
George Piggford lays out the various forces composing AIDS not only as a disease, but as an 
unruly collection of discourses at the turn of the millennium: 
[I]n theoretical discourses, "AIDS" tends to signify an overdetermined set of possible 
referents. These include a physical condition (overlapping with the notion of AIDS 
constructed through medical discourses); an American, politically conservative 
conspiracy to eliminate homosexuality; a threat to the singularity and uniqueness of one's 
own body; an opportunity to reconceptualize the significations of homosexuality and the 
homosexual community; an opportunity for large pharmaceutical companies to exploit 
economically those infected with HIV; fear; death; etc. (171) 
The majority of these forces are threats to be neutralized. Piggford explains the distinction 
between the perspective of AIDS theorists and that of the medical community. Theorists like Lee 
Edelman, claims Piggford, have lost faith in the medical community and see it as their task to 
comprehend, contain, and perhaps redirect the various AIDS discourses (176). Eric Savoy rightly 
worries that with this focus on rhetoric rather than syndrome, "The distinction between body and 
text tends to blur" (Savoy 73; Piggford 177). Piggford solves this dilemma by noting that the 
"tropic" comprehension of AIDS-as-discourse and the "empirical" apprehension of AIDS as a 
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material, observable syndrome are not mutually exclusive (179). He offers an arena in which to 
approach the space between these paradigms:  
[L]iterary texts can inscribe both discourses in an attempt to make sense of AIDS in a 
way that is not strictly scientific, theoretical, or rationalistic. The writing of literature, as a 
creative or imaginative endeavor, can inscribe what is often unwritable in more strictly 
organized and limited forms of discourse such as the medical text or the theoretical 
inquiry. In this way, literature provides a context in which one might attempt to read the 
illegible. (179) 
Piggford is describing a liminal space, a cognitive gap experienced not only by persons living 
with AIDS, but also by those who witness their deterioration. Piggford notes the ability of 
authors including Hervé Guibert, Tony Kushner, and Gunn to navigate this space by writing "as 
close to death as possible," by approaching the "'threshold of revelation'," the "moment of the 
apprehension of death" (180). Piggford's argument recalls Conrad's depiction of the approach to 
Koh-ring in "The Secret Sharer": in the liminal setting of the Gulf of Siam, the captain is able to 
approach the gnosis of a near-death experience and to contain it, albeit imperfectly, within his 
story. In Conrad, as in AIDS writers and especially Gunn, a fatal (or near-fatal) approach to the 
unknown allows a subject to relinquish its conventional boundaries. In the literary, liminal 
settings in which these boundaries are temporarily displaced, the reader can access, and relate to, 
the writer's suffering. As I will demonstrate, Gunn's dreamscapes in The Man with Night Sweats 
function as effective liminal spaces for dissolving subjective boundaries and containing the 
tropic and empirical experiences of persons living with AIDS. At stake in the successful 
expression of these experiences are the identities of the narrator, bereaved, and departed alike; all 
approach (if not complete) fusion in the dreamscape. 
 Containment is a word that connotes safety from a pervasive danger. To contain AIDS 
discourses in literature does not reduce the physical danger of HIV infection, but it does serve 
the affective function of preserving loved ones in memory without reducing them to the material 
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reality of their disease or its rhetorical implications. Literature also provides a safe space for 
persons living with AIDS to contain their suffering enough to communicate it. In this way, 
Gunn's AIDS poetry continues his earlier work's search for safety, and his formal verse is 
complimented by a more neutral, less gritty narrative aesthetic. The speaker of Gunn's poems in 
The Man With Night Sweats is similar to Christopher Isherwood's narrator of The Berlin Stories: 
not a leather-clad rebel but a self-proclaimed "camera," a nondescript (if not dispassionate) 
portrayer of life during a major urban crisis (1). Deborah Landau picks up the thread of safety in 
Gunn's work by noting that "[t]he question of how to endure is a crucial one for Gunn and for 
any poet writing about AIDS. The AIDS epidemic raises the stakes in the modernist crisis of 
belief and adds resonance to [Wallace] Stevens's dictum that the role of the poet is to 'help 
people to live their lives'" (198, emphasis mine). The impetus for the "modernist crisis of 
belief"—two World Wars of such violence as to defy containment in language and religious 
paradigm—is replicated in the AIDS crisis, but epidemics, unlike most wars, lack boundaries 
between home and military fronts. There is no physical space of respite in the San Francisco 
under siege by AIDS: citing Michel Foucault, Autumn Fiester and Lance Wahlert note that the 
medical clinic is 
an intensely problematic space for queers because many of their identities and categories 
were born there. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, with the rise of medical 
disciplines such as sexology and psychology, there began the naming and diagnosing of 
various forms of sexual and gender non-normativity in a clinical context. (86) 
The authors point out that this "naming and diagnosing" in the late nineteenth-century may have 
been intended to supersede obsolete categories such as "sodomy," but homosexuality had 
actually been "migrated into a discourse of pathology" under the umbrella of science and 
medicine (87). This historical moment, in which clinical terminology cloaked moral judgment, 
established a mistrust between LGBTQ persons as the clinic that, as Landau suggests, caused 
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many to lose faith in the medical community as their first line of defense against the AIDS crisis. 
In the landscape of The Man With Night Sweats, neither the hospital nor one's bed offer safety. 
This renders literary accounts of the crisis, especially poetry, all the more important as safe 
spaces for authors and readers to process, mourn, and preserve memories. The liminal spaces 
found within poetry are recuperative; the identities at stake are those of author, narrator, and 
reader, who do not transform (as in Conrad and Woolf) but merge into a shared identity. 
The Material of Memory 
One recurring question throughout this study has been: if a person abandons the conventions by 
which she defines herself when she enters a liminal setting, what is the nature of the self that 
exists for the duration of the liminal experience? In chapter two, Bataille has offered the 
beginning of an answer with base materialism, but base material even as confronted by Conrad is 
still (ironically) abstract. Like Conrad and Woolf, Gunn recognizes the transformative potential 
of liminal settings, especially when embedded within a spiritual or social ritual. Indeed, many of 
his poems' narratives are ritualized remembrances of sexual encounters, characterized by 
communal transformative experiences much like the liminal phases of van Gennep's rites of 
passage. But while Conrad retreats from the darkest, most violent revelations liminal space has to 
offer, and Woolf focuses on the refashioning of conventional roles made possible in social ritual, 
Gunn observes—and doesn't turn from—the dropping away of all that composes the self, both 
socially and physically. This compassionate yet objective attention brings Gunn the closest yet to 
showing readers the liminal self. Gunn had an affinity for Christopher Isherwood, whose narrator 
begins The Berlin Stories by stating: "I am a camera with its shutter open, quite passive, 
recording, not thinking" (1). Considered together, the four sections of The Man with Night 
Sweats resemble a photo album or perhaps a documentary film. Although the first three contain 
gritty, playful portraits of characters Gunn knew in San Francisco, their taut forms seem to 
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anticipate tragedy; the fourth section begins in-medias-res, as the poet considers the plague's 
continuing devastation and confronts the inevitably dissolving boundaries of his own body. 
Rather than mirror their dying subjects by gradually moving toward free verse, the book's later 
poems maintain Gunn's signature formal control. Gunn's very English maintenance of formal 
verse even in the face of disaster is indicative of his association in the fifties with The 
Movement, a group of poets attracted to the pastoral images and precise, conventional forms of 
traditional English poetry. The Movement poets, who included Philip Larkin, Ted Hughes, 
Robert Conquest, and other English poets, saw their work as oppositional to the sprawling 
metaphysical explorations of modernists like Eliot (Lodge 9). But Gunn's work with The 
Movement didn't extend far beyond the sixties, and he is neither conservative nor nostalgic—if 
anything, like Lynch, he warns against nostalgia which obscures present problems. If Gunn 
admires Isherwood's "camera" narrator, he emulates the open shutter and passive recording, not 
the lack of "thinking." By confronting readers with both lived grief and memories of grief—grief 
that he has already begun actively to fit into his worldview—Gunn achieves the Owen-esque 
goal of communicating violent events that resist circumscription in the imagination. 
 Although Gunn's love of formal verse persists in his later poetry, and Landau rightfully 
claims that Gunn rejects Eliot's metaphysical promises, there is a kinship between Eliot's urban 
waste land and Gunn's disease-riddled San Francisco. The Waste Land features—or elegizes—
vampire-like denizens of an "Unreal City," people who find themselves spiritually bereft in the 
aftermath of the First World War (Moody 87). Gunn's San Francisco is the Unreal City's material 
counterpart, populated not by vampires but their anemic, suffering victims. Like Eliot's denizens, 
the people with AIDS whom Gunn describes are betrayed by a manifestly fraudulent faith. As 
Eliot elaborates in the subsequent Four Quartets, this fraudulent faith (held by the Unreal City's 
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denizens) is in the expressive power of language at the expense of religion. For Eliot, the divine 
word (logos) transcends humanity's symbols, which (as defined by Coleridge in his Biographia 
Literaria) are material objects gesturing toward divinity (Parker 178). Gunn, in a similar vein, 
laments his characters' false faith in the material wholeness and consistency of their bodies. As 
the eponymous yet anonymous narrator of the title poem, "The Man with Night Sweats," recalls, 
"My flesh was its own shield: / Where it was gashed, it healed" (Gunn 461, lines 5-6). It is here, 
at a crucial junction, where Gunn's elegy diverges from Eliot's. Rather than reaching away from 
the failing material body toward transcendence in the form of divinity, or seeking refuge in the 
imagination, the poet frankly acknowledges his body's weakness: 
I cannot but be sorry 
The given shield was cracked 
My mind reduced to hurry, 
My flesh reduced and wrecked. (13-6) 
 
Gunn, in a gesture more similar to Wilfred Owen's poetic reaction to the violence and futility of 
war than to Eliot's reaction to a spiritual dearth, confronts the revelation that the body, despite 
youth and virility, is in a constant state of flux and decay.  
 "The Man with Night Sweats" articulates the anxiety felt by a man who—whether ill or 
not—recognizes and fears his body's permeability. The poem's first line begins with a blunt, 
sensual observation, demonstrating the vitality inherent even in symptoms: 
I wake up cold, I who 
Prospered through dreams of heat 
Wake to their residue, 
Sweat, and a clinging sheet. (1-4) 
 
Although "cold" is associated with death rather than life, this chill "wake[s]" the poet, rendering 
him conscious to experience his unease. In "dreams of heat," which may refer to a partner's 
body-heat, the poet has "prospered," or thrived materially—immediately, Gunn assigns value to 
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bodily pleasure, even if that pleasure is merely dreamt. Upon waking, only the "residue" of these 
valuable dreams remains. The poet doesn't tell the reader whether this remnant is material, 
psychological, or both; regardless, it appears in the same visceral catalogue as "sweat" and "a 
clinging sheet." Gunn insinuates here and elsewhere that memories, like dreams, do not merely 
mark the absence of what once existed. Memories are a material extension of bodies and their 
influence, yet another trace of Bennett's "thing-power." If "cold" is the vital yet worrisome force 
that awakens the poet, ambiguous "residue" greets him in place of the dream-companion. Poet, 
"clinging sheet," and "dreams" are wrapped up in each other, the material body dissolving 
between the brute reality of the sweaty sheet and the persistent echoes of memory. 
 After recalling the way his wounds would heal in his younger days, the poet continues 
reminiscing about his evolving relationship to his body and its boundaries: "I grew as I explored 
/ The body I could trust" may refer to the poet's own body or lovers' bodies; the line's ambiguity 
highlights the permeable boundaries between the man and his lovers (7-8). Two lines later, 
"trust" finds a foil in "risk": the poet trusts his or another's body not to be an unbreakable shield, 
but to provide pleasure in vulnerability: it is "risk" that "made robust, / A world of wonders in / 
Each challenge to the skin" (10-2). A "challenge to the skin" may refer to sexual penetration, but 
it may as easily refer to the action of any external force upon the skin, which marks at once the 
circumscription of our bodies and the locus of contact with other bodies. David Gewanter views 
the body's gradually increasing permeability in Gunn's poems as a productive "adventure" with a 
frustrating end: 
In Gunn's early poems, the self's expressions—flesh, vision, speech, imagination—reach 
outward, hesitantly, through the barricades and armor of its surface. In the 1960s, a willed 
recklessness of Gunn's poetic forms and of personal experiment begins to puncture and 
tear at these surfaces. New identities flower and die back into the self, which grows more 
ample and undefended with each adventure. In Gunn's later poems, the porous body 
becomes more fully open to passion, impulse, lust, and drug. Yet by now, the body's 
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welcomed hosts—its guests and enemies—have taken up residence in the body's lush and 
open environs. [. . .] this heralds the end of the body's adventure, as it becomes a 
necropolis. (258) 
Gewanter's quote follows an interesting pattern. He begins by referring to the armored "surface" 
of the "self," a surface which poetic experimentation helps to "puncture." Like the man in Gunn's 
title poem, this repeated puncturing allows the self to "flower" and "grow," though in growing it 
becomes even more "undefended." But when Gewanter pivots to Gunn's later poetry (including 
The Man with Night Sweats), he replaces "the self" with "the body," eliding their distinction. Far 
from an oversight, Gewanter's diction is indicative of Gunn's valuation of the material body as 
identical with the self. Even when the "skin" is broken or faces dissolution after a "challenge," 
such moments of bodily merger with other subjects allow the self to overgrow its conventional, 
illusory circumscription. 
 Gewanter helpfully elaborates Gunn's valuation of the vulnerable, permeable body. By 
calling attention to the body's transformation into a "necropolis" at the end of its "adventure," 
Gewanter reveals Gunn's treatment of the body as "both person and place" (258; 267). In Gunn's 
"Lament," the body "let you down for good, / Its blood hospitable to those guests who / Took 
over by betraying it" (115-7). Gewanter reads this transformation, though lethal, as another 
stretching of the self, the ultimate "challenge to the skin" and thus a liminal "domain of ecstasy": 
"To make a life of your dying is, truly, to achieve a kind of ecstasy; however, it does not create a 
second, mirroring self. Other things take over. [. . .] In this ecstasy, the body becomes a home 
and garden-soil courteously welcoming the virus" (267). Although Gewanter aptly notes Gunn's 
tendency to compare the dying body to a "field of combat" or occupied city, the hostile virus is 
not all that takes up residence within the self as it faces dissolution. In Gunn's poetry, 
remembered visions of his friends and himself take on an immediate presence. In what Gewanter 
calls the dying body's "ecstasy," from the Greek word ekstasis meaning "to stand beside oneself," 
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these memories don the flesh sloughed by the material self. This ecstatic mode is common in 
liminal settings: with the conventional aspects of the self suspended yet in reserve, new modes of 
the self seem to exist concurrently with old modes. For example, in Gunn's "The Reassurance," 
the lamented friend appears "fleshed out again" ten days after his death to embrace his former 
companions (Gunn 471, line 6). Although this cathartic event is possible only in "dream," the 
speaker's mental projection of his friend is not another betrayal but a significant aspect of his 
dying subjectivity:  
 And it was you, although 
 You were fleshed out again: 
 You hugged us all round then, 
 And gave your welcoming beam. (5-8, emphasis Gunn's) 
 
This brief stanza gives much insight into the mindscape of the self at the poem's center, a speaker 
who may or may not be healthy but has reason to fear for his life. The speaker's italicized 
insistence that this vision "was" his friend reinforces the apparition's material presence in the 
poem, as does his "flesh," "hug," and "welcoming beam." Notable too is Gunn's use of the first-
person-plural despite the "dream" belonging to one person: "You hugged us all round then," and 
in the prior stanza, "we saw you dead" (7, 2). This diction suggests a widening of the self beyond 
the individual as its borders stretch to accommodate not just a deceased friend, but a community 
of mourners who may or may not be living. The "welcoming beam" further blurs the speaker's 
subjective boundaries: to where are "we" (the mourners) being welcomed? Perhaps to Gewanter's 
"city of the dead," but perhaps instead to the liminal setting of memory, in which weakening 
subjectivities of the living find support from the remembered strength and compassion of the 
dead, whose identity is also at stake: 
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How like you to be kind, 
Seeking to reassure. 
And yes, how like my mind 
To make itself secure. (9-12) 
 
"[Y]es," the speaker acknowledges, this dream is his mind's attempt "To make itself secure." 
Despite this seemingly cynical response to an absent critic, the speaker attributes the vision not 
just to his "mind," but to the friend whose nature is to be kind—again, death blurs the division 
between the individual's body (including the mind emerging from that material) and that of 
others, since the friend's kindness is now intrinsic to the speaker's dreamscape. Gewanter's body-
as-place is not only a fertile ground for HIV, but also, if temporarily, a refuge for the lingering 
psychological influences of the dead. The body threatened by death does not merely become a 
necropolis, but a sanctuary, a place of final communion among equals in a liminal mindscape. 
The Body in Gunn's Liminal Dreamscapes 
Gunn often uses dreamscapes, set in the liminal state between consciousness and 
unconsciousness, to highlight his speakers' relationships to their bodies and others' bodies. In 
"Sacred Heart," placed two poems after "The Reassurance," the speaker recounts a friend's 
struggle to reconcile images of religious suffering with recent memories of his partner's painful 
demise. As in "The Reassurance," much of the poem is set within the speaker's dream, and both 
dreamscapes serve a purpose: while the former poem's dream soothes the speaker by revealing 
other bodies' lingering presences in his memory, the dream in "Sacred Heart" highlights this 
residual materiality in the dying body in order to belie the metaphysical, regenerative promise of 
Christianity. Much like "The Reassurance," this poem emphasizes sensuality in the waking and 
dreaming states. Unlike the twelve-line "Reassurance," this forty-eight-line poem's syntax and 
imagery moves between the addressee's tortuous, confused sensory input while he is awake, and 
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the sharply defined sensual images in his dream. The poem begins by describing a troubled 
sleep: 
For one who watches with too little rest 
A body rousing fitfully to its pain 
— The nerves like dull burns where the sheet has pressed — 
Subsiding to dementia yet again; (1-4) 
 
The image of this man watching a body "rousing fitfully to its pain," its nerves "like dull burns," 
is viscerally painful, yet full of ambiguity. In line 13, when the speaker first addresses "You," it 
becomes clear that the poet is remembering a man who took care of his dying companion. 
However, in the earlier lines quoted above, the "one" who "watches [. . .] A body" could refer 
either the caretaker watching his friend, or the dying friend watching his own body. By waiting 
until later in the poem to introduce second-person point of view, Gunn creates an elision of the 
two companions' bodies. This ambiguous image, perhaps of a consciousness watching its body, 
recalls Gewanter's "ecstasy" of the dying body: the body stands beside itself. The body's 
"Subsiding to dementia yet again" further destabilizes it, since its memories (including the 
attendant dream) are untrustworthy. 
 But when the poet moves into the second-person and describes the dream of the man 
(whom I'll refer to as "the watcher") caring for his friend, the imagery sharpens. In the dream it is 
Christmas, the ritual celebration of Christ's birth, but the watcher has a vision of his partner 
"crucified / In his front room, against the mantelpiece": 
Yet it was Christmas, when you went outside 
The shoppers bustled, bells rang without cease, 
You smelt a sharp excitement on the air, 
Crude itch of evergreen. But you returned 
To find him still nailed up, mute sufferer 
Lost in a trance of pain, toward whom you yearned. (15-20) 
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Instead of the winding syntax and ambiguous pronoun of the preceding lines, the speaker begins 
recounting the watcher's dream with a series of direct assertions: "Yet it was Christmas," 
"shoppers bustled," "bells rang," "You smelt." This directness is compounded by sensory 
imagery: holiday adrenaline is a "sharp" airborne scent mingled with the smell of pine, a "Crude 
itch," while bells ring "without cease." These images, disguised as banal elements of the holiday 
season, are echoes of the "dull burns" in the opening lines: memories of his dying friend's 
suffering suffuse the watcher's dreamscape without reprieve. Hence, when the watcher goes back 
inside, he finds his friend "still nailed up, mute sufferer." Although the dying man's suffering 
renders him "mute" and "Lost in a trance," the dream becomes a conduit through which the 
watcher feels and finds symbols for that pain. A liminal space—the dream—becomes a realm in 
which watcher and watched (perhaps lover and beloved) begin to merge, sharing an experience 
of suffering. Not only would this experience resist articulation outside of Gunn's poetic 
container, but it would also lack a subject to articulate it: the poet refers to the dying man's 
"death" in the past tense shortly after describing the dream (25). The merger, however, is 
incomplete. In the last line of dream before the watcher awakens, the "mute sufferer" is a body 
"toward whom [the watcher] yearned." Although the watcher can access his friend's pain in the 
dreamscape, their reunion is both mysterious and temporary; a crucifixion is hardly the "fleshed 
out" hug of "The Reassurance," though it shares its visceral quality, and the watcher must still 
wake to the reality that his friend is dead. Yearning persists. 
 So far, I have been attending to two bodies and the merging of their pain and desire 
within the dreamscape in "Sacred Heart." All of this becomes more complex, and more liminal, 
when we consider the religious implications of the watcher's friend taking Christ's place on the 
cross. The poet coyly dismisses the watcher's cognitive dissonance as he tries to make sense of a 
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dreamscape that juxtaposes the commercial bustle of "shoppers" with the religious iconography 
of the "Dying God": 
When you woke up, you could not reconcile 
The two conflicting scenes, indoors and out. 
But it was Christmas. And parochial school 
Accounted for the Dying God no doubt. (21-4) 
 
For the second time, the poet baldly states "But it was Christmas." In another ambiguous 
moment, "it was Christmas" may refer either to the date within the dream or the date on which 
the watcher awoke (or both). The preceding "But," like the former "Yet," hints at a sarcastic 
tone: of course people will go about their holiday business to commemorate the dead while the 
living suffer, the poet implies: it was Christmas. Gunn's addition of "no doubt" to the next line 
continues this undertone by asserting that a "parochial school" could simply "[account] for" the 
suffering of a mythical deity. Alternatively, this line may suggest that "parochial school" 
accounts for Christ's inclusion among the dream's symbols, the imaginative residue of a religious 
upbringing. Gunn teases out the connotations of the "Dying God," using capital letters to 
increase the ironic distance between mythical suffering and material, remembered suffering. 
 Like in "The Reassurance," the poet acknowledges the role of the watcher's 
consciousness in designing his dreamscape. But as the poem continues, the poet makes it clear 
that the religious skin which the watcher's imagination has imposed upon his dead friend's 
memory is not, as in Eliot, a gesture toward regeneration. Rather, the dream's religiosity and its 
figurative bleeding into the waking world belies the literal bleeding of material bodies. Gunn's 
treatment of religious imagery as a mask for material suffering is similar to what Woodcock calls 
the "poses" of his earlier work: temporarily inhabited, non-actualized social roles. But while 
Gunn's poses in poems such as "On the Move," in which a voyeur observes a gang of bikers, 
sublimate homosexual experience as Woodcock suggests, his use of a religious mask in "Sacred 
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Heart" has the opposite function. As evinced in the poem's second half, this mask doesn't stick to 
and obscure the poem's material bodies, but wavers in and out of the dying man's semi-cogent 
perspective: 
Now since his death you've lost the wish for sleep, 
In which you might mislay the wound of feeling: 
Drugged you drag grief from room to room and weep, 
Preserving it from closure, from a healing 
Into the novelty of glazed pink flesh. 
 
We hear you stumble vision-ward above,  
Keeping the edges open, bloody, fresh. 
 
Wound, no — the heart, His Heart, broken with love. (25-32) 
 
As in the first stanza, Gunn plays with an ambiguous pronoun. Although the lack of 
capitalization in "his death" suggests the friend has died, the line directly follows a reference to 
the "Dying God," continuing the association of Christ with the friend. The watcher avoids sleep 
for fear of "mislay[ing] the wound of feeling," or temporarily losing the painful memory of his 
friend. This memory, "grief," manifests as a physical form without definition except for "edges" 
that are "open, bloody, fresh." Line 27, "Drugged you drag grief from room to room and weep," 
disturbs the cadence of steady iambic pentameter by adding a slow triplet to the rhythm: 
"Drugged-you-drag." This rhythmic speed bump joins with the long "o" and "e" sounds in the 
repeated "room" and "weep" to add weight to the line, creating a dragging pace. The heavy, 
visceral language Gunn uses to describe "grief" renders it a wound without a body, an opening 
without an interior. Unlike Christ's mythical stigmata, traceable only to the teachings of 
"parochial school," the watcher's grief traces pain he witnessed personally, though its source no 
longer exists. To allow this grief-object to heal would be to reduce it to a "novelty," "pink flesh" 
that is "glazed" and finished like a clay urn—inert scar tissue rather than the affective memory 
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encountered in "The Reassurance." In this poem and throughout Night Sweats, Gunn affirms the 
"open, bloody, fresh" boundaries of the self, even when that self will inevitably dissolve.  
 Immediately after this affirmation of attachment to others (even if only in painful 
memory), the watcher recognizes his "wound of feeling" to be a visionary "heart, His Heart, 
broken with love." Unlike the earlier capitalization of "Dying God," which distanced myth from 
man, the capital letters here emphasize the sacred quality of the dead lover's envisioned heart to 
the watcher. The "Heart" may be Christ's, the dead lover's, or the watcher's; Gunn has 
triangulated a trinity of shared suffering. "[B]roken with love" suggests that the "open, bloody, 
fresh" boundaries the watcher has been defending are the remnants, the traces, of a love as sacred 
as Christ's. This line's rhythm—every word but "broken" is monosyllabic, and the line itself is 
broken after its second word, "no"—evokes a beating heart, a reminder of the material body even 
as the material blends with the divine. In this third phase of the poet's ritualized memory, the 
wound-without-a-body temporarily gains substance. 
 Like the ephemeral dream-image of Christ, the watcher's waking vision of a bleeding 
heart draws attention to reality's inescapability. Grief, a real yet intangible affect, has become the 
bleeding heart, an illusion that appears tangible. This crossing of sensory wires does not mark a 
return to the confusion of the first stanza. Instead, after recalling the dreamscape's moment of 
clarity, the watcher gains a new perspective on his present body. The reader hears this shift in the 
beating heart of line 32, but to the watcher, it manifests as "An unfamiliar ticking," a mechanical 
rather than biological sound (33). A vision ensues in which tangible falsehood, the hallucinated 
heart of Christ, clashes with intangible reality, the nothingness left by a lover's absence. In this 
vision, as in the prior dreamscape, the watcher's tripartite merger with his friend and Christ does 
not endure. Gunn's description of the watcher's chest as "a bright plate from an anatomy book" 
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contains ironic dissonance reminiscent the "patient etherized on a table" in the opening of Eliot's 
"Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" (35; 3). But while Eliot ironically reduces a romantic evening 
stroll to clinical language, Gunn makes the same reductive gesture toward divine vision. The 
gesture continues in the lines that follow: the heart "In its snug housing, under the transparent / 
Planes of swept muscle and the barreled bone" is the same material heart that "glows" and 
generates "holy heat" (36-8). In "The heart of hearts transplanted to your own," "heart" is no 
longer capitalized, and the clinical word "transplanted" does not suggest miraculous 
transfiguration. Nevertheless, this visionary heart loses "rich purple drops with every beat": these 
lost drops of blood are more precious to the watcher, not less, for their materiality. 
 Gunn's replacement of religious solace with material affirmation (despite the chaotic, 
ephemeral nature of material) is traceable to his modernist and war-poet ancestors. Gunn extends 
the strategies of poets like Wallace Stevens and Wilfred Owen to challenge not just religion, but 
commercialism. The final eight lines of "Sacred Heart" descend from the visionary register in a 
gesture reminiscent of the sinking pigeons in Stevens' "Sunday Morning": 
And, in the isolation of the sky,  
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make  
Ambiguous undulations as they sink,  
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. (117-20) 
 
The pigeon, a member of the dove family and an ironic, earthly substitute for a symbol of the 
Holy Spirit, sinks into unknowable "darkness," but its "wings" are "extended," signaling 
confidence if not hope. The pigeons' travel is not the sacred progress of Eliot's Four Quartets but 
the "ambiguous undulations" of Gunn's watcher, who struggles to conceptualize his friend's 
descent into death, yet adores the pain this struggle generates—the "broken heart." Gunn renders 
the end of this struggle as deadening vision rather than a descending flight. As his envisioned 
heart loses "purple drops," the watcher's "vision alters": 
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The hallucination lighted through the skin 
Begins to deaden (though still bleeding), falters, 
And hardens to its evident origin 
— A red heart from a cheap religious card, 
Too smooth, too glossy, too securely cased! (40-6) 
 
If Gunn is ambivalent toward the religious imagery in this poem, he more explicitly rejects the 
commercialization of both emotion and religion. As the glowing fusion of material and divine 
organ transforms into a greeting card, it "deaden[s]," "falters," and "hardens" into a "cheap" 
object. Its "smooth," "glossy" casing mocks the shared suffering Gunn has affirmed—it denies 
the "open, bloody, fresh" boundaries of the permeable body, much like the "shoppers" in the 
dreamscape do. This commercial representation of a heart is "still bleeding." This parenthetical 
reinforces the thread of pain that persists throughout the poem. Gunn's interjection recalls 
Wilfred Owen's use of parentheticals throughout "Maundy Thursday," another poem that 
explores the relationship between the tangible and intangible, the material and the divine. In each 
of Owen's parentheticals, the poet, who is attending a Christian service, describes what the 
physical cross means to the person kissing it: to the "men" it is "the emblem of a creed," to the 
"women" it is "the Body of Christ indeed," and to the children it is "a silver doll, immensely 
bright" (3-9). Each of these understandings is more material and less religious than the last until 
finally, the poet avoids the cross's metaphysical associations entirely by kissing "the warm live 
hand that held the thing" (14). For Owen, the hand is vital and warm, a better symbol of hope in 
a time of war than a cold, silver cross. For Gunn, who witnesses not war but the equally violent 
spread of HIV infection, vital material manifests not as a strong hand, but as a vulnerable heart 
that "falters." More so than religion, commercialism belies pain in Gunn's late twentieth-century 
United States. The watcher realizes that pain loses its transformative personal and political 
potential when it is reduced to empty, commercial sentiment. 
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 In the closing lines, the watcher meditates on the suffering the vision leaves behind: 
"Stopped in a crouch, you wearily regard / Each drop dilute into the waiting waste" (47-8). These 
lines present the watcher as a tired, immobile, possibly ill figure. His vision has left him wasted. 
The vital flow of blood from the glowing heart has become a tap left dripping "dilute into the 
waiting waste." Although it is unclear whether the watcher's vision has ended, the heart remains 
in its "cheap" commercial form. Unlike his predecessors, who leave room for regeneration if not 
religious salvation— in "Burnt Norton," Eliot laments "the sad waste time before and after" 
while affirming a transcendent, eternal present, while Stevens affirms the imagination's power to 
alter the present—Gunn embraces a crumbling, irredeemable present. 
In The Man with Night Sweats, Gunn addresses the second question posed at the 
beginning of this study: what is the nature of the self as it exists in a space between identities? In 
his dreamscapes, Gunn fuses narrator, caretaker, and remembered friend, suggesting that while 
individual subjects are temporary, the shared identity possible in memory and dream persists—
not forever, but long enough to generate meaning for those who have lost loved ones to AIDS or 
are witnessing their own bodies dissolve. Gunn's poems render each sexual act a brush with 
death, an opportunity poised between the greatest possible intimacy and the greatest possible 
loss. These repeated liminal encounters form a new body, one not limitless but with redrawn, 
more inclusive boundaries. Through the liminal dreamscapes in his poetry, Gunn provides a safe 
space for authors to communicate, and readers to access, the pain of disease and the pleasure of 
intimacy that renders every life experience worthwhile. 
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CHAPTER 5: LISTENING TO NOTHINGNESS IN E. M. FORSTER'S A PASSAGE TO 
INDIA 
“Radical limitations on knowledge presented not so much barriers to be overcome in a striving 
for mastery as a sense that what lies beyond the knowledge of what is known must be honored 
and known—if known at all—only on its own terms.” 
—Stephen Ross, "Thinking Modernist Ethics with Animals in A Passage to India" 
“They are happy out there with their savage noise, though we cannot follow them.” 
—E. M. Forster, A Passage to India 
As I observed about Conrad's novellas, the approach to what William Freedman calls 
"spots of unknowing," events that defy rational conceptualization and thus cannot be inscribed 
using everyday language, is at once tempting and dangerous. For Conrad, this flirtation with the 
threshold of dissolution allows the body to take on a new, yet still socially circumscribed, role. E. 
M. Forster's characters also approach these epistemological dead-zones, but for Forster, this 
approach cannot be adjusted at the last instant. It is either completed, no matter the risk, or it is 
futilely aborted. Forster's passage through liminal space is not a round trip, and in this way his 
liminality has more in common with Gunn's than Conrad's and Woolf's. Gunn laments but 
accepts the inevitable dissolution of the self in death; he does not try to refashion the 
conventional self as do Conrad and Woolf. Moreover, while Conrad's characters' approaches to 
the terrifying unknown are punctuated by moments of dark humor that contribute to a sense of 
fear rather than relief, Forster's approaches place terror and humor on equal footing: both are 
appropriate reactions to that which cannot be fixed in rational paradigms. As is evident in the last 
section of Passage to India (1924), "Temple," Forster's humor signals that the rational self as 
circumscribed by convention has reached—and is crossing—the threshold of an ineffable 
experience. The bodies that emerge from these experiences do not neatly reintegrate into British 
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or Anglo-Indian society. Once the novel's cross-cultural friendships are established and 
consummated, each party's understanding of itself in terms of a racialized other begins to change. 
With that change comes the permanent, cyclical muddle represented by Krishna's birth-festival: 
not the straightforward sympathy of Forster's imperative "Only connect" (the epigraph to 
Howards End), but a collective self, a combination of individuals (as in Gunn) that elides 
colonial identity and that can only exist in liminal settings. 
 Shun Yin Kiang analyzes friendship in Forster's works and the spontaneous encounters 
that occur outside the influence of "colonial machinery" (133). He notes that friendship occupies 
"the liminal space between the eventful and the uneventful" in Forster's colonial politics: 
everyday events compose friendship and contribute to relations between the British colonizers 
and Indian subjects, yet such "small-scale and context-specific" modes of interaction do not 
impact colonial norms (146). As he analyzes friendships in A Passage to India, Kiang attends 
closely to the spatial settings in which spontaneous encounters occur and friendships form. Jonah 
Corne focuses less on people and more on the spaces in which encounters between them occur, 
claiming that Forster's ruined settings "ref[use] to be assimilated into a straightforward, pastoral 
Edenic narrative" in which the concern is to regain lost wholeness (41). Instead of the typical 
modernist anguish over fragmentation, Corne locates a "queer erotic energy" in Forster's 
damaged or empty spaces, "a [responsive] range that includes anguish but is not limited to it and 
where provisional compensations and even pleasures find expression in modes of queerness" 
(27-8). I propose to bring these two views together, arguing that in Passage, relationships outside 
colonial norms become possible during shared moments in liminal spaces. Departing from 
Kiang, I suggest that such ephemera do have the potential to impact norms of the broader 
colonial narrative, since the characters emerge transformed. This is especially evident in the 
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queer erotic energy unleashed during the collision of Fielding and Aziz's boats in "Temple," a 
passage I will discuss later: though the two men cannot navigate liminal flood waters of Mau 
without plunging into the medium that surrounds them, they nevertheless form a temporary bond 
outside the bounds of the power dynamic between colonizer and colonized. 
 Stephen Ross asks the question that lies at the intersection of ethics (understood as 
relations with others) and liminal space: 
[H]ow do we engage with those aspects of alterity that are essentially other, radically 
alien, perhaps fundamentally inimical to existing epistemological frameworks? How do 
we preserve them as other, using “other” only as a placeholder for their inassimilable 
character, as a marker of the not-all that is at once in excess of the frameworks and yet 
integral to their coherence? (307) 
Ross's desire to "preserve" alterity while rendering it recognizable—to engage with radical 
difference without depriving it of what makes it different—echoes the function of liminal space 
in each artist I have explored so far: Conrad crafts liminal encounters so that his characters may 
approach illegible knowledge; Woolf's and Lynch's liminal dining settings expose shifting 
dynamics among characters without destroying them; and Gunn deploys the liminal dreamscape 
to preserve fragments of others within a self that expands to contain them. Forster partakes in a 
similar preservationist strategy, using the temporarily equalized, unconventional dynamics 
between subjects in liminal settings to plant the seeds of relationships that wouldn't otherwise be 
possible. These relationships flourish within liminal landscapes rich with nonrepresentational 
sound and comic moments that defy rational hierarchy. I will focus specifically on Forster's 
description of the Marabar caves and the Hindu festival honoring Krishna's birth at the ending of 
Passage. Both are liminal settings occupied simultaneously by Indian and Anglo-Indian 
characters, people whose conventional identities render friendship difficult (if not impossible), 
but who may find common ground in liminal settings. 
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Nothing Lurks in the Marabar Caves 
In the second segment of Passage to India, "Caves," Forster dwells on his description of 
the Marabar caves, marking them as ancient and hollow. The caves are empty of semantic 
meaning in a way that renders human activity invisible and irrelevant: 
An entrance was necessary, so mankind made one. But elsewhere, deeper in the granite, 
are there certain chambers that have no entrances? Chambers never unsealed since the 
arrival of the gods? [. . .] Nothing is inside them, they were sealed up before the creation 
of pestilence or treasure; if mankind grew curious and excavated, nothing, nothing would 
be added to the sum of good and evil. (139) 
The English characters’ visit to these caves (and the disaster that ensues) presents a literal 
threshold experience, that of entering the caves and departing the bounds of human history, and 
the figurative threshold of experiencing a leveling of cultural difference. The sign of this latter 
threshold is the persistent echo that renders speech within the caves impossible: “[w]hatever is 
said, the same monotonous noise replies [. . .] ‘Boum’ is the sound as far as the human alphabet 
can express it” (159). When language, one of humanity’s oldest institutions, loses its meaning in 
these ancient caverns, what is left to divide cultures? Unfortunately, this loss of divisive meaning 
is also a loss of fulfilling meaning, and thus the echo’s elimination of semantic meaning results 
in Mrs. Moore's disillusionment with her faith: “[r]eligion appeared, poor little talkative 
Christianity, and she knew that all its divine words from ‘Let there be light’ to ‘It is finished’ 
only amounted to ‘boum’” (161). But Forster does not allow the echo’s resonance to end with 
Mrs. Moore's death. After being accused of rape, Aziz must depend on the law, a construct of 
human language, to defend himself. However, it is ultimately sound, a persistent echo, that 
signals to Adela Quested that she must correct her story. Forster draws on the sonic, comic 
qualities of repetitive ritual to demonstrate ways that people with vastly different backgrounds 
can share ineffable experiences in the same space. 
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 Forster insists that the Marabar caves contain “nothing"; they are a liminal setting outside 
of historical concerns. This ungraspable nothingness, which would add "nothing" to "the sum of 
good and evil," reflects Heidegger's nothingness: it is more primitive than the intellectual act of 
negation itself, and unrelated to human ethical concerns such as good and evil. To one like Adela 
Quested, who has never had a radical challenge to her identity, this space is impossible to 
process. Adela has only her rational, conventionally English epistemological framework in 
which to fix experience. She may encounter Indian culture as an Other, but not, as Ross suggests, 
preserve its alterity. Faced with the overwhelming presence of nothingness, Adela is overcome 
with Heideggerian anxiety. As discussed earlier, anxiety for Heidegger is the mood in which one 
encounters nothingness. One feels unease but is unable to point to a specific source, and this 
unplaceable concern dissolves the barriers we assume to exist between bodies in our everyday 
lives: "As a whole it is so for one. All things and we ourselves sink into indifference” (101). 
After her encounter with "nothing" in the ancient cave, the confused Adela convinces herself that 
she's been physically violated by Aziz. Although she eventually recants, and Forster deliberately 
obscures the event's true circumstances, a force has been exerted on Adela. But what does force 
her, and how? Adela is forced by anxiety, which she cannot anticipate, to encounter 
nothingness—to temporarily loosen the boundaries of her identity against her will. Her confusion 
in placing the source of her violation is characteristic of Heideggerian anxiety, and this confusion 
manifests as the echo that remains with Adela until she partially resolves it: partially in the sense 
that she clears Aziz, but can still never articulate the true nature of her experience. Its true nature 
defies articulation. 
 The interiors of the Marabar Caves are spots of unknowing, liminal vacuums in which 
distinctions between bodies become meaningless. This occlusion extends both to the characters 
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and the reader. Forster does not describe Adela's experience inside the cave after she is separated 
from Aziz. Instead, he presents Aziz's perspective as he ironically flees from his alleged victim's 
offensive question: "Have you one wife or more than one?" (164). After ducking into a cave to 
regain his composure, Aziz exits and struggles to find his guest, but every cave's threshold is 
identical: 
Aziz, looking again, could not even be sure he had returned to the same group. Caves 
appeared in every direction—it seemed their original spawning place—and the orifices 
were always the same size. [. . .] When they had [shouted] for a while, the guide 
explained that to shout is useless, because a Marabar cave can hear no sound but its own. 
(165) 
By comparing them to living beings capable of "spawning," Forster portrays the caves as vital, 
though not individual. They thwart Aziz's search by forming a collective vacuum into which 
language cannot penetrate. The guide's assertion that "a Marabar cave can hear no sound but its 
own" reinforces the image of the living vacuum, since it is the caves, and nothing within them, 
that "hear." This assertion also hints at the incompatibility between individual, conventional 
subjects and immersion in borderless nothingness. If, as Forster has insisted, "nothing, nothing" 
is inside the caves, then there is nothing inside them to produce their "own" sound. When a 
tourist like Adela or Mrs. Moore enters and makes noise, their sounds become the echo that 
overwhelms them. Having crossed this threshold into nothingness, their individual voices are 
subsumed into the cave's monolithic indifference. Like Conrad's jungle in Heart of Darkness, 
which nurtures Kurtz as if it were a living (if depraved) parent, Forster's caves have agency, and 
they act upon those who cross their threshold. This experience leaves a lasting mark on both 
women, who cannot completely retreat from it. 
  This reading does not present liminal encounters as lethal, but as radically challenging to 
identity. At this late stage in his career, Forster does not shy away from the difficulties that his 
mantra, "Only connect," presents. In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Passage, Oliver 
  103 
Stallybrass notes a change in Forster's goal for the novel during the course of its writing. Forster 
initially intended Passage to be a "little bridge of sympathy between East and West," but later 
decided that this goal was naive (Forster in Stallybrass 15). As Stallybrass notes the growing 
cynicism in Forster's letters, he reveals the author's strategy for finishing his novel: focusing not 
on friendships, but on the spaces in which relationships are able to materialize. In a 12 April 
1922 diary entry, Forster claims: 
My practical experiences at Dewas have made me both cuter and stupider. I no longer 
make the emotional appeal that is necessary to call out the best from an Oriental, real or 
imaginary. The philosophic scheme of the fragment still suits me. Must try to recover my 
dormant sense of space. Earthy self-consciousness.  
In a letter to former student and long-time friend Syed Ross Masood, Forster is more explicit: "I 
think that most Indians, like most English people, are shits, and I am not interested in whether 
they sympathize with one another or not" (15). Forster does not abandon the idea of connection, 
but refines it to account for the limits and spatial circumstances of friendship between 
individuals. The "Earthy self-consciousness" he desires is evident throughout Passage, but 
especially at the novel's beginning and end. Consider the opening description of the fictional city 
of Chandrapore: 
Chandrapore was never large or beautiful, but two hundred years ago it lay on the road 
between Upper India, then imperial, and the sea, and the fine houses date from that 
period. The zest for decoration stopped in the eighteenth century, nor was it ever 
democratic. In the bazaars there is no painting and scarcely any carving. The very wood 
seems made of mud, the inhabitants of mud moving. So abased, so monotonous is 
everything that meets the eye, that when the Ganges comes down it might be expected to 
wash the excrescence back into the soil. Houses do fall, people are drowned and left 
rotting, but the general outline of the town persists, swelling here, shrinking there, like 
some low but indestructible form of life. (31) 
"Earthy self-consciousness" suggests an awareness of one's materiality as contiguous with the 
physical qualities of the setting one inhabits. The Chandrapore landscape comments on human 
relationships without introducing a single character. The city used to occupy a valuable space 
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between rigid, socialized "imperial" India and the unclaimed "sea." Each "fine" aspect is 
qualified: despite its placement, it was "never large or beautiful"; rather than romanticizing the 
Indian past, Forster points out that the "zest for decoration" that produced the "fine houses" was 
never "democratic." The former fineries arose from imperialism, a hierarchical social institution, 
and the present mud-like, nearly featureless bazaars seem to be a natural extension of the land 
that has reclaimed itself from imperial embellishment. Again, Forster recalls Conrad (and Jane 
Bennett's "thing-power") in his attribution of agency to liminal landscape: all is visually 
"monotonous" and seems composed of "mud," though the mud evolves by "swelling here, 
shrinking there"; like Bataille's base material, this land is "some low but indestructible form of 
life," "some" emphasizing its ambiguity as a uniform, monolithic being, and "indestructible" 
emphasizing its foundational nature. Forster's presentation of this in-between setting mediates 
our understanding of India's role not only as a colonized territory, but as a physical space that 
predates and will outlast the colonial institutions that oppress its population. Thrust into such 
spaces, of which the Marabar Caves are the epitome, Forster's characters face radical challenges 
to their institutionally-formed identities. These confrontations with spaces outside of the 
Lacanian symbolic order—caves "sealed up before the creation of pestilence or treasure"—leave 
characters forever changed, and not necessarily in a way that restores hierarchy and facilitates 
social mobility. 
 It is strange to imagine a situation in which Conrad is more optimistic than Forster, but 
that is my point concerning the two authors' visions of the aftermath of liminal journeys. In 
Conrad's "The Secret Sharer," the unnamed captain returns from the shadow of Koh-ring—not 
only a near-death experience but a near-annihilation experience, threatening the captain as well 
as his entire ship and crew—relatively unscathed. With Leggatt's departure, the captain is able 
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fully to inhabit his hierarchical social role as ship's captain. Similarly in Heart of Darkness, 
Kurtz dies after crossing a liminal threshold, but Marlow, having skirted Kurtz's moral and 
physical peril, goes on to many more adventures at sea. In Forster's A Passage to India, Adela 
Quested and Mrs. Moore do not fully recover from their liminal encounters, or at least they do 
not return to their previous trajectories. After her experience in the cave, Adela abruptly departs 
Aziz's Marabar picnic and drives back to Chandrapore with her friend Mrs. Derek. The reader 
discovers this through the confused speculations of the remaining party, rather than via Adela's 
perspective. Aziz recounts immediately afterward that "'We were having an interesting talk with 
our guide, then the car was seen, so she decided to go down to her friend.' Incurably inaccurate, 
he already thought that this was what had occurred. He was inaccurate because he was sensitive" 
(168). Aziz does not wish to remember Adela's offensively ignorant question about Aziz's 
number of wives. He invents an alternative narrative to mask his embarrassment for both parties, 
and Fielding accepts this narrative, worrying that Adela and Mrs. Derek have been "impolite" 
(169). This manufactured narrative signals the start of Adela's dissolution after she encounters 
the nothingness in the caves. She cannot reintegrate her individuality. From this point onward, 
Adela becomes less of a character and more a discourse; she influences the narrative most by her 
accusation against Aziz and its rippling effects. Plagued by an echo, Adela becomes an echo for 
the reader, the tangible effect of fearful prejudice on the lives of colonial subjects. When she 
amends her story and her echo finally departs, Forster does not return her to her former role as a 
character. Instead, Adela breaks off her engagement to Ronny Hyslop, and we are not to hear 
from her again. This is not necessarily a moral judgment by Forster. Rather, it is as if Adela 
cannot recover the identity she was forced to relinquish in the cave, despite (and perhaps because 
of) the lack of referent for that force.  
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 Mrs. Moore suffers a similar, albeit more literal, dissolution after her adventure in the 
Marabar Caves. She is consumed by anxiety, unable to restore a Christian epistemological 
framework that has been shattered by her encounter with nothingness. Peter Childs explains the 
source of her disappointment: 
[Mrs. Moore's] is a vision in which the inconsequentiality of human life is envisaged, as 
well as its contingency: 'Everything exists, nothing has value' [. . .] What Mrs Moore has 
sought in the cave is some intimation of salvation, which has been a subject several times 
earlier in the novel, when the question of who is to be included in and excluded from 
heaven has been conjectured upon. Forster said that salvation features in all his work, but 
decreases in importance to the point that it has almost disappeared from A Passage to 
India. (32) 
As in Gunn, the modernist impulse toward salvation recedes in the wake of war and mass 
tragedy. Salvation has not entirely disappeared, but almost. For Forster, salvation—the 
preservation of one's identity after death or some other experience of annihilation, such as an 
encounter with the Marabar's nothingness—is not guaranteed. Mrs. Moore's physical body 
wastes away after she visits the Caves, but her Christian faith has also atrophied, and she is not 
necessarily bound for a transcendent afterlife. As Childs notes, individuals are both 
inconsequential and contingent in Mrs. Moore's post-Marabar worldview. Rather than anticipate 
entrance into "Heaven, Hell, Annihilation—one or other of those large things, that huge scenic 
background of stars, fires, blue or black air," Mrs. Moore accepts that the path through life to 
death is a gradual dissolution of the self into the "monotonous noise" of "boum," the sound that 
follows her from the Caves (212). Mrs. Moore reforms her identity to accommodate "the horrors 
of the universe and its smallness," becoming like the "monotonous" animated mud of 
Chandrapore. This is evident when Adela asks Mrs. Moore to tell her the nature of the echo that 
afflicts them both: 
"If you don't know, you don't know; I can't tell you." 
"I think you're rather unkind not to say." 
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"Say, say, say," said the old lady bitterly. "As if anything can be said! I have spent my 
life in saying or in listening to sayings; I have listened too much. It is time I was left in 
peace. Not to die," she added sourly. "No doubt you expect me to die, but when I have 
seen you and Ronny married, and seen the other two and whether they want to be 
married—I'll retire then into a cave of my own." (205) 
 
Mrs. Moore's former "Christian tenderness" has transformed into something that resembles 
cynicism (204). She speaks "bitterly" and "sourly." Her disgust is not with life writ broadly, but 
with language. She is tired of both "saying" and "listening to sayings," and thus she cannot 
translate the echo, a non-saying, for Adela. Both women have been forced into an encounter with 
nothingness in the Marabar Caves; while Adela still struggles unsuccessfully to integrate her 
experience into rational institutions like language, Mrs. Moore has allowed the echo to permeate 
her understanding of reality, overriding previous paradigms such as marriage, which she will see 
through as formalities before retiring from her social role. Mrs. Moore recognizes that the 
Marabar incident is a misunderstanding which will cause Aziz to suffer, but she refuses to 
testify, for the "[g]ood, happy, small people" like Aziz "do not exist, they were a dream" (210). 
All institutions, including socially-constructed selfhood, have evaporated for Mrs. Moore, and so 
ethical conventions premised on the existence of an Other are meaningless. 
 The remainder of Mrs. Moore's individuality exists in her decision not to testify, rather 
than to participate in the legal "machinery" Adela has set in motion: "I will not help you to 
torture him for what he never did. There are different ways of evil and I prefer mine to yours," 
she says to Adela. This acknowledgment of evil marks the remainder of Mrs. Moore as such, the 
component of her identity that has not yet been subsumed into the monotonous echo. It also 
recalls Marlow's "choice of nightmares" in Conrad's Heart of Darkness: Marlow faces a choice 
between remaining loyal to the abusive, mechanical Company or to the depraved yet still-human 
Kurtz. Mrs. Moore chooses the evil of inaction over the evil of participation in the racist 
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institutions that create the conditions for situations like Aziz's. Unlike Marlow, she cannot 
reintegrate into her former institutions, and dies before reaching England: her inaction leads her 
to abandon social concerns altogether. She is similar to Kurtz, who has also crossed a liminal 
threshold and fades until his voice is his only remaining physical trace. Mrs. Moore's 
conventional values dissolve into the echo she hears, and this transformation prevents her from 
writing a letter to her children: "the universe, never comprehensible to her intellect, offered no 
repose to her soul [. . .] and she realized that she didn't want to write to her children, didn't want 
to communicate with anyone, not even with God" (161). As evinced by her failed letter and 
inability to translate the echo for Adela, Mrs. Moore cannot fully reenter the symbolic order after 
crossing the threshold past which language ceases to function. Mrs. Moore's similarity to Kurtz 
in their mutual failure to reintegrate their social roles after entering liminal spaces is significant: 
unlike Conrad's protagonists, who encounter temporary versions of themselves in liminal space 
(Kurtz for Marlow and Leggatt for the captain in "The Secret Sharer") and yet return without 
permanent alteration, Mrs. Moore has no foil for whom to serve as a cautionary tale. There is 
nothing mystical or literary about her dissolution, as Forster takes pains to show. "No one could 
romanticize the Marabar," Forster writes, "because it robbed infinity and eternity of their 
vastness, the only quality that accommodates them to mankind." The nothingness inside the 
Marabar Caves renders concepts like "infinity" and "eternity"—concepts of mathematical 
transcendence—as meaningless as the "divine words" of "poor little talkative Christianity"; all 
such language "only amounted to 'boum'" (161). To Mrs. Moore, reintegration into the English 
social order she has temporarily left holds no value, nor does remaining in India. 
 Forster treats the incident in the cave as a Conradian spot of unknowing, a liminal space 
that defies existing epistemological frameworks yet exerts force on those individuals who cross 
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its threshold. Adela herself becomes such a spot of unknowing after traversing this space and 
finding herself unable fully to reintegrate her former sense of self. But even these dark areas of 
Forster's narrative are brightened by humor. A parallel to "The Secret Sharer"'s dead scorpion in 
the inkwell appears while Fielding tries to discuss Aziz's impending trial with Professor 
Godbole, a school principal. One subject after another preempts Godbole's attention as an 
increasingly frustrated Fielding tries to discuss their imprisoned mutual friend. The "queer vague 
talk" to which I refer concerns a "Russell's viper" that an unpopular master had found "nosing 
round his classroom": "Perhaps it had crawled in of itself, but perhaps it had not" (183). The 
viper is "so poisonous" that Godbole feels obligated to hear each staff member's theory about its 
origin, but like Conrad's scorpion, this is an unanswerable question. A threat with an unknown, 
unknowable origin has "nosed" its way into a social space and rendered that space dangerous. 
This threat is dangerous because of its death-bringing poison, but also comic because of its 
juxtaposition with the novel's more pressing occluded event: the Marabar incident: "Thus when 
his mind was bursting with other troubles, and he was debating whether he should compose a 
letter of appeal to Miss Quested, he was obliged to listen to a speech which lacked both basis and 
conclusion, and floated through air" (183). Unmoored by logic, this viper may be read as the 
inscrutable force that assails Adela in the cave, or as the racialized threat Adela invents. No 
matter what it represents, its presence inspires both fear and mirth. Unlike Conrad's scorpion, 
which is comic because it is disturbingly out of place and the Mate cannot account for it, 
Forster's viper is comic because of its multiplicity of origin theories. Conrad uses the black 
inkwell as a miniature version of Koh-ring, an image of the unknown and unknowable; Forster's 
scorpion doesn't arise from a black hole, but from a muddle of theories, and this muddle contains 
Forsterian humor. Some of the implied theories of the viper's origin, such as its deliberate 
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placement by a disgruntled student, suggest malicious acts. Others suggest randomness—the 
viper may have "crawled in of itself." The endless attempts to account for it, as in Conrad's story, 
are futile. But while Conrad's scorpion defies all explanation, Forster allows the possibility of an 
explanation for his viper, perhaps even a harmless one: humor need not play into fear of the 
unknown, but rather Forster suggests we laugh at the unknown—even if it proves deadly. 
Navigating Liminal Waters 
If, as Childs claims, the Marabar caves are "presented as a claustrophobic microcosm of 
that which the human mind cannot encompass," then the festival of Krishna's birth at the novel's 
end is an opposite space that accomplishes a similar end (25). "Temple," the novel's last segment, 
maintains Forster's sense of "[e]arthy self-consciousness," but unlike "Caves," the concluding 
segment is set in a spatially open realm reminiscent of Conrad's Gulf of Siam; as smooth, liminal 
spaces, these bodies of water are characterized by shifting vectors rather than permanent lines 
and objects. This navigational difficulty results in a boating accident. Water plays an especially 
important role in the novel's spiritual conclusion. As Childs notes, water suggests "a benediction 
as it suggests spiritual renewal in Eliot's The Waste Land. In opposition to the echo, which 
remains with Adela as the dagger adhered to the rajah, the water tank is an image of blessing [. . 
.] or friendship" (199). The imagery that begins with Mrs. Moore's comparison of the water tank 
in the mosque to the universe's cyclical refreshment culminates with a "climactic immersion in 
'the great Mau tank'" during which Fielding and Aziz fail their final navigational challenge. The 
boating accident on the water in "Temple" reaffirms Forster's earlier claim about humanity's 
inability to persist without the "blessing" or "friendship" signified by water: "The annual helter-
skelter of April, when irritability and lust spread like a canker, is one of [India's] comments on 
the orderly hopes of humanity. Fish manage better: fish, as the tanks dry, wriggle into the mud 
and wait for the rains to uncake them" (Forster 215). Mrs. Moore, the catalyst for the novel's 
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water imagery and a spiritual presence in her own right, has wriggled into the mud like a fish. 
Even before the reader hears of her death, her identity has dissolved into the monotonous 
"boum," like the monotonous mud with which Forster opens the novel. Shortly before her death 
is revealed, the reader witnesses a group of Indians chanting a variation of her name: "'Esmiss 
Esmoor'" (228). Like the fragments of memories that Gunn preserves in liminal dreamscapes, 
Mrs. Moore's transition into death renders her a unifying force. The unity that Mrs. Moore's 
memory creates is not mystical, nor is it divine. It is closer to the the homogeneity suggested by 
Bataille's base material; Forster evinces this by using "monotonous" to describe both the mud of 
Chandrapore and the Marabar echo. No longer living and thus free from all conventional 
paradigms, Mrs. Moore is no longer subject to the difficulties that render friendship between 
Aziz and Fielding impossible, signified by their failed navigation through the "great Mau tank." 
 Forster begins the novel's denouement by juxtaposing the cyclical nature of India's 
seasons, with its long dry periods and monsoon seasons, with Aziz's cyclical attempt to befrtiend 
his English visitors. After treating Ralph Moore's bee stings and repeating his declaration that 
one who recognizes a friend in a stranger is "an Oriental," he thinks: "Never be friends with the 
English! Mosque, caves, mosque, caves. And here he was starting again" (306). By repeating the 
titles of the novel's first two segments as if it were a chant—similar to the earlier rendering of 
Mrs. Moore's name as a chant—Aziz highlights the monotonous nature of such cycles. Like the 
Marabar echo, the chants in "Temple" reduce all meaning to a single syllable. But unlike the 
echo, the chanting during Krishna's festival is associated with what Aziz calls "our monsoon, the 
best weather." As does Eliot before him, Forster uses water to represent spiritual fulfillment and 
salvation; and, as in Conrad, water is a liminal surface to be traversed. This set of associations 
seems paradoxical: water at once represents a journey's middle-stage and ending.  However, 
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Forster solves this paradox in a way that Eliot has already hinted at in "Little Gidding," the final 
poem of Four Quartets and a follow-up to The Waste Land's quest for spiritual renewal: 
We shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time. 
Through the unknown, remembered gate 
When the last of earth left to discover 
Is that which was the beginning; 
At the source of the longest river 
The voice of the hidden waterfall 
 
For Forster, as for Eliot, to break a cycle is to return to its beginning, but with a different 
perspective. This is exactly what liminal settings allow characters to accomplish. The "happy" 
chanting and "savage noise" underlying the rains are not simply a return of the Marabar echo, 
though the echo is contained within this noise. The water is consuming, yet welcoming: 
Was the cycle beginning again? [Aziz's] heart was too full to draw back [. . .] Once on the 
water, he became easy. One kind action was with him always a channel for another, and 
soon the torrent of his hospitality gushed forth and he began doing the honours of Mau 
and persuading himself that he understood the wild procession, which increased in lights 
and sounds as the complications of its ritual developed. There was little need to row, for 
the freshening gale blew them in the direction they desired. [. . .] The strange temporary 
life of the August flood-water bore them up and seemed as though it would last forever. 
(307). 
Here, my argument returns to where it started, yet with a difference. Conrad's Gulf of Siam, with 
its crazily arranged fishing stakes as boundaries, is a threatening space devoid of comfort. The 
captain's narrative is linear: he embarks without mastery, navigates around death, and emerges 
on the other side, secure in his conventional role as commanding officer. Forster converts the 
narrative of the navigational near-death experience from one of danger and recovery to one of 
humorous mishap and revelation. In this narrative, the water remains "temporary," but it seems 
to "last forever." Forster's liminal space is not to be traversed once, a traumatic experience to be 
endured and left behind. Instead, it is Eliot's "end of all our exploring" that is also "where we 
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started," a setting that seems temporary, but is also a space to which—as the echo insists to Miss 
and Mrs. Moore—all material inevitably returns. This hint of universal affinity, always 
underlying the narrative but not always visible, manifests vibrantly in the "wild precession" Aziz 
tries to comprehend. Forster treats the liminal self as the fully-integrated self, not devoid of its 
former identity but containing all identities. 
 The collision of Aziz's boat with the Fieldings' boat that ends this navigation, though 
violent, does not destroy the characters, nor does it end their liminal journeys. Instead of 
presenting collision with the unknown as annihilation, as does Conrad in his description of Koh-
ring as the "gate of Erebus," Forster presents it as comic, using muddle as a path to temporary 
harmony: 
[Aziz] entered the dark waters, pushing the village before him [. . .] Dark and solid, the 
little waves sipped, then a great wave washed and then English voices cried 'Take care!' 
The boats had collided with each other. 
The four outsiders flung their arms and grappled, and, with oars and pole sticking out, 
revolved like a mythical monster in the whirlwind. The worshippers howled with wrath 
or joy, as they drifted forward helplessly against the servitor. Who awaited them, his 
beautiful dark face expressionless, and as the last morsels melted on his tray it struck 
them. (309) 
Forster incants the word "dark": the "dark waters," "[d]ark and solid" waves, and the "dark face" 
of the idol—all against the backdrop of the monsoon's sheets of rain—highlight this space as a 
spot of unknowing, epistemologically opaque. Rather than rendering the space terrifying (as does 
the nothingness in the Marabar), this darkness is the ultimate connection between the English 
and Indian characters. It transforms the English "outsiders," each with a distinct identity, into a 
single "mythical" unity, a piece of India's folklore. The darkness similarly eliminates the 
distinction between the watching participants' "wrath or joy." Finally, the tray's landing on the 
struggling party can do nothing but cause the reader to laugh in amazement: a sacred object, 
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representative of divinity, has scattered melting food over the water. The material unites with the 
metaphysical. This moment in the liminal, ritualized reenactment of Krishna's birth is not devoid 
of danger—"wrath" is still possible, the collision's victims resemble a "monster," and they drift 
"helplessly"—but at his novel's end, despite his cynicism, Forster reveals the universal humor in 
liminality. To temporarily forego one's conventional role is frightening and dangerous, but it also 
enables one to elide power relations and connect with the Other over the comic revelation that all 
returns to a material foundation. All reduces to "ou-boum," a sound that is scary—yet funny. 
 Despite this cathartic climax, Aziz and Fielding are "aware that they would meet no 
more" while they chat on horseback during the novel's final scene (310). Only after all the 
English are driven from India, claims Aziz, can the two men be "friends" or, as Aziz's "half-kiss" 
implies, more (316). Ambreen Hai places the failed connection of Aziz and Fielding in the 
context of Forster's career-long focus on communication. Hai notes Forster's conclusion after his 
second trip to India that "there is no prepolitical body or psyche, that history cannot be washed 
away, that resentment, rivalry, exploitation, and mistrust are necessary components of any 
interracial exchange charged with the contexts and histories of colonialism" (155). Colonialism 
is not a spiritual burden to be lifted by poetry, as Eliot attempts in The Waste Land. It is instead a 
collection of material forces that exerts itself over both grand and personal narratives. Hai 
elaborates the nature of communication within a space influenced by colonialism: "[Passage] 
announces the failures of language and the impossibility of communication yet itself purports to 
communicate; if it cannot build a bridge to friendship, then it seeks to convey reasons for that 
failure and build a bridge toward understanding" (156). The epistemologically occluded, 
frightening, yet sometimes comic moments in A Passage to India's liminal settings generate such 
understanding. The sympathy between Aziz and Fielding may not be founded on shared rational 
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interests, but on a shared physical understanding that power and logic neither determine the 
boundaries of the self, nor do they circumscribe all relationships. But the same material forces—
the caves, the echo, and the water—-that bring the two men together also ensure that they will 
again be apart: "the horses didn't want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn't want it, sending up 
rocks through which the riders must pass single-file" (316). Like the menacing agency of 
Conrad's forest and the excessiveness of Woolf's and Lynch's food, Forster's material forces 
erupt into the narrative without cause or warning. Forster's characters take advantage of these 
moments outside of typical power structures to share intimate experiences. Though Aziz and 
Fielding may only connect for an instant, future friendship has been rendered possible, and that 
makes all the difference. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
“Through the darkness of future past 
The magician longs to see. 
One chants out between two worlds 
Fire walk with me.” 
—David Lynch, from Twin Peaks 
 
In the previous four chapters, I have meditated on the functions of literary liminal 
spaces—settings, events, and physical landscapes. Conrad, Forster, Woolf, Gunn, and Lynch are 
all modernists in their curiosity about the nature of individuality, experimentation with 
temporary, fragmented, and communal subjectivity, and concern about the threatening rise of 
technology and global war. I have argued that all of these authors use liminal spaces as staging-
grounds for the articulation of experiences that elude everyday language. My approaches to these 
artists' texts raise several more questions. Why do in-between spaces enable extraordinary 
communication? What sort of self exists in a space that is, by definition, between identities? The 
former question finds the start of an answer in Conrad, who presents the ocean as a liminal 
surface to be traversed via ship, a closed, isolated system. Only by nearing the threshold of death, 
the annihilation of this system, can the protagonist of "The Secret Sharer" inhabit his role as 
captain and relinquish his imagined or supernatural double. In Heart of Darkness Marlow 
similarly approaches Kurtz, an avatar of death who has all but left his body behind, yet returns to 
civilization. For Conrad, the interstices between worlds and ways of being present terrifying 
temptations to abandon one's conventional social identity and merge with the base material of 
one's surroundings. If braved, the thresholds of these spaces offer temporary knowledge of the 
self's permeable boundaries—thus allowing characters to share seemingly ineffable experiences. 
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Through his characters and their doppelgängers, Conrad shares the experience of isolation both 
at sea and in the heart of an inhuman wilderness. 
 The second question—concerning the nature of the liminal self, a body between 
identities—finds answers in Woolf, Lynch, and Gunn. Woolf departs from Conrad in choosing 
close quarters rather than a wide expanse as her liminal stage: the dinner table. In To the 
Lighthouse, unstable relationships are made manifest through intrusions of repulsive materiality 
into Mrs. Ramsay's orderly dinner party. As Bataille argues while describing base material, the 
material foundations of our bodies cannot be ignored, nor are they inherently inferior. Lynch 
picks up Woolf's dropped utensils in Twin Peaks, a story in which food is a subtle, driving force. 
The Hayward Supper Club hearkens back to Lighthouse in its evocation of tedious, forced social 
ritual, but Lynch goes beyond the table. The Black Lodge's demons subsist on the repulsive 
creamed corn that Donna unknowingly delivers to Mrs. Tremond (likely a demon herself), and 
the investigation into Laura Palmer's death is constantly distracted by an excessive amount of 
donuts, pie, and coffee. Woolf and Lynch highlight the inescapable materiality of the self, a 
materiality which is exposed rather than newly created in liminal space. Thom Gunn's liminal 
dreamscapes offer another portrayal of identity in liminal space: identity as memory. For Gunn, 
once the shield of the flesh has cracked and the body's boundaries begin to crumble, identity is 
no longer rigid, and intimate connection between people becomes a means of preservation as one 
self enters another. 
 E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India engages with both central questions, portraying the 
conditions under which one can express the seemingly ineffable, and also the nature of the selves 
who attempt such expression in liminal space. Foreshadowing Gunn, Forster stresses the 
importance of attempted (even failed) connection between people. He uses the chaotic setting of 
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a festival of a god's birth during a monsoon to stage a connection that has nothing to do with 
reason or social convention: a collision of boats. By highlighting chaos, emptiness, and repetitive 
sound as markers of the fictional boundaries between selves, Forster invites the reader to 
challenge these boundaries—no matter how long it takes, and how many failures there are along 
the way. Rather than focus on the nature of the singular liminal self, Forster examines the 
possibility of shared identities in liminal space, connections that could persist even after return to 
normalcy. A fear of isolation, perhaps uniquely potent in the twentieth century, runs through 
each of the texts I have engaged. But a potential for communion with others, even after the 
dissolution of the self, also persists, whether in transcendent or mundane form. 
 To end this study, I return to Twin Peaks and Lynch's cryptic poem, quoted above. The 
poem is recited by Mike, a Black Lodge spirit who used to join BOB on his killings, but has 
since retired. "Through the darkness of future past" recalls Eliot's speculation in "Burnt Norton" 
that "Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future, / And time future 
contained in time past" (1-3). Eliot concludes his poem with a lament: "Ridiculous the waste sad 
time / Stretching before and after" (177-8). The "darkness" of a future containing the past, and 
the "waste sad time" that reaches before and after the eternity Eliot seeks, are both spaces to 
traverse: interstitial, liminal spaces. For Lynch, it is a "magician" who can see through the 
darkness, one who uses the materials around her to shape her reality. The magician's identity is 
subsumed before her chant can begin, however: it is an impersonal "One" who "chants out." This 
chanting, as in Conrad's ocean, Woolf's table, Gunn's dream, and Forster's cave, takes place 
"between two worlds." Repetitive chanting loses conventional meaning, but retains meaning in 
liminal space, as the echo does for Mrs. Moore and Adela. The chant in Lynch's poem is "Fire 
walk with me." Fire in Lynch performs a similar role as water in Eliot and Forster: it purifies 
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through destruction. Eliot ends "Little Gidding," the poem that ends the cycle begun by "Burnt 
Norton," by declaring that 
All manner of thing shall be well 
When the tongues of flames are in-folded  
Into the crowned knot of fire  
And the fire and the rose are one. (259-262) 
This once again highlights a difference between Eliot and poets later in the twentieth century. 
Eliot looks forward to a transcendent realm in which "All manner of thing shall be well." 
Conrad, Woolf, and Forster face the unsettling possibility of the self's dissolving without such a 
transcendent realm to enter. Gunn and Lynch never expect such a world. Rather, they learn to 
embrace the transient world they inhabit: "Fire walk with me." Lynch's pronouncement indicates 
danger, temptation, and exploration. To cross the threshold into liminal space is to confront all of 
these possibilities, and to emerge—if at all—with shifted bodily boundaries.
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ENDNOTES 
1The feeling of unease (unheimlich) one experiences during Heidegger’s anxiety is similar to 
Freud’s concept of the uncanny (also commonly translated as unheimlich). Drawing on the 
etymology of the German word, Freud suggests that the meaning of heimlich has over time 
changed from comfortable, familiar homeliness to homeliness as that which is hidden from 
strangers; heimlich and unheimlich are no longer antonyms. For Freud, the uncanny is that which 
feels as though it was once familiar, yet now inspires dread. Among his examples of objects with 
uncanny effects are “severed limbs,” “a severed head,” “a hand detached from the arm,” and 
“feet that dance by themselves” (150). He emphasizes that uncanniness arises “when the 
boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something 
that we have until now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and 
significance of what it symbolizes” (150). Similarly, Heidegger’s anxious person is confronted 
with a more authentic experience of dasein, that person’s specific historical moment of being-in-
the-world. This new experience of one’s being is at once familiar and threatening. Thus 
Heidegger builds on the Freudian uncanny by applying it not only to the world of objects, but 
also to the embodied experience of selfhood. This sense of the defamiliarized self will be 
important for understanding the function of ritual in both Heart of Darkness and “The Secret 
Sharer.” 
2This discussion of Kurtz’ severed heads is adapted from Adam J. Engel, "Talking Heads: 
Bodiless Voices in Heart of Darkness, 'The Hollow Men,' and the First World War," Conradiana 
45.3 (2013), print. 
3Problematically, Conrad genders effective, stable signs as masculine, while unstable signs are 
feminine and partake in the darkness that obstructs language. Masculine signs (including base 
material body parts and facial hair) both attract and repulse the narrators. Feminine signs (which 
seem to include the entire bodies of women like the mate's wife, Kurtz's Congolese lover, and his 
Intended) seem only to repulse. Further research could address Conrad's use of gendered signs in 
liminal space, as well as the homoerotic tension that arises during crises such as "The Secret 
Sharer"'s bathroom incident and the groping of ears during the storm in "Typhoon." 
4Bennett's claim that all things are substantially one and formally many is similar to Bataille’s 
argument for base material. Both seem good candidates for the substance that underlies a person 
(or body) during liminal phases: neither vibrant nor base material depends on human constructs 
(reason, language, etc) for its subjectivity or raison d’être, because neither has conventional 
purpose. We can imagine vibrant and base material as occupying Deleuze and Guattari’s smooth 
space, a fluctuating web of events rather than a chain of intentional, rational actors. For my 
purposes, the important difference between Bennett’s vibrant material and Bataille’s base 
material is the ubiquity of the former. While Bataille acknowledges the base in visionary 
moments (much like Conrad), Bennett locates vibrant material as an unavoidable, sometimes 
trivial set of forces with which we are always interacting. 
5In his discussion of the black vernacular trope of the Signifying Monkey, Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
describes the Trickster as a "mediator," a disingenuous interpreter between humanity and divinity 
(687). Like the Signifying Monkey, known for "repeating and simultaneously reversing in one 
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deft, discursive act," Gersten (unwittingly?) performs suburban values to the point of reversal 
(686). The liminal space of the dinner provides a perfect platform for this performance, a 
subversive mediation between town's public veneer and the violent world within its houses' 
walls. For more on the Trickster's role in liminal space, see Gates, "'The Blackness of Blackness': 
A Critique of the Sign and the Signifying Monkey" (1983). 
6Unfortunately for Leland, the warning comes too late, and his body's attack on his identity leads 
to his suicide after he's imprisoned by Cooper. In the next chapter, I will further discuss the 
disconnect and antagonism between the body and its subject in the context of the AIDS crisis. 
7The Reagan administration was notoriously slow and misguided in responding to the AIDS 
crisis. To cite just one example, in 1987 the U. S. Senate adopted the Helms Amendment, which 
"require[d] federally funded educational material about to stress sexual abstinence and forb[ade] 
any material that 'promotes' homosexuality or drug use" (aids.gov). For a succinct history of the 
events and legislation surrounding the AIDS epidemic, see "A Timeline of HIV/AIDS" at 
https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/aids-timeline/. 
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